Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

811.79603/12–945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, December 9, 1945—6 p.m.
[Received 6:48 p.m.]

12921. Dept’s 10667, Dec 8.³⁵ We have advised British Govt PAA and American have filed $375 rate. We observe that as yet we are not instructed to ask British Govt to increase frequencies permitted to PAA, for allocation by US Govt (reference Satterthwaite’s conversation with Morgan Thursday³⁶ on Nov 27 [aide-] mémoire).

There were meetings Saturday at the Ministry of Civil Aviation at which the cabled text of PAA press release of Dec 7³⁷ was discussed, particularly [with?] relation, if any, to the attitude of the US Govt toward conference recommendation of rates. Hildred called Satterthwaite Saturday night to say that the British Govt would like to consider the filing of the $375 rate by the two American companies as an agreed rate and therefore reasonably meeting their position until developments in January with respect to US attitude on IATA rate conference, or bilateral talks, but found it difficult to do so in the light of PAA release. He said it was common knowledge that the rate of $375 was based on consultation, informal, of course, but consultation nevertheless. As the Dept is aware, Hildred is one of the leaders of that group of British Aviation people, Govt and private, wishing to come to a reasonable, understanding with the United States. The recent deterioration in aviation relations has hurt Hildred’s influence and strengthened those who believe in the extreme position taken by the British at Chicago. While Hildred did not directly say so in his conversation yesterday with Satterthwaite, it is apparent that the events of the last few days have made the British more and more hesitant to abandon restrictions on frequencies, which they were getting ready to do if they were assured a solution to the rate question. Hildred did not refer to Bixby’s explanation of what might happen if frequencies were not limited (see Embassy’s 12734, Dec 5, 4 p.m.³⁸), but it is clear that it has had an affect on him, as has BOAC, to whom Bixby also discussed the frequency question. We, therefore, feel that uncertainties in present situation, particularly those involving attitude of US Civil Aeronautics Board, may again cause British to return to an increasingly restrictive policy. Related to this is loss of influence of Hildred, through apparent destruction of principle, developed largely by him, that operators could work out much [such?] problems as rates for themselves, and that this would be acceptable compromise between original British position of international Govt authority and completely uncontrolled unilateral action.

In spite of foregoing, it is possible that a letter from the Embassy to Hildred, referring to the aide-mémoire of Nov 27, informing him that PAA and American having filed identical rates, we assume conditions of mémoire have been met, and that therefore pending formal arrangements, the British Govt will permit both carriers to move as much traffic as their limited equipment will permit, will produce a satisfactory reply. A statement couched in such terms would both avoid saying the $375 rate was an agreed one, and that it was not an agreed one. If we refrain from bringing up the “agreed” question, the British Govt might reply that they had noted that the two American carriers had filed identical rates, which met the spirit of the British position. They would then either permit them to come in with a specified or unlimited amount of frequencies. If specified, they could be allocated by the US Govt as it saw fit.

Bixby thinks foregoing may work, and said that Trippe had agreed and would so notify CAB which was meeting Monday.

Bixby reported Trippe as saying that he was afraid CAA [CAB] would issue a statement Monday against conference idea, and that this would upset delicate avoidance of “agreed rate” principle in exchange of letters between two Govts. The British might not, of course, move from their present position until talks begin at first of year, but if they can do so without seriously compromising their principle of consultation on rates, they would like, we think, to have talks preceded by a few weeks of relative peace, rather than mounting difficulties.

Winant

35. Telegram 10667, December 8, 1945, 6 p.m., to London, reads as follows: “Please inform appropriate authorities that Pan American Airways and American Overseas Airways have today filed with CAB fares of $375 to London ($675 round trip). These fares effective December 10 CAB consenting to waiver of 3–day term.” (811.79603/12–845)
36. No record of conversation on December 6 found in Department files.
37. For summary of Pan American’s statement, with quotations therefrom, see New York Times, December 8, 1945, p. 19, col. 5.
38. Not printed. The pertinent portion of this message reads as follows: “Bixby saw Hildred this morning in presence of Satterthwaite. Bixby reviewed present position of Pan American in terms of its domestic competitive situation and assured Hildred that Trippe was in favor of full cooperation with IATA (International Air Transport Association) on rates and other matters but that he did not feel the US Govt supported this position. Bixby said he was, disturbed by the thought of unlimited frequencies on the North Atlantic since Pan American had 28 and American 14 large aircraft which for domestic competitive reasons both companies would have to put on the North Atlantic. This would mean, Bixby said, some 40 flights per day. This remark of Bixby’s will clearly not make it easier to sustain principle of unlimited frequencies.” (811.79641/12–545)