740.00119 E.W./10–645
Report on Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the
Treaty of Peace With Italy by an Ad Hoc Committee of the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee42
September 6, 1945
The Problem
1. To draft the military, naval, and air clauses for the Treaty of Peace
with Italy which would fulfill the general objectives stated in the
enclosure to SWNCC 155.43
[Page 1035]
Facts Bearing on the Problem
2. The fascist regime in Italy declared war against France and Great
Britain on June 10, 1940; against Russia on June 22, 1941; and against
the United States on December 11, 1941. On July 25, 1943, the fascist
regime was overthrown, and on September 3, Italy surrendered
unconditionally to the Allies.
3. From then on, the position of Italy changed rapidly, so that by the
time the long terms of the armistice were signed on September 29, 1943,
General Eisenhower wrote Marshal Badoglio that these terms were “based
upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities.
Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of
Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United
Nations.” General Eisenhower added that it was recognized that some of
the terms were obsolescent.
4. On October 13, 1943, Italy declared war against Germany and was
granted the status of cobelligerent by the Allies. Diplomatic relations
with Italy were subsequently resumed by the great powers, and on July
15, 1945, Italy also declared war against Japan. In the Potsdam
Communiqué of August 2, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and the
U.S.S.R. announced their intention of concluding peace with Italy and
supporting Italy’s application for membership in the United Nations.
5. Beginning with President Roosevelt’s and Prime Minister Churchill’s
statements44 on the granting of cobelligerency, the Italians
have been led to believe that the final peace terms for Italy would
depend upon their progress towards democracy and their contribution to
the war effort. Progress towards democracy has been made, Italian
cooperation with the Allies has always been willingly granted, and the
Potsdam Communiqué recognized Italy’s material contribution to the
defeat of Germany. Concurrently with their moral support the Allies have
assisted Italy economically with a view to preventing disease and unrest
and enhancing the Italian war effort. The underlying principle of this
policy has been to encourage and assist the development of Italy as a
friendly democratic state.
6. This policy is now to be implemented further by the conclusion of a
peace treaty with Italy. The policy and the underlying principle form
the guides for the drafting of the clauses of the treaty.
Discussion
7. See Appendix “A”.
[Page 1036]
Conclusions
Political
8. Having in mind the foregoing considerations, and taking into account
that Italy shortly is expected to assume the obligations as well as the
privileges of membership in the United Nations Organization, it is
concluded that for political reasons specific limitations with respect
to the armed forces should be omitted from the military, naval and air
clauses of the treaty. In line with economic policy, and for political
reasons, it is also concluded that no limitations on rehabilitation or
operation of Italian armament industry are necessary.
9. Given the present political alignment of Italy, and in the light of
our determined policy, it is further concluded that international
supervision of the Italian armed forces should be avoided. American
interests would therefore be best served by treaty provisions binding
Italy to the moral obligations which she will assume upon her entry into
the United Nations.
Military—Ground and Air
10. In the light of the overriding political directive, it would seem
undesirable to include restrictive military clauses unless some material
military threat to the United States or its vital strategic interests
would so require. The Committee does not find a basis for any such
material military threat in the foreseeable future. The problem of
preventing Italy from again becoming a tool in the hands of an aggressor
is one which should be dealt with as part of general security
arrangements rather than in the peace treaty with Italy.
11. Clauses in the treaty relating to the armed forces should, however,
contain the adherence of Italy to the policy of non-aggression and to
the principle of regulation of armaments. The clauses should elaborate
on this policy to the extent of setting forth in general the primarily
defensive purposes for which Italian armed forces will be organized.
12. In view of the overriding political directive referred to above, it
is considered that no clauses setting a definite ceiling on the army or
air force or imposing restriction on training, armaments and equipment
should be included. For like reasons no provisions regulating the
rehabilitation and operation of war industries are recommended.
13. In order that the United States may keep currently informed of
Italian technical developments in the military field and may be in a
position to exercise political or economic influence in giving direction
in connection with Italian rearmament, the establishment of a strong
U.S. Military Mission to Italy is recommended under arrangements which
would permit free access to Italian military and industrial
installations and facilities.
[Page 1037]
14. Demilitarization (i.e., restriction as to size and type of armaments,
limitation as to air facilities and air fields) is not recommended.
15. Administrative provisions as to repatriation of prisoners of war are
recommended for inclusion in the treaty. Provisions as to graves and
disposal of remains should be covered in a separate instrument as should
provisions continuing the rights of an occupying power for the benefit
of troops remaining in Italy during redeployment.
Naval
16. Italy’s future naval activities and naval construction should be
directed toward her internal security, the local defense of her
territories and sea routes, and the support of the United Nations.
17. Treaty stipulations which would impose on Italy retributive measures,
dismantling or apportionment for dismantling, specific restrictions on
future naval operations, building or shore activities (Including
scientific research and experimentation), and apportionment for use
among the United States, Great Britain, and U.S.S.R., would be contrary
to the interests of the United States and the political policy of its
government.
18. Treaty stipulations which would impose on Italy limited reparative
measures in favor of France, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia would be
just in principle, and would conflict neither with the interests of the
United States nor the political policy of its government.
19. Since French naval losses suffered directly at Italian hands were
small and since the French navy today is considerably more formidable
than the Italian (largely by reason of the aid we have extended the
former), Italian naval reparations to France should be of a token
nature.
20. Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia should receive relatively substantial
naval reparations confined, however, to light surface craft.
Recommendations
21. That the draft of the military, naval, and air clauses, attached
hereto as Appendix “B”, be approved for incorporation in the Treaty of
Peace with Italy.
APPENDIX “A”
Discussion
General Considerations
1. The American objective is to strengthen Italy economically and
politically so that she can withstand the forces that threaten to
sweep her into a new totalitarianism and thence into an
international political alignment diametrically opposed to American
interests.
[Page 1038]
Italian sympathies naturally and traditionally lie with the western
democracies; with proper support from them, Italy would become a
factor for stability and order in Europe, and a staunch pro-American
element on that continent. Italy’s strategic position in the
Mediterranean and American dependence upon the lines of
communication to oil supplies in the Near East are basic factors
which require, in the national interest, that the fullest
consideration be given to possible long-range effects of the
proposed treaty on relations between Italy and the United
States.
2. The Italians are essentially a peaceful people, and their
conclusive experience in World War II, from which Italy has emerged
a bankrupt and devastated country, may be counted upon to ensure
that if fairly dealt with now they will not again resort to
aggression nor permit themselves to be aligned against their
traditional Allies.
3. It is apparent from the progress of events that the imposition of
a purely punitive peace on Italy would be contrary to American
interests. It is equally apparent that there are wrongs to be
redressed, wrongs which the victims of fascist aggression have
suffered and for which Italy herself now desires to make reparation.
Once these wrongs have been remedied, American interests require
that Italy be established as a useful and prosperous state and that
advantage be taken of the desire of the Italian people for full
cooperation with the United States.
4. It is the Committee’s understanding that the draft political
clauses of the treaty will contain provisions generally as follows:
Territorial:
-
a.
- No revision of the Franco-Italian frontier.
-
b.
- No revision of the 1938 boundary between Italy and
Austria,
-
c.
- Revision of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier
approximately along the Wilson line, modified in the
North to include within Yugoslavia Slav elements up
to the 1914 frontier and in the South to permit the
retention by Italy of the Arsa coal mines.
-
d.
- Cession of the Dalmatian Island to
Yugoslavia.
-
e.
- Cession of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, who
will be required not to fortify them.
-
f.
- Italy will probably be required to place her
African possessions under trusteeship, Italy to be
made trustee. An exception will be the southern part
of Eritrea, including the port of Assab, which it is
proposed shall be ceded to Ethiopia.
Economic
-
a.
- Reparations from Italy to be limited to one-time
removal of capital industrial equipment, devoted to war
purposes, which have no peace-time utility.
-
b.
- Italian reparations from Germany to be met from German
assets in Italy.45
-
c.
- War claims against Italy to be met only from Italian
assets within the Territory of countries presenting such
claims.
-
d.
- Italian merchant vessels, cable facilities, et cetera,
to be retained by Italy.
-
e.
- No restrictions to be placed on Italian
industry.
5. Certain basic military and naval considerations may be summarized
as follows:
-
a.
- The nature of the Italian people is neither warlike nor
aggressive and the experience of Italy in this war has
probably served to stamp out what martial spirit may have
existed. It is hardly conceivable that the Italian people,
unless subjected to aggressive foreign influence, would
again permit themselves to be involved in a war of
aggression.
-
b.
- The Italian economy has always been grossly inadequate to
support a modern war. As a result of the destruction and
general disruption of her economic life in this war, the
Italian economy, without foreign support, would not be in a
position to support any significant program of rearmament.
That economy will be controlled by those who supply the
basic materials which Italy has always lacked and of which
she is now critically short. Since the United States is now
and is likely to continue to be the major source, it will be
in a position to influence the direction which the
rehabilitation of Italian economy will take.
6. From the foregoing general considerations, the conclusion seems
inescapable that for the foreseeable future, Italy, taken by
herself, can not put herself into a position to threaten the vital
interests of the United States in a military way. As in the past,
Italy’s military potential would seem to lie solely in her utility
to another power or combination of powers. This utility arises more
from her geography than from her military potential in men or
resources.
7. It follows that the military clauses of the treaty should be
considered more from the standpoint of the general arrangements for
security and control of the European and Mediterranean areas than
from the narrow standpoint of any possible threat by Italy herself.
These arrangements will presumably be created under the United
Nations charter.
Military—Grotmd and Air
- 8.
- It is assumed that the military clauses are not to be
retributive in character. The condition of Italy today offers
sufficient object lesson to the Italians and to others that war
does to pay. Accordingly, the test of the necessity of military
clauses of a restrictive nature is that of the military risk
presented. Moreover in view of the overriding political
directive which has determined the U.S. approach to the Italian
problem generally and against which the proposed treaty
provisions must be considered, it is assumed that it will be
politically
[Page 1040]
undesirable to include restrictive military clauses unless the
military threat to some vital interest of the United States is
material and one which the inclusion of restrictive clauses in
the treaty would eliminate or diminish.
- 9.
- Restrictive clauses are for present purposes taken to include
(a) limitations on the future size,
composition, and armament of the ground and air force, (b) limitations on war industries and
production of armaments, and (c)
provisions for demilitarization of certain areas.
- 10.
- From the short range standpoint, that is, for a period up to
five years, it is concluded that Italy by itself can present no
material threat. The basic consideration is the present
condition of the country, already referred to. Italy is now, and
will for some time be, completely reliant on substantial outside
support to hold its economy together and offers no prospect of
establishing any significant war potential. The present military
establishment dates from the armistice when the Allies undertook
to train, rearm, and re-establish a few units from the remnants
of the badly disorganized and demoralized Italian army. The
Italian ground force and air force are, therefore, almost wholly
dependent on Allied military support and also to a great extent
upon Allied administration for continued maintenance. It is not
within the realm of probability, even should there be a rapid
political realignment, that Italy can offer any material short
term threat to U.S. interests.
- 11.
- Italy in concert with another power or group of powers
presents, of course, a different picture. Access by another
power to Italian bases primarily and the incidental use of
Italian men and material has accounted for whatever military
part Italy has played in both wars. There is no doubt that the
Italian mainland in the hands of any Great power would present a
threat to U.S. strategic interests, particularly the line of
communication to the Near East outlets of the Saudi-Arabian oil
fields. However, such a threat could certainly not be
eliminated, and it is believed would be very little lessened by
provisions in the present treaty placing restrictions on the
Italian armed forces. Reliance by Russia or another power would
primarily be on its own forces. Treaty limitations on the
Italian army and air forces, if effective and observed, would
have little or no bearing on the use to which the strategic
locations in Italy might be put. Finally the problem of
protecting our interests against a combination to which Italy
might be a party is much broader than the treaty with Italy and
should be dealt with through other means.
- 12.
- In this connection, possible demilitarization of certain areas
should be mentioned. Demilitarization is taken to mean
limitation upon the size and specifications of arms and armament
in a particular
[Page 1041]
area
and limitation on size of and facilities installed at air fields
within the area. Demilitarization of Sicily, Sardinia, and the
smaller islands has been proposed by the British. The strategic
purpose of demilitarization would be, of course, to prevent
closing the straits and cutting the lines of communication
through the Mediterranean. While limitations of this sort would
undoubtedly have some effect in making less easy the use of
these areas by another power, it is doubted that such measures
would be of sufficient practical value to warrant inclusion
here. Our experience in these areas indicates that without
prepared bases these islands can be readily utilized by any
power with mobile equipment and forces adapted for the purpose.
More important though is the fact that interdiction of the sea
passages could be achieved by present types of aircraft and by
long range projectiles without use of these bases.
- 13.
- Long range aspects of the military threat offered by Italy,
either by itself or in concert with other powers, present the
same series of considerations, although their implications
become more difficult to appraise. Because of the greater
uncertainties the risks are greater. However it becomes in
proportion more difficult and less realistic to attempt to meet
these remote conditions in the drafting of the present
treaty.
- 14.
- Take first long term limitation on the ground and air forces.
Limitations in the past have been directed principally at (a) overall numbers, (b) composition and distribution, (c) training, and (d) armament
and equipment. It is obviously impracticable at this time to set
up fixed and final schedules which will govern the ceiling and
armament of the Italian army for an indefinite future or even
for a limited period of, say, 10 to 20 years. The rapid
developments in types of equipment would make any such tables
obsolete practically before they became effective.
- 15.
- The need for flexibility and adaptation to changing conditions
would therefore make necessary some agency or commission set up
and acting under the treaty, such as the various disarmament and
armistice commissions under the treaties of the last war.
Theoretically such a commission should be effective to fix
standards and regulate the level of armaments in the light of
changing conditions. Actually they have not operated
successfully in the past and in the particular conditions
presented here would involve a number of complications. First,
any commission would be inter-Allied which would place the
Russians in a position of equality with the U.S. and U.K. and
would in all probability bring in the Yugoslavs. The political
disadvantages are obvious. From the U.S. military standpoint it
is not thought desirable to place the Russians on a footing of
equality or to give
[Page 1042]
them in effect the rights the U.S. and British now enjoy by
reason of their military effort in Italy.
- 16.
- Long term limitations on war industries and production of
armaments seem similarly unrealistic, subject to the following
comment. One of the few respects in which Italy might become a
military factor is through development of new weapons. Italy’s
scientists, particularly in the electrical and aeronautical
fields, have always been advanced.
- 17.
- Regulation of Italian scientific experiment for war purposes
by an inter-Allied commission does not seem either practical or
desirable for the reasons stated above. But if a strong U.S.
military mission were established under bilateral agreement with
the Italian government, the results of experiments along lines
of particular interest to us would undoubtedly be observed and
the benefits obtained, at least so long as reasonably close
political relations exist. Even if such relations did not exist,
it is believed that the fundamental weakness in the Italian
economy would for an indefinite period place a limit on any far
reaching development of new war implements or weapons.
- 18.
- A final and important factor in weighing the implications of
long term military clauses is the creation of the United Nations
organization. Questions of regional security are to be regulated
by this body. It is also specifically contemplated that it will
develop a general system for the regulation of armaments. While
the effectiveness of this machinery is still to be determined,
it undoubtedly offers a more workable long term means of
adjusting the Italian military establishment to the needs of its
security and our own interests than the proposed instrument. It
is therefore concluded that the military clauses should refer to
the United Nations organization and should commit Italy to the
policies of non-aggression and to the principle of regulation of
armaments set forth in the charter. In the direction of
implementing the principle of arms regulation, Italy should also
agree that it will develop its armaments program and policies
along lines primarily defensive in nature and that its armed
forces will be only such as are appropriate for internal
security, guarding its frontier against acts of aggression, and
policing its colonies and trust territories.
- 19.
- As a practical measure of assisting the Italian Government in
the reorganization of its military establishment, it is
recommended that a strong U.S. military mission be established
by bi-lateral agreement with Italy. Such a mission would be
particularly desirable in view of the non-restrictive nature of
the draft military clauses and would offer a practical safeguard
to the U.S. against certain contingencies
[Page 1043]
mentioned above. This agreement
would be sufficiently-broad to give the mission rights of
inspection and investigation of military research and
experimentation.
- 20.
- It is recommended that administrative provisions as to
prisoners of war be included in the treaty. Provisions as to
graves and war dead should be covered in a separate instrument
as should provisions continuing the rights of an occupying power
for the benefit of troops remaining in Italy during redeployment
and the occupation of Germany and Austria. The latter should be
negotiated and executed at the military level.
Naval
- 21.
- It is believed that future Italian naval activities and
construction should be generally related to the moral
obligations which will he placed upon Italy upon her entry into
the United Nations, and the protection which membership in that
organization will afford her.
- 22.
- The imposition of specific restrictions on future Italian
naval operations, naval building, or naval shore activities
(including scientific research and experimentation) would hardly
be compatible with the cultivation of a friendly Italy, lending
strength and giving position to the western democracies in the
central and eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, such specific
restrictions would not be in accord with our political policies
toward Italy.
- 23.
- The omission of specific restrictions on Italian naval
activities and naval construction would not be inconsistent with
the assumption by Italy of moral obligations, arising from her
membership in the United Nations, in respect to the future
activities and size of the Italian Navy.
- 24.
- It is considered that the only objective justification for
retributive action in respect to the Italian Navy would be the
possible exemplary and deterrent effect upon other secondary or
minor powers contemplating war in the future. It is thought that
there is no sound basis, in either history or reason, for
presuming that such action would have this effect. Furthermore,
retributive action would serve to impair the accepted political
policy of encouraging and assisting the development of Italy as
a friendly democratic state.
- 25.
- Since retributive action is discarded, apportionment for dismantling of all or part of the
Italian Navy could only have meaning as a measure intended to
effect the distribution of post-war naval power in the
Mediterranean. The significance of such a measure would be,
primarily, the reduction of the strength of the Italian Navy in
relation to the French and Russian navies, the lessening of the
facilities available to Italy’s allies in time of war, and the
weakening
[Page 1044]
of our
prospective friend in southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean.
Also, such apportionment would not conduce to strengthen the
political policy.
- 26.
- All evidence indicates that there is no outstanding commitment
to Russia to transfer outright to her one-third of the Italian
fleet and merchant marine. The commitment which did exist was to
assign to Russia one-third of the
fleet and merchant marine for employment in the war against
Germany, without prejudice to ultimate disposition. That
commitment has been liquidated by events.
- 27.
- It is considered that, in principle, reparative action in the
form of apportionment for use of a part of the Italian fleet is
justified and, within limitations, would not be counter to our
national interests or our political policy.
- 28.
- It is assumed that the United States and Great Britain could
employ none of the ships of the Italian fleet and consequently
wish none for their own use. It is likely, however, that the
Russians could employ Italian naval vessels. Therefore, the
effect of apportionment for use among these nations would be to
add nothing to the United States or British navies but to
strengthen the Russian navy, particularly in respect to the
Balkan nations.
- 29.
- It is believed that Italy’s Mediterranean neighbors (France,
Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia) which suffered naval losses at
her hands are entitled to naval reparations in the form of
apportionment for use. It is further believed that such
reparations are unavoidable.
- 30.
-
France.
- Losses suffered by direct Italian
action were only one (1) destroyer and two (2) submarines (this
excludes those vessels surrendered to Axis by Vichy Admiral at
Bizerte; and those scuttled by French at Toulon to avoid German
seizure, raised, and incorporated in Italian navy).
- 31.
-
Greece and Albania.
-
a.
- A distinction can be drawn between the naval losses
suffered by these countries and those of France and
Yugoslavia because aggression against Greece and Albania
was initiated by Italy.
-
b.
- Losses suffered by direct
Italian naval action were small; Greece—1 old light
cruiser, 1 submarine; Albania—1 gunboat. By subsequent
German action, however, Greece lost 1 coast defense
battleship, 2 submarines, 4 destroyers, 1 old destroyer,
11 old torpedo boats, 10 old coastal minelayers.
- 32.
-
Yugoslavia.
- Although aggression against Yugoslavia was initiated by
Germany, the Italians captured or destroyed 4 destroyers, 5 old
torpedo boats, 3 submarines.
- 33.
- Attached hereto as Appendix “C”46 is a tabular summary of Italian
combatant ships by types and present operational status on the
basis of the best information available here. This summary
indicates the sorry condition of the Italian navy; furthermore,
even the few recently built ships classified as fully
operational are definitely inferior by our modern standards.
This table also reflects the apportionment of Italian ships to
France, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia proposed in the naval
clauses of the Treaty, and the effect of such apportionment on
the respective navies.
APPENDIX “B”
[Extract]
Part IV. Military, Naval
and Air Clauses
Article 13
Italy hereby declares its attachment to the principles, set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations, that international disputes shall
be settled by peaceful means in such manner that international
peace, security, and justice are not endangered, and that force
shall not be threatened or used against the territorial integrity or
independence of any state. Italy also recognizes the overriding
necessity, in the interest of the early rehabilitation of the
devastated areas of Europe, that there be a minimum diversion of
manpower and economic resources to armed forces and to armaments.
Italy accordingly subscribes to the principle of the regulation of
armaments and proposes to rely primarily for its security upon the
arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security
provided under the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 14
For the purpose of regulating the level of its armaments until the
general system for the regulation of armaments to be formulated
under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations becomes
operative, Italy agrees that its armed forces shall be established
for the purposes, primarily defensive in character, specified in
Article 15. The size, distribution, training, armament, and
equipment for its armed forces shall be such as are appropriate for
these purposes. Italy undertakes to direct her future production of
armaments to the provision of the armed forces required for the
purposes set forth in Article 15.
[Page 1046]
Article 15
- 1.
- Italy undertakes to direct the future activities of her ground
forces to (a) maintaining internal
security, (b) guarding the frontiers of
Italy against acts of local aggression, (c) maintaining order and security in Italian colonies
and trust territories, and (d) to the
support of the United Nations.
- 2.
- Italy undertakes to direct the future activities of her naval
forces to (a) the internal security of
her metropolitan area and that of her colonies or trust
territories, (b) the guarding against
local aggression of her sea frontiers and the sea routes to her
colonies or trust territories, and (c)
the support of the United Nations.
- 3.
- Italy undertakes to direct the future activities of her air
force to the purposes of (a) employment
in air defense and in coordination with the ground forces in
pursuance of any of the purposes specified in Article 15, (b) furnishing military air transport of a
type and on a scale in keeping with the size and composition of
the Italian armed forces, (c) maintaining
air communication with Italian colonies and trust territories,
and (d) to the support of the United
Nations.
Article 15–A
Transfer of Italian Warships
- 1.
- Italy will transfer ships of her navy to France, Greece,
Albania and Yugoslavia as follows:
-
a.
-
To France:
- One destroyer of the Artigliere class.
- The submarines Atropo
and Zoea.
-
b.
-
To Greece:
- One light cruiser of the Regolo class.
- Four torpedo boats of the Partenope class.
- Three escort vessels (corvettes) of the Ape class.
- Five motor torpedo boats of the 1943
class.
- Three anti-submarine motor boats
(V.A.S.).
- Three medium tugs.
-
c.
-
To Albania:
- One torpedo boat of the Sirio class.
-
d.
-
To Yugoslavia:
- Four destroyer escorts of the improved Orsa class.
- Three escort vessels (corvettes) of the Ape class.
- Five motor torpedo boats of the 1943
class.
- Two coastal minesweeper of the R.D.
class.
- Three anti-submarine motor torpedo boats
(V.A.S.).
- Three medium tugs.
- 2.
- All of the foregoing ships will be transferred in good
operating condition, and having on board:
-
a.
- Full armament and other equipment as designed or as
existing, at the election of the transferee
country.
-
b.
- Full ammunition allowances.
-
c.
- One year’s normal supply of spare parts.
-
d.
- Fuel sufficient for passage to the nearest port in the
transferee country.
. . . . . . .
