Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control(Japan)/8–1345

The Australian Legation to the Department of State ⁸²

undated

Future of Japan

views of the government of the commonwealth of australia

1. Participation of Australia in discussions and decisions:

In view of the part played by Australia in the war against the Axis Powers and in particular against Japan, and in view also of her geographical position in the Pacific, she should participate fully at all stages in Allied consultations and decisions on the future of Japan. Australia should take a direct part, preferably by way of personal, round-table consultation, in the formulation of Allied policies, the drafting of Armistice terms and signature of Armistice conditions, the definition of methods of control and the establishment and working of control machinery. The Australian Government finds it difficult to understand why it has not been recognised in the negotiations which have taken place so far with Japan, and as Australia is vitally affected by the terms of peace with Japan it feels bound to express its views and the following may be taken as its interpretation and amplification of the documents which have passed. The terms of these documents are somewhat general and the Australian Government hopes this interpretation will guide the application of the terms.

2. The Emperor of Japan:

As Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, he should be held responsible for Japan’s acts of aggression and war crimes. The future of the Imperial Throne should be decided by the Japanese people in due course and before such a decision is taken political movements aiming at the abolition of the institution of the Throne or acceptance of the Emperor as a constitutional head of the State should be given full freedom of organization and propaganda. The Emperor should be personally identified with the acceptance of surrender terms, thus helping to destroy any legend that the Emperor is outside or above responsibility for the conduct of the war and its ultimate disaster for Japan. It should be made clear that from the moment of the signing of the surrender terms all the powers and prerogatives of the Emperor lapse indefinitely and that all authority in relation to the Japanese Empire will be vested exclusively in the Allied Command and remain so vested until the final peace settlement. No exception should be permitted to the general rule that every person to whom war crimes can justly be imputed is liable to punishment. The evidence of Japanese war crimes and atrocities revealed in the report to the Australian Government made by Chief Justice Webb⁸³ and now before the War Crimes Commission discloses a deliberate system of terrorism and atrocity which must have been known to the Supreme Authorities in Japan. It would be a very difficult matter to justify discrimination in this respect as between Hitler and his associates on the one hand and the Supreme Authorities in Japan on the other. While, therefore, the Emperor should be retained at the moment in order that he can be expressly associated with the surrender terms, it should be made clear to Japan that this involves no commitment by the Allies as to the future, and that the person of the Emperor is to be regarded as at the disposal of the Allied Governments in the same way as each and every other person of the surrendering enemy state.

3. Economic, social and political conditions in Japan:

Elimination of Japanese militarism and its constant threat to Pacific security involves radical changes in Japan’s social, political and economic pattern. Mere superficial changes in governmental machinery and external trade during a relatively short period of foreign control will not suffice. The roots of Japanese militarism are embedded in the totalitarian social, political and economic system built up over the past 70 years. The depressed conditions of the agricultural population and industrial workers, with consequent low consumption standards and limited domestic demand was largely responsible for the intense pressure for exports characteristic of Japanese industry. Agricultural poverty meant that large supplies of cheap industrial labour were available with considerable productive power but low standards of living. These conditions resulted in the drive to secure markets which was an important element in Japan’s territorial ambitions. Agricultural poverty also meant large supplies of military manpower. This in turn contributed to an overemphasis on heavy industries as a war potential. In order to correct this distortion of the Japanese economy, every effort should be made to improve the economic and social position of the agricultural population and to foster trade union and other movements aiming at raising standards of living.

It is realised that such a policy implies radical and direct intervention by the Allied countries in domestic Japanese affairs. Such intervention would be ineffective unless undertaken with determination and sustained until a democratic and popular regime is fully established. This involves a considerable period of occupation and there is a danger that the occupying Powers may weary of the task. This danger, however, should be weighed against the very real danger of a revival of Japanese chauvinism and aggression if the main features of Japan’s social, political and economic life are left substantially unchanged. If the Allied Nations demonstrate their will and determination to take all steps necessary to prevent future Japanese aggression, it may well be found that a firm policy vigorously applied in the early stages may produce promising conditions in a relatively short period. Moreover, the Japanese should be made to realise that controls would be modified and withdrawn as soon as there is reasonable prospect of successful conduct of affairs in accordance with the above-mentioned principles by the Japanese themselves. Such encouragement of Japanese activities is important, because the success of Allied controls will in large measure depend on the extent to which Japanese participation is secured.

Subject to the general policy outlined above, immediate control of Japanese industry should be along the following lines:

(a) Economic disarmament, covering all industry;

(b) Allied control of industry (including shipbuilding) with emphasis on restoration of light industries;

(c) Allied control of Japanese import and export trade, with a view to fostering growth of essential consumer goods industries and giving effect to Allied reparations policy, having in mind also Japan’s losses of overseas territory and the need to fit Japanese export trade into the postwar network of International economic relations;

(d) Reparations to be paid in kind as the Allies may determine.

Although on the one hand Japan should not be allowed unrestricted economic expansion while the Allies carry the heavy burden of security, this policy should not be allowed to prejudice the promotion of reforms by permitting the existence of mass unemployment and economic instability. It is necessary however to break the power of the Zaibatsu in their monopoly control of industry.

4. Political conditions:

Popular influence on government in Japan should be encouraged. The task is to replace the Militarists, Zaibatsu and Bureaucracy by a system of Government responsible to popular needs. Although in the long run this is a task for the Japanese people themselves, it will be difficult for genuinely democratic forces in Japan to assert themselves. They should therefore receive every help and encouragement from the Allied Powers.

In the initial stages the Supreme Allied Commander should assume complete authority, the powers of the Diet and all Japanese policymaking bodies being suspended. Gradually, however, restrictions on the exercise of civil functions by Japanese should be relaxed until, finally, they can be removed. Existing political parties should be dissolved, but new parties with aims compatible with the purposes of the United Nations should be countenanced. Local Government activity should be encouraged. Civil liberties would require legislative definition and protection by the Military Government. Obnoxious features of the judicial and police system should be abolished. Freedom of worship raises the difficult question of State Shinto with its Emperor-worship and its militaristic associations. In this connection reference is made to paragraph 2 above, in which consideration is given to the treatment of the Emperor.

5. Other matters:

(a) Japanese who have been prominent in any militaristic or Fascistic movements or activities should under no circumstances be used in any capacity by the Allied Military Government.

(b) Surrender terms should be signed by the Emperor, the Military and Naval Chiefs, and the principal Cabinet Ministers.

(c) The Japanese Navy should be completely destroyed or transferred to Allied hands; the Japanese Air Force and Military installations and material should also be destroyed or, where appropriate transferred; the Merchant Navy should be surrendered to the Allied Nations, a proper share being assigned to Australia.

(d) Service personnel should be demobilised, conscription abolished, the Kempeitai (Gendarmerie), Tokkoka (Secret Police) Patriotic and Secret Societies and Ex-Servicemen’s Associations dissolved and manufacture and carrying of weapons prohibited.

(e) There should be provisions safeguarding Allied prisoners of war, and also provisions concerning Japanese prisoners of war.

(f) There should be provisions regarding war criminals (including the Emperor).

(g) It should be clearly understood that the Armistice is conditional on the surrender of all Japanese troops on the mainland and in the outlying parts and islands, and that the authority of the Emperor and of the Japanese Command is used to remove them and return them to Japan.

82. Notation by Mr. Dunn on August 14: “This was sent to me by the Secretary. I have read it but I do not see anything to be done about it.” Notation by the Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Dickover): “Concur.” (740.00119 P.W./8–1345) Notation on copy transmitted October 19 to Mr. Dickover: “Copy left with Secretary of State at 3 p.m. on 13 Aug. 45.” (740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–1945)
83. Sir William Flood Webb, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia.