874.00/11–645
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: There are attached two memoranda38 of proposals for possible discussion among the Yalta powers in respect to Rumania and Bulgaria which include recommendations based on Mr. Ethridge’s reports.39 In submitting these proposals, however, we feel we must voice our conviction, which is likewise shared by Mr. Ethridge, that no settlement of these specific problems seems possible if they are treated as isolated cases. Undoubtedly Soviet preoccupation with regard to the maintenance of “friendly” regimes in both countries is part of a larger scheme for the establishment of a security zone throughout the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. It cannot be overlooked that the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops in both Rumania and Bulgaria as well as the Soviet insistence upon the maintenance of an excessive Bulgarian force provide a ready means of pressure upon Greece and Turkey to obtain whatever strategic ends Moscow may have in view. To look for the early withdrawal of Soviet troops from this area prior, to a settlement of the Straits question and further clarification of Soviet aims in respect of Greece, the Greek islands, and the Italian colonies, appears somewhat illusory.
Although a final, satisfactory adjustment of the Rumanian and Bulgarian problems may seem remote in the absence of a general [Page 408] agreement with regard to this area, it is, nevertheless, felt that we must maintain our position of adhering to the principles publicly proclaimed as the result of both the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam discussions. Since to concede a limited Soviet sphere of influence even in this area of strategic importance to the USSR might be to invite its extension to other areas, our continued reiteration of the principles that a firm and lasting peace can only be achieved if the people of the liberated areas can exercise the right of self-determination seems the only course open to us at this time.
As regards the preparation of the individual peace treaties, the maintenance of this principle may mean certain delays in resuming satisfactory relations with respect to these two countries, but in our opinion should not preclude an expression of our willingness to go ahead with the preparation and, if possible, the conclusion of peace treaties as regards the other two countries to whom settlements were promised at Potsdam, namely, Italy and Hungary.
Insofar as the latter is concerned, we believe that it would be useful to mark our recognition that elections in that country not only were conducted free from intimidation and force but also provided an opportunity for the bulk of the people to express their own free selection. In these circumstances there is every reason from the United States point of view why a peace treaty should be concluded without delay with the new Hungarian Government. The economy of this country is rapidly deteriorating to such a point that a complete breakdown is feared. Some measure of alleviation, such as might be effected through a moratorium on reparation is urgently required. An attached memorandum gives further details in this respect.40
It is recognized that the Soviet Government may be hesitant to proceed with peace negotiations as regards Italy until we, on our hand, are prepared to go forward with the Balkan discussions.
Further details in respect of Italy and Yugoslavia are contained in attached memoranda.41
- Not printed.↩
- For report on Bulgaria, dated November 6, see p. 365; for report on Rumania, dated December 7, see vol. v, p. 633.↩
- Not printed; for documentation on Hungary, see pp. 798 ff.↩
- Not printed; for documentation on concern of the United States regarding control of Venezia Giulia, see pp. 1103 ff.↩