Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

871.00/1–1146

Memorandum by Mr. Mark Ethridge, Special Representative of the Secretary of State³⁰

Summary Report on Soviet Policy in Rumania and Bulgaria

The contradictions between the public commitments of the Soviet Government with regard to Rumania and Bulgaria since August 1944 and the policy which it has actually followed have resulted in serious differences of opinion between it and the United States. Whereas the Soviet Government is publicly committed by the statements issued by Mr. Molotov on April 3 and August 25, 1944³¹ to non-interference in Rumania’s internal affairs, by the Yalta Declaration to the establishment of a government broadly representative of all democratic elements, and by the Potsdam Agreement to broader consultation of the American and British delegations on the Allied Control Commissions in these two countries, it has in fact pursued a policy of prolonging military occupation, indirect political domination of Rumania and Bulgaria through the Communist Party and extensive economic penetration, both direct and indirect. The objections of the United States Government to this trend of affairs have been expressed in its notes of August 18 and November 16, 1944 [1945?] to the Bulgarian Government with regard to electoral procedure³² and in its notes of March 14 and August 23 regarding the formation of the Groza Government and the development of the constitutional crisis in Rumania.³³

The Soviet interpretation of the democratic governments called for in the Yalta Declaration may be judged by the regimes which it now supports in Rumania and Bulgaria. In both countries it has fostered the establishment of “front” governments which on the surface appear to represent all democratic groups in the two countries with the exception of those “bourgeois” parties which, while they have in general favored Western constitutional procedures, have in the past been identified with anti-Soviet policies. Upon closer examination, however, the Fatherland Front³⁴ in Bulgaria and the National Democratic Front in Rumania are revealed not as coalition governments in the true sense of the term but as regimes dominated to a very large extent by the Communist Party despite the fact that it is in a minority in both countries. The Peasant and Socialist Parties, which in free elections would together undoubtedly win a majority in both countries and give every appearance of being democratic in the Western sense of the term, are nominally members of these “front” governments. In both cases, however, they are represented not by their recognized leaders but by “dissidents”, their role is in no way commensurate with their probable popular strength, and they are moreover under constant attack by the Communists. The former “bourgeois” parties are represented in a lesser degree and enjoy relatively limited popular support within the two countries. In the case of Rumania, a number of important elements which formerly played an important role in supporting the pro-Fascist policies of King Carol or of Marshal Antonescu, such as the Tatarescu Liberals and certain remnants of the Iron Guard Legionnaires, today occupy posts within the government.

In both Rumania and Bulgaria there are noteworthy similarities in the use which the Soviet Government has made of the local Communist parties. In both cases it has relied on the Communist organizations developed before the recent World War, headed by Ana Pauker in Rumania and by Georgi Dimitrov in Bulgaria. In both countries the Communists restricted themselves to seizing certain key posts through which they have succeeded in dominating the whole government. Of these the most important are the Ministry of Interior, which controls the police, and the Ministry of Justice. In other ministries, and in particular the Ministry of War, they have found it possible to exert influence by the appointment of key officers on the second level who are either Communists or are at least amenable to their point of view. In both Rumania and Bulgaria the activities of the Communist Party are directed from Moscow and all the Communist Ministers have at one time or another during the past year visited the Russian capital for conferences with the Soviet authorities. It is also believed on good evidence that direct telephone communication with Moscow is maintained by these governments at all times. The influence of the local Communist parties is, in fact, such that they serve as a check on official Soviet military and diplomatic representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria and have thus far succeeded in forestalling any efforts which the latter may have made to further Soviet policy by dealing with persons not under Communist control. While the Soviet Government has thus succeeded in exercising a very direct and constant influence in the internal affairs of the two countries, its policy of exerting its authority through a minority party has led to a rapid decline in Soviet prestige and has alienated the majority parties which at the start were quite willing to cooperate with the Russians.

Parallel to its political domination of Rumania and Bulgaria, the Soviet Government has been active in extending economic controls over these two countries. In part, this economic activity has been carried on within the framework of the Armistice Agreements with the two countries, although in the case of Rumania, the Soviet authorities have given a broader interpretation to their rights under the Armistice than the United States and Great Britain would have accepted had they been consulted. Outside the framework of the Armistice terms, the Soviet Government has concluded trade agreements which, initially at least, have absorbed almost the entire exportable surpluses of the two countries, and have included many products which the Soviet Government does not necessarily need for itself but apparently intends to reexport to other countries. In addition to this, in Rumania, under the pretext of regulating economic enterprises formerly in the hands of German firms, the Soviet Government has assumed a controlling interest in important sectors of the Rumanian economy, such as transportation and the petroleum industry, through the operation of joint Soviet-Rumanian companies.

Parallel to this program of political domination and economic penetration, the Soviet authorities systematically neglected to give adequate recognition to American and British interests. It must be admitted that the terms of the Armistice agreements and the atmosphere created by the Soviet-British discussions in Moscow of October 1944 gave the Russians considerable reason to believe that Rumania and Bulgaria were being abandoned to their exclusive domination. With the Yalta Conference, however, the United States and Great Britain launched a new policy which reasserted their interest in these countries and since that time they have repeatedly tried to restore the balance upset during the previous autumn. Despite considerable efforts, however, the positions of the American and British delegations on the Allied Control Commissions have not changed substantially, and the attempts of the American and British missions to make effective the views of their Governments and to protect the interests of their nationals has met with only moderate success. Apart from questions of broad policy and general prestige, the principal American interests in these countries are investments in local industry, which are important only in Rumania, commercial relations, freedom to express the point of view of the United States through the medium of newspapers and films and the conduct of educational institutions.

It is significant to note certain marked contrasts in the policies of the Soviet Government in Rumania and Bulgaria. As the Bulgarian Communist Party represents a native growth of considerable vigor, representing perhaps as much as twenty per cent of the electorate, the Soviet authorities were able to leave them to a considerable extent to their own devices and merely accorded them general support. In Bulgaria the Soviet troops of occupation exercise a very minor influence on the government’s position and almost all democratic groups were, at least at the start, quite willing to adjust themselves to Soviet policy. It was the excesses committed by the Bulgarian Communists, rather than any overt act on the part of Soviet authorities, which led to the disintegration of the Fatherland Front coalition after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe. In Rumania, on the other hand, the Communist Party never represented more than three or four per cent of the population, and even today the only Communist leaders in which the Russians have complete trust are persons such as Ana Pauker, Emil Bodnaras and Vasile Luca who, while Rumanian citizens, belong to minority groups by national extraction. Since they had to place their reliance on so small a group, the Soviet authorities were neither able to create a real coalition government nor were they able to guide Rumanian affairs without very extensive and direct interference on the part of Soviet civil and military authorities. It should also be noted that Bulgaria has gained from a territorial point of view by its intimate relations with the Soviet Union and sees the possibility in the future of improving its position vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Rumania, on the other hand, with the exception of Northern Transylvania which it expected to regain in any case, has suffered only losses at the hands of the Russians. Another point of difference is the monarchy. While it is a factor of no consequence in Bulgaria, it has been recognized as a major issue in Rumania, where the Soviet authorities have made every effort to win over the monarch to their point of view. There are likewise significant contrasts in the degree of success which Soviet policy has achieved. Whereas in Bulgaria most democratic groups are entirely reconciled to the necessity of adjusting themselves to the new position of the Soviet Union and blame most of their troubles on Bulgarian Communist extremists, in Rumania there is a far greater reaction on the part of most democratic elements to direct Soviet interference in their affairs, a feeling which extends even to certain leading native-born Rumanian Communists.

Judging Soviet policy from its reflection in Rumania and Bulgaria alone it appears probable that the Soviet Government is sincere in believing that only those governments are democratic and friendly to the Soviet Union which are headed by Communist-dominated “front” regimes. In view of Russia’s domestic political system it is perhaps not surprising that its government should entertain such views. Russian protestations of non-interference in these two countries, however, are almost certainly insincere, for their constant and vigorous intrusions into the internal affairs of those countries is so obvious to an impartial observer that Soviet denial of its existence can only be regarded as the reflection of a party line dictated from above. As regards ultimate Soviet intentions in this area, there is as yet no reason to believe that Soviet policy aims at anything more than the establishment of a security zone pivoted on Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It should be emphasized, however, that the strong position which the Soviet Government is establishing in Bulgaria and Rumania will doubtless be used as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Greece, Turkey and the Straits, and could be converted without great effort into a springboard for aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Confronted with this Soviet attitude in Rumania and Bulgaria, the United States is faced with the alternatives of continuing its policy of adherence to the position taken at Yalta and Potsdam or of conceding this area as a Soviet sphere of influence. Its present policy is presumably founded on two principles: namely, that the peace will be secure only if based on truly representative governments in all countries with western political traditions, and that to concede a limited Soviet sphere of influence at the present time would be to invite its extension in the future. Unless the United States is prepared to abandon these two principles it must take the necessary steps to ensure their eventual application. While certain local and temporary advantages may be gained by direct American intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria, it should be recognized that no significant improvement can be expected in these two countries without a change in Soviet policy. It should further be recognized that the only sound criteria of a change in the Soviet attitude would be the holding of free elections under conditions similar to those obtaining in the recent elections in Finland, Hungary and Austria. From past experience it is clear that measures short of free elections, such as broadening the base of the present governments through cabinet reconstructions, the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops, et cetera, would provide no sound guarantee that Soviet policy had been altered.

Mark Ethridge

Washington , December 7, 1945.

Washington, December 7, 1945.

30. A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to President Truman under cover of a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State dated January 11, 1946.
31. For text of the Soviet statement regarding Rumania, issued to the press at Moscow on April 2, 1944, as transmitted earlier to the Department of State by the Soviet Embassy, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, p. 165. For text of the statement by the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs regarding Rumanian affairs, released to the press in Moscow on August 25, 1944, see telegram 3148, August 25, from Moscow, ibid., p. 193; see also, in this connection, telegram 3147, August 25, from Moscow, ibid.
32. See the American note of August 13, 1945, to the Bulgarian Government regarding the undemocratic election procedures in Bulgaria, contained in telegram 437, August 14, from Sofia, volume iv, p. 284; see also telegram 436, August 13, from Sofia, ibid . Subsequent to this note, the Secretary of State issued a public statement regarding the undemocratic election procedures in Bulgaria, the text of which was contained in telegram 260, August 18, to Sofia, ibid., p. 294. For text of the note to the Bulgarian Government, dated November 16, 1945, regarding Bulgarian elections, see telegram 373, November 14, to Sofia, ibid., p. 376; see also telegram 695, November 16, from Sofia, ibid., p. 384, regarding the delivery of this note.
33. For Ambassador Harriman’s note of March 14, 1945, to Foreign Commissar Molotov regarding the situation in Rumania, see p. 512. For text of the note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat on August 23, 1945, see telegram 7108, August 21, to London (sent, mutatis mutandis, to Moscow as telegram .1882), p. 581.
34. Political organization including certain agrarian elements, the Social Democrats, the Zveno, and dominated by the Communist Party; the ruling political organization in Bulgaria at this time.