740.00119 Council/9–845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

7744. For the Secretary. Urtel Delsec 4 Sept. 7. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee report on draft military and naval clauses of Ital treaty has already been forwarded by air mail to London. This report gives reasons for conclusion that no numerical ceilings should be placed on Ital armed forces in treaty; it was prepared following full discussions between State, War and Navy representatives during which it developed that only Army Air Forces favored numerical ceilings, whereas Navy was strongly opposed and Army Ground Forces inclined to Navy view. Dept disapproved fixed numerical ceilings on basis that Ital economy provided effective limitation of armed strength for period during which it might be possible to enforce such ceilings, that Ital armed forces could be made effective only through outside assistance (which U. S. Army desires to extend through proposed U. S. Military Mission to Italy), and that it was desirable if possible to avoid international supervision of Ital armed [Page 1051] forces since such supervision would negate influence and indirect control to be exercised through proposed American Military Mission. Recommendations of SACMED and other Allied officials in Italy were also considered in discussion of draft clauses.

SWNCC report gives strength of Ital Navy, after proposed transfers to France, Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, as follows:

Fully Operational Requiring Overhaul and Repairs Sunk, Possibly Salvageable
Battleships 1 5 1
Large cruisers 0 1 3
Small cruisers 1 9 4
Destroyers 4 5 5
Submarines 1 29 8

In addition, there are miscellaneous minor craft in varying stages of repair.

Report contemplated that these remaining units would be left to Italy, as Navy representative states that majority are of little use to anyone, including Italy, it being estimated for example that $25,000,000 each would be required to place battleships in first class condition. Report also contemplated that no units would be transferred to USSR, as info available to Navy indicated transfer as discussed at Moscow and Tehran56 was intended for war purposes rather than definitive transfer and this view was confirmed by President Roosevelt’s statement at his press conference on March 3, 1944.

War and Navy have been asked to assist immediately in drafting alternative clauses as requested.

Acheson