741.92/11–2145: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 22—8:58 a.m.]
[14.] British aide-mémoire summarized in Dept’s No. 8, undated,18 demonstrates same intransigent attitude reflected by Bird here. British, while granting it is not in their interest to impose intolerable burden on Siamese economy, attach great importance to acceptance by Siamese of heavy penalties as public admission of guilt. British attitude is to some extent irrational but nonetheless obstinate and would seem to demonstrate definite intention to proceed with unilateral policy in Siam whenever they do not find us amenable.
It seems to us that Dept would now be fully justified in presenting to British strong note of protest at unilateral manner in which they are proposing to act. US contribution to victory in Far East was certainly sufficiently great to warrant our having a substantial voice in peace settlement in SEA (South East Asia), particularly in case of only independent country in that area treatment of which by any of the Allies is bound to affect overall relations of West with East. British have no right to make fact they were at war with Siam and we were not excuse for unilateral settlement since our policy was not expression of disinterest in Siam but on contrary one of sympathy and support.
If Dept does not wish to present to British note of protest along above lines, following possible alternative is suggested. British claim they will be willing to reduce penalties on Siam if it proves in fact after signature of agreement that burden on Siamese economy is such [Page 1371] as to cause permanent dislocation. Siamese on other hand maintain that once they have committed themselves they would have no assurance that burdens would ever be lightened. Situation might be met without changing text of agreement by British addressing to Siamese delegation at time of signature a letter stating that should implementation of agreement place intolerably heavy strain on economy of Siam His Majesty’s Govt would be glad to consult with Siamese Govt at latter’s invitation with view to taking steps necessary in interest of Siamese domestic economy, her international commercial relations and economic stability of SEA. While such a step would be far less satisfactory than our proposal of an Allied Claims Commission to assess all compensation and reparations, it would nevertheless make clear to all parts so [parties] that modification of terms was envisaged if conditions warranted. We would then, even though not a member of an Allied Commission, have a lever to exercise pressure on British through diplomatic channels as soon as we felt situation so demanded. Letter might moreover meet Regent’s need (ref my No. 2, November 13) for some British concession, however slight, to demonstrate to Siamese that govt has had some voice in negotiations.
If British prove unwilling to reply favorably in case of either alternative approaches above, we believe wisest course would be for us to resume diplomatic relations with Siam without more ado. While this would be step to which British could hardly take exception in view of long period we have already waited at their request, we feel it would give them serious pause and might be more effective than any other move on our part so causing them to reconsider their policy.