Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

871.00/8–2245: Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

Bucharest, August 22, 1945—9 p.m.
[Received 11:30 p.m.]

581. At 4:30 p.m. today Marshal of the Court read from a prepared text King’s reply to the three Russian points given in my telegram 576 of August 21.⁵⁰ The text of King’s reply is given in my immediately following telegram.⁵¹

General Susaikov allegedly replied to Negel that King’s document was directly pointed toward the breaking of relations with the Soviet Government and clearly showed King did not consider in any manner the point of view of the USSR. He added that the Soviet Union would break relations with Rumania and, while it would not consider the King directly responsible, all advisers assisting in the composition of his note should be arrested.

At the King’s request his confidential secretary conveyed the above information. He added that every conceivable pressure from NDF politicians and the Russians has been centered upon the King and his mother with scarcely veiled threats as to their impending fates and those of their advisers. It has been indicated to the Palace that arrests of proscripted advisers by the NDF would start tonight. Tatarescu is reported to have stated that former King Carol may be restored.

The King is remaining in Bucharest to be near the Foreign Missions in the event of personal difficulties, and for greater safety his advisers consider he should stay in the Royal Palace.

The King, since his request of Groza to resign has become the primary object of pressure by the Russians and NDF. His advisers are now consulting with the Party leaders, notably Titel Petrescu head of the Socialists, to apprise them fully of the situation and to press Petrescu to implement his tacit agreement for the Socialist Party Ministers to resign from the Government.

Responsible reports state the Socialist Executive Committee and its Ministers in the Cabinet have voted in favor of this resignation, but that it is being deferred at this critical moment due to Russian and Communist intimidation of certain Cabinet members. Further developments in the Socialist position may be known tonight or early tomorrow.

Careful scrutiny of blatant Soviet intimidation efforts and those of opportunistic politicans as outlined above may indicate that the bluff factor is being relied upon to influence the Rumanians psychologically. Yet if any of the feared events occur or pressure sharply intensifies, the King may become a virtual political prisoner. He cannot be expected to withstand unremitting Soviet pressure without speedy and public external support recognizing this fact. It is not inconceivable that the course of Royal constitutional action could collapse with consequent difficulties for Rumania unless the Department may decide to issue a forthright statement or adopt other action in the light of reported circumstances.⁵²

Repeated to Moscow as 173.

Melbourne

50. Not printed; it reported that the King had held an audience for Soviet General Susaikov in the course of which Susaikov had urged the King to make a public declaration including the following points: That external pressure upon the King and external interference on the subject of the Rumanian Government would find an unfavorable echo in Rumanian public opinion; that Rumanian general elections will take place soon and the people will express their free will for the government of their choice; and that the King had no criticism against the Groza regime (871.00/8–2145).

51. According to telegram 582, August 22, 10 p.m., from Bucharest, the King’s reply to the Soviet points was as follows:

    “1) The decisions taken in common at Potsdam by the three principal Allied Powers, as well as the result of the constitutional consultations have obliged me to proceed with formation of a new government which should fulfill the conditions enabling it to be recognized by the three Allies, and to begin negotiations for peace. Consequently I have requested the Groza Government to resign. The Cabinet refusing to comply with my request, I have resorted to the procedure decided upon by the three powers in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. 2) As constitutional sovereign, I desire that free elections should take place in Rumania, and to see established as soon as possible necessary conditions for assuring complete freedom of these elections. I must however underline that this question is today in the hands of the three great powers. 3) Objection to the Groza Government is that it is not recognized by two of the three powers. To this is added the fact that the government has refused to resign.” (871.00/8–2245)

52. Telegram 447, August 22, 7 p.m., to Bucharest, advised that the Secretary of State had issued a public statement on conditions in Rumania (871.00/8–2245); see bracketed note, p. 588. Telegram 604, August 25, 8 p.m., from Bucharest, reported that the statement had had a fine effect among those elements learning of it, but Rumanian Government censorship had completely suppressed it (871.00/8–2545).