741.9211–2845
The Department of State to the British Embassy 26
Aide-Mémoire
This Government appreciates the consideration which the British Government has given to American comments on the terms of the proposed British-Siamese Agreement.
It realizes that unity of British and American approach to Siamese problems is complicated by the fact that Great Britain declared war on Siam and considered it a satellite enemy while the United States ignored the Siamese declaration of war as not representative of the will of the Siamese people and considered Siam a country to be liberated from the enemy. In a sincere effort to maintain unity of British-American action with regard to Siam this Government has earnestly endeavored to accommodate itself to the British position. It withdrew its proposal that Siam, along with Korea and Formosa, should be eligible for UNRRA aid. It has so far declined to reply to Siamese requests for comments on the proposed British-Siamese Agreement. Twice, at British request, it has deferred resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam. It has refrained from pressing its objections to certain of the terms of the proposed British-Siamese Agreement which appear to it unduly harsh in the light of the record of Siam both during and since the war.
This Government, however, is now deeply concerned at the views expressed in the Embassy aide-mémoire of November 12, 1945 that the United States may not properly be associated with the British Government in determining Siamese capacity to pay compensation for damage to Allied property and that the claims of the United States and other Allies not at war with Siam must be subordinate [Page 1378] to those of the countries which are at war. This position it is felt would be sound if the British state of war with Siam were unrelated to the war with Japan or if the United States had been a neutral in that war. On the basis of actual facts, however, this Government cannot acquiesce in the British position. Except for the purely technical status raised by the British declaration of war against Siam, the British and American Governments have been completely allied in the war in the East. Siam was in an Allied theatre under combined Anglo-American Command. All operations affecting Siam were Allied in character and were directed solely against the Japanese in that country. Both Governments aided the Siamese. Both Governments requested Siam not to enter the war against Japan until Siamese efforts could be coordinated with the overall Allied strategy against Japan. The surrender of the Japanese in Siam was compelled by the Allied defeat of Japan. Siamese aid in disarming the Japanese and repatriating prisoners of war was provided by an Allied agreement concluded with Siam.27 Both Governments are equally concerned with the establishment of peace, prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia.
This Government cannot agree that, because of the different technical status in its relationship vis-à-vis Siam, the United States is not concerned equally with Great Britain in the settlement of Allied claims against Siam or that it is not equally concerned in Siam’s capacity to pay such claims.
In the same aide-mémoire the British Government expresses the view that the rice levy demanded by it is not to be considered as having the penal connotation implied in the word “reparations”, but rather as a “special measure of reconcilement and aid by Siam towards those nations who suffered directly through denial of Siam’s rice exports during the war years”. This Government believes that if this view were to be accepted, a similar demand could logically be made against Indochina and indeed against every country whose normal exports were cut off by the exigencies of war. Furthermore, this view would ignore the fact that Siam and each of such countries has been denied the imports which normally they would have received for those exports.
The singling out of Siam for a special “act of reconcilement” is, in the opinion of this Government, penal in effect and this view is supported by the statement in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 8, 1945 indicating that one purpose of the levy is to prevent Siam ending the war “in an incomparably better financial position than any of the other nations which were in a position to offer resistance to the aggressor”.
[Page 1379]It is noted also that the British proposal does not provide for an allocation of Siamese rice free of cost to those countries suffering a rice shortage. Allocations of Siamese rice will be made by the Combined Food Board or successor body in accordance with regular procedures and quite unrelated to the proposed levy. According to the understanding of this Government the British proposal is actually to distribute among certain of the Allied countries which suffered more from the war than did Siam the value of the rice which Siam is to contribute free of cost. The value of that rice may well exceed one hundred million dollars. The rice purchased pursuant to Combined Food Board allocations by countries not sharing in this distribution would be paid for at controlled prices, while the countries sharing in the distribution would not be required to pay for the rice which they receive until delivery of their share of free rice had been completed. The effect of the rice levy is thus to require Siam to contribute huge sums to the governments of the neighboring colonial areas as a penalty for not suffering as did those areas, for the briefness of Siamese resistance to Japan, and for the declaration of war by the Pibul administration.
Regardless of the technical term applied to such penalty this Government believes that it will have a definite bearing on the economy of Siam and on the ability of Siam to pay Allied claims.
This Government would consider it neither just nor reasonable that the settlement of Allied claims should be subordinated to the benefits of the proposed rice levy to be distributed among other countries which may or may not have claims against Siam. Accordingly it feels strongly that if it be determined that Siam has not the capacity to meet the full levy and in addition pay compensation for Allied claims in full, the value of the levy in whole or in part should be applied in settlement of those claims. It would follow that the Allied Claims Commission, establishment of which has been requested by this Government, should have some control over the distribution of the benefits of the rice levy.
This Government recognizes that Siam has considerable gold and foreign exchange. It is possible, as stated in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire, that Siam would be able to meet the rice levy, pay all Allied claims in full and still have sufficient foreign exchange assets so that she would not have to turn to other nations for financial assistance. It is also possible that the effect of the huge rice levy and the payment in full of Allied claims would place an intolerable burden on the internal economy of Siam. Those are matters yet to be determined and this Government cannot accept the view that it may not participate in that determination, which is a matter of Allied concern, on equal terms with those of its Allies technically at war with Siam. Furthermore, [Page 1380] this Government must question the principle implied in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire that Siam should be penalized drastically simply because she may have relatively substantial gold and foreign exchange assets. Such policy might result in Siam suffering relatively more from the Allied victory over Japan than nations far more at fault than was Siam.
This Government attaches such great importance to the basic principles involved in these questions that the American views have been set forth in some detail. It earnestly requests the British Government to reconsider its position set forth in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of November 12 so that an Allied Claims Commission on which the United States will be equally associated with the British Government will be established to consider Allied claims against Siam, to determine Siam’s capacity to pay those claims, including the effect of the proposed rice levy, and to bring about an equitable settlement of such claims; to agree what part, if any, of the value of the proposed rice levy should be applied in settlement of such claims; and to pass accordingly on the distribution of the benefits of that levy.
- In a memorandum of November 28 to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) recommended that the Under Secretary deliver this aide-mémoire personally to Lord Halifax “to emphasize its importance”. (741.92/11–2845) This was done on November 29.↩
- See footnote 43, p. 1307.↩