741.92/11–2445: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 26—9:15 a.m.]
18. Negotiations with British were subject of Cabinet meeting November 22, according to Suni who was present. Two members urged immediate and unconditional acceptance of British terms but Cabinet decided, with concurrence of all other members, government would hold to commitment to Assembly that, in exchange for yielding of rice levy, it would insist on British acceptance points proposed by Siamese. Minor points might be abandoned but not points of substance. If British refuse to accept Siamese modifications, Siamese would announce publicly that negotiations were not free and they were confronted with an ultimatum. That being made clear they would sign the agreement. Prime Minister later informed Suni Regent had approved Cabinet decision and it will unless policy subsequently changed represent Siamese strategy when negotiations are resumed. There is no word yet as to when that will be.
Modifications proposed by Siamese are substantially those outlined in my War Department message 587, September 28 and my SSU message October 10 from Kandy.22 Particular importance is attached by Siamese to:
- (1)
- Creation of Allied Claims Commission to assess damage and determine extent of Siamese responsibility;
- (2)
- Definition of term “Settlement of war with Japan” to mean disarmament and internment but not evacuation of Japs (Gen. Evans confirms evacuation will probably take 6 months or more);
- (3)
- Some limit on Siamese responsibility for supporting British troops since cost of supplies alone is now 100,000 bahts per day;
- (4)
- Clarification of Paragraph 11 (E) of Military Annex to make certain Britain does not intend to take over administration of Siamese territory;
- (5)
- British proposed that if Siamese consented to rice levy there be no mention of levy in agreement but Siamese wish it mentioned.
Suni also said rumors are being widely circulated in Bangkok, he believes by British, that present government is standing in way of restoration of normalcy and economic stability and, if agreement were signed without further argument, difficulties now confronting country would vanish (we have also encountered these rumors). Suni added that certain political elements following out this line and encouraged by British are attempting to discredit Prime Minister and unseat Cabinet. Finally rumors which, according to Suni, have received credence in highest quarters suggest that US decision not to [Page 1375] resume diplomatic relations was intended as a warning to Siamese that they should sign agreement in its present form if they wished formal relations with US resumed. I assured Suni this last rumor is wholly without foundation.
Comment: Suni was obviously sent by Prime Minister who in several conversations with us has exhibited intense discouragement. ITS obviously does not wish to be placed in position of supporting certain Siamese politicians vis-à-vis others but, on the other hand, we feel it is not in our interest that acts of ours such as failure to resume diplomatic relations be used to discredit a Cabinet endeavoring to maintain Siamese independence and to replace it by one which might be composed of British puppets. I am inclined to believe Regent will be skillful enough to avoid latter eventuality but it cannot be wholly ruled out. For further background and recommendation on this question see my No. 19, November 24.
- Latter not printed.↩