860C.01/6–2345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 24—2:20 a.m.]
2239. Polco. At the final meeting of the Commission last night I presided. The communiqué was first considered and agreed to as subsequently released. Kolodziejski was dropped from the list of new Ministers as he has declined to serve for personal reasons. Bierut, supported by Mikolajczyk and the other Poles, argued for the elimination of “Provisional” in the title of the new Govt since this would add to the prestige and effectiveness of the Govt. As this subject had been discussed between myself and Vyshinski in the afternoon and he had agreed to the retention of the word, I assumed Soviet support and [Page 358] stated that the title of the Govt had been decided upon at Yalta by the three Heads of Govt after thorough consideration. In spite of my agreement with Vyshinski, Molotov supported Bierut. He admitted that my position was literally in accordance with the Crimea decision, but suggested that the 3 Govts might be consulted on this point. As to the Soviet Govt he said there was no objection to dropping the word. Clark Kerr supported my position, but agreed to refer the question to his Govt. He pointed out, however, that this would cause a delay of 24 hours. I then stated that because of the difference in time between Moscow and the US it would be impossible for me to obtain an answer under 48 hours at best. Thereupon Molotov withdrew his suggestion. I asked Bierut whether the Poles accepted the title as laid down in the Crimea decision. He agreed but proposed that the new Govt when organized should approach the three Govts with the proposal that the word “Provisional” be eliminated. Molotov agreed. I did not oppose this but explained that the Crimea decision would not be fulfilled until free elections had taken place to establish a permanent Govt and indicated that I did not wish to hold out any hope that my Govt would view with favor a change from the decision of President Roosevelt on this question. I asked Bierut whether he agreed that the word “Provisional” would not be changed without the approval of the British and American Govts. Bierut answered in the affirmative.
It was agreed that the Polish text of the agreement would be the official text for the Poles to use among themselves in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the translation.
I then asked my colleagues whether they accepted the agreement reached among the Poles. Molotov expressed full agreement. Clark Kerr said he had received instructions from his Govt to accept the settlement but that in extending approval Mr. Churchill washed to point out that the British Govt was not committed to recognize the new Govt until satisfied that it had been “properly formed” in conformity with the first two paragraphs of the Crimea decision. In the view of the Brit Govt this included formal acceptance by the new Govt of pledge to hold free and unfettered elections etc., (following the wording of the Crimea decision). Clark Kerr then referred to the assurances that Bierut had given me last night that the new Govt accepted the undertaking to hold free elections as provided but asked for a definite pledge. Thereupon followed an argument between Clark Kerr, Molotov and Bierut, the latter showing some irritation at the lack of confidence of the British. Clark Kerr backed down and simply asked Bierut whether he accepted the Crimea decision on this point. When he obtained an affirmative answer he stated that [Page 359] the Brit Govt accepted the settlement and would recognize the new Govt. He said he was completely satisfied with Bierut’s statement and assured him that the Brit Govt would extend recognition.
I stated that I accepted the settlement as a member of the Commission; that I had not yet heard from my Govt but that my Govt was committed to the Crimea decision and when the new Govt was formed as therein provided my Govt would carry out its undertakings.
I said that there were some statements made at the previous meeting by the Poles in regard to supplementary understandings which had been reached but which I had found were not included in the written statement and I wished clarification of these understandings in order that I might accurately report them to my Govt. I referred specifically to Bierut’s statement the preceding night in regard to the National Council and asked whether I was correct in my understanding that the membership of the National Council would be broadened on the same democratic basis as the Govt. Bierut referred to the additional members of the Presidium as stated in the written agreement. I inquired further regarding the membership of the Council itself. Thereupon Molotov interrupted and he [we?] had a long argument as to whether it was appropriate to inquire into the private affairs of the Polish Govt. I maintained my position that it was quite proper for my Govt to be fully informed concerning all the agreements that had been reached among the Poles. Mikolajczyk said that he thought the Poles had nothing to hide and that it was a question which should be discussed inasmuch as the National Council was the supreme authority of the Polish Govt. Bierut thereupon confirmed and amplified his statement of the night before, explaining that there were now only 140 members of the Council and that its base would be broadened through the local councils in order to bring in wider representation from groups not now represented, that all of the conferees in Moscow would be invited to join the Council and that the question would be given further consideration on their return to Warsaw.
I then asked what the understanding was in regard to Under-Ministerial posts. Molotov again interrupted and said that he did not see why we should pry into the business of the Poles as this question had not been previously raised and that he was thoroughly satisfied. (I had raised this question as I had been informed by Mikolajczyk that Bierut had agreed to a proportional distribution of the Under-Ministerial posts but that Bierut had failed to report this at the previous meeting.) I pressed Bierut for a reply to my question. Bierut did not reply directly but stated that there was work enough in Poland for all competent men and that they would bring in all democratic elements that would contribute to the competence of the Govt, but that [Page 360] appointments should be based on individual ability rather than party affiliation. This was a democratic principle. Mikolajczyk agreed generally but pointed out that in democratic govts recognition was given to the relative popular strength of the different parties and that this principle should also be recognized. Bierut rejoined that their agreement to work together was firm and that he was sure they could settle this question among themselves without Allied interference.
I stated that I wished to make myself clear—that I had asked these questions in order that my Govt might understand fully the agreement that had been reached among the Poles themselves and the manner in which they intended to attain the unity which was our common objective.
The meeting closed with expressions of mutual thanks and confidence in the settlement that had been reached. After the meeting I entertained all participants at the Embassy.
I believe that the discussion about the supplementary understandings, although Molotov objected to it, was useful. After the meeting I was profusely thanked by almost everyone of the outside Poles. They expressed the belief that it would assist them in obtaining a fair interpretation of the verbal understandings that had been reached.
Molotov’s remarks unfortunately give us a clue that he may resist the carrying out of the understanding reached at Yalta that our Govts would continue to interest themselves in developments in Poland through our respective Ambassadors in Warsaw. I feel that it is of the utmost importance that our Ambassador reach Warsaw at as early a date as possible after the formation of the new Govt. I believe further that it is of real importance that I see him personally prior to his arrival in Warsaw in order that I can give him a detailed account of the discussions here.
Bierut and his associates have made it clear in private conversations with me that they desire and need American moral and economic support and are ready to establish closer and franker relations than Molotov appears at present to wish. The other Polish leaders from within Poland for their part have made it plain that their only hope of attaining independence and reasonable personal freedom is if the Brit and American Govts continue to interest themselves in the implementation of the agreements reached.
Sent to Dept, rptd to London for Schoenfeld as 317.
[For documentation regarding the Polish Government and elections, the liquidation of the affairs of the Polish Government in Exile [Page 361] in London, and Poland’s frontiers and areas of Polish administration in occupied Germany, particularly during the period of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), volume I, pages 714–784, and volume II, pages 1104–1153. For the minutes and other records of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference, July 16–August 2, 1945, between President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill (later Prime Minister Attlee), with their advisers, see ibid., volume II, pages 31–606, passim. For the decisions with regard to Poland in the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, signed by President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Attlee on August 1, 1945, see ibid., pages 1490–1492. For the decisions with regard to Poland in the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, issued as a communiqué dated August 2, 1945, see ibid., pages 1508–1509. For Stanislaw Mikolajczyk’s notes on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and on Polish-American and Polish-Soviet conversations at the Berlin Conference, see ibid., pages 1517–1542. For additional details and subjects regarding Poland considered at this Conference, see ibid. , entries in index under Poland.]