860G.5034/7–2345: Telegram
The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt)54 to the Secretary of State
[Received July 25—7:45 p.m.]
102. I called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was most cordial and promptly entered into a discussion of various matters. On the subject of nationalization and the protection of American interests he said that “in order to satisfy the people” it would probably be necessary to nationalize what he described as “heavy industry” as well as the banks and insurance companies. He was careful to point out that the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies would be occasioned less by the pursuit of state socialism than as a result of their insolvent condition. He also added that he anticipated Parliament would provide compensation “in all appropriate cases.” Insofar as concerns American property interests in Czechoslovakia I stressed the desirability of an authorized statement that there would be no seizure or nationalization of American property and that in any general field in which the Government found it desirable to nationalize where American property rights might be affected there would be full and adequate compensation. He replied that he would bear my suggestion in mind but thought “such a statement at this time would be premature”.
On the subject of the withdrawal of Russian forces he said it was progressing steadily and that within a very few days no more than 8 or 9 small Russian divisions would be left in Czechoslovakia and that these would all be concentrated along the Czech-German frontier. He added that all Russian garrisons will have been withdrawn within the next few days and that with the exception of a few of what he described as “office units” no Russian forces would remain in the interior of the country by the end of this month. He said that a few small units which would not be combat troops would be stationed at “one or two” railroad centers or junctions to be sure that Russian railway traffic moves smoothly. He then suggested that a similar withdrawal by the American forces to the Czech frontier was desirable.55 I replied that I would refer his suggestion to Washington. In [Page 479] my opinion it is undesirable that our forces be withdrawn from the area now occupied by them as distinguished from a reduction in the number of our troops which had heretofore occupied [apparent omission] as had the opportunity as a result of its own inspection to satisfy itself that Russian forces have actually been withdrawn to the extent asserted by Fierlinger.
We then discussed general economic conditions which Fierlinger said were gradually improving. He did not deny the disastrous effect on the food ration of the population resulting from wholesale seizure by the Russians of cattle and food supplies in general. He said that one time or another during the past few months between 2 and 3 million Russian troops had been in Czechoslovakia and that while they had brought some of their own food their local seizures had seriously affected livestock conditions throughout the country. He added that with the withdrawal of all Russian forces other than approximately 90,000 along the frontier of the country he expected food conditions in Czechoslovakia would materially improve.
Insofar as concerns industry he observed that the production of consumption merchandise particularly in Bohemia and Moravia was entirely a matter of the cooperation extended by the American, British and Russian forces of occupation in Germany not only in respect of raw materials that might be available there but particularly in affording transportation to Czechoslovakia from the west and the north. He said it was most desirable that the Elbe be made navigable as quickly as possible for transportation purposes and that he hoped the American forces would heighten their bridges at once as until this was done the large [vessels?] could not use the river for navigational purposes. He said the Russians had been extremely prompt in heightening or removing such of their bridges as have been obstructing river traffic. In the close of our talk I expressed the dissatisfaction of the Department and myself with the reply received from the Russian Government in connection with the Klieforth incident. Fierlinger replied that he desired to apologize once again and said he could not understand why the Russian Embassy had not made an apology and thus disposed of the incident. I suggested that by reason of his intimate relations with the Russians it might be appropriate for him to invite the attention of the Russian Ambassador to the desirability of an apology. He said he would do so and frankly observed that he was at a loss to understand why the Russian Ambassador had not tendered Klieforth an apology on his own initiative concluding his comment with the smiling remark “but you and I know how difficult it is to extract an apology from the Russians”.
- Laurence A. Steinhardt presented his credentials to President Beneš as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on July 20, 1945.↩
- In his telegram 74, July 11, midnight, the Chargé in Czechoslovakia had reported that Prime Minister Fierlinger, in the course of an address on July 11, stated that Soviet troops were withdrawing toward the frontiers and it was therefore only logical that American troops would also soon be withdrawn behind the frontiers (860F.01/7–1145). In his telegram 75, July 12, 3 p.m., the Chargé” reported that Prime Minister Fierlinger, in numerous public utterances and activities, had taken the lead in voicing Soviet dictated policies in demanding extreme economic measures and the unilateral withdrawal of American military forces (860F.00/7–1245).↩