860C.01/6–1745: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 17—5:10 p.m.]
2136. Polco. Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk arrived Saturday15 afternoon in time for reception given by Molotov to all of the Polish delegates. The cordiality with which the members of the different groups met each other was significant and the informal conversations indicated that they all realized the vital importance of the conference coming to a successful conclusion. The four Poles from within Poland, including the two named by Molotov, showed an almost emotional desire to see broader representation in the new Govt. Rzymowski,16 Warsaw Foreign Minister was also present.
I had a long talk with Bierut and as a result invited him and Morawski to lunch today. They both showed a keen desire to get American [Page 347] cooperation and support both moral and economic in the stupendous job they have in reconstructing life in Poland. Although they would not admit that the people in Poland were not back of the Warsaw regime, Bierut made it plain that they were ready to compromise in bringing into the Govt new personalities to satisfy American opinion.
They showed considerable suspicion of the British, principally because they evidently consider the association with the London Govt is close and that the British support the terrorist activities of the London Govt agents which have continued up till the present. They stated however that the Warsaw Govt recently had offered an amnesty to Partisans who would lay down their arms and as a result the London Govt had published throughout Poland an order to the underground to do so. Bierut also said that the American Army was interposing no difficulty to Poles who wished to come back to Poland whereas the British Army was obstructing.
Bierut said that it was their policy not to prosecute those who had different political views as long as they did not participate in subversive activities. He explained that it had been agreed that during military operations the NKVD would operate in protection of the rear of the Red Army but now that hostilities had ceased the Soviet Govt would shortly terminate this agreement.
In response to my offer to answer any question that Bierut might have, he asked our attitude towards the Polish claims to the Oder-Neisse Line. I told him that we were committed to compensation to Poland by incorporation of part of East Prussia and also territory to the west, but that we had been surprised that their demands had gone beyond the Oder line. We considered that this question should be settled in connection [with the peace]17 although it might be discussed at the forthcoming Berlin meeting. He asked permission to show me the maps and data supporting their claims, to which I agreed.
He then asked whether we were prepared to give Poland economic aid and emphasized the importance of this to Poland. I told him that UNRRA18 and the Red Cross were prepared to give relief and that either through the World Bank or, if legislation were obtained, through the Export and Import Bank,19 we were sympathetically disposed to assist. Bierut spoke of the desirability of a commercial treaty which would allow development of trade in both directions [Page 348] in order to give Poland an opportunity to buy American products she so vitally needed.
He showed interest in our attitude on restitution and reparations and mentioned that in 1939 Poland had had 40,000 motor vehicles whereas since the Germans had taken most of them away there were only 3,000 left. He spoke optimistically about the future increase in agricultural production that would come from the land reforms but emphasized the difficulty of reestablishing production in the areas in the Vistula Valley which had been fought over and were still heavily mined, and the present shortage of meat, fats and transport.
He also expressed a desire for American technical experts to assist in reestablishing and expanding Polish industry.
As to the consultations, I expressed the hope that the Poles would agree on a settlement among themselves. He said that this was also his hope and that he had called a meeting of all the Poles this afternoon to begin the conversations.
We discussed UNRRA and the Red Cross, covered in separate cables.20
They remained some 3 hours, appeared to be grateful for the opportunity to have a frank talk, and seemed to appreciate my invitation to come again when other questions develop which they would like to discuss.
I will see Mik and Stanczyk tonight at dinner at the Brit Ambs and hope to see the 4 Poles from within Poland tomorrow. I thought it best tactically to talk to Bierut and Morawski first.
Lieutenant Tonesk21 was extremely helpful in the manner in which he handled the interpreting.
- June 16. According to telegram No. 6096, June 16, 1 p.m., from London, Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk left London at about 7 a.m., June 16 (860C.01/6–1645).↩
- Wincenty Rzymowski, who became Foreign Minister on May 2 when Premier Osubka-Morawski relinquished that post.↩
- Bracketed insertion on basis of copy of telegram in Moscow Embassy files.↩
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. For documentation regarding the participation by the United States in the work of UNRRA, see vol. ii, pp. 958 ff.↩
- The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was approved on July 31, 1945, increasing the lending authority of the Bank, and for other purposes (59 Stat. 526).↩
- In telegram 2161, June 19, 6 p.m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported his conversation with President Bierut of June 17 as it touched upon the subject of Red Cross aid to Poland; the Ambassador had stated that the continuation of the relief program to Poland was dependent on the admission of Red Cross representatives to Poland and urged President Bierut to reconsider the Polish Government’s policy of refusing entry permits to Red Cross representatives (811.142/6–1945).↩
- Lt. William J. Tonesk, U. S. Navy, aide and interpreter to Ambassador Harriman in the sessions of the Three Power Commission on Poland.↩