Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

SWNCC 21 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁸⁸

SM–2866

Washington, 14 August, 1945.

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Subject: Instruments for the surrender of Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed General Order No. 1 (contained in Enclosure “B” of SWNCC 21/5⁸⁹) and their suggested changes are indicated in Enclosure “A”.⁹⁰ The reasons for such changes as are not immediately apparent are as follows:

a. The provision for surrender of certain Japanese forces to the Commander in Chief of the Australian Imperial Forces has been deleted and the forces in that area included under Admiral Mount-batten’s responsibility in view of the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff have just stated their willingness to assume responsibility for parts of the Southwest Pacific area south of the Philippines immediately upon Japanese surrender.

b. The paragraph pertaining to surrender in Korea has been deleted and U.S. responsibilities for Korea have been assigned to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, since the occupation responsibilities for Korea have already been assigned to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recognizing that provisions needed to be made for acceptance of local surrenders by U.S. commanders who might not be under the commander in chief assigned the responsibility for the area for which the local surrender is offered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already issued instructions to provide for this contingency.

Preliminary arrangements have been directed for the entry of U.S. forces into Keijo⁹¹ and Dairen in case they arrive before the Russians occupy these points. This and the matter of U.S. forces seizing key points along the north China Coast present operational problems concerning the surrender which will in all probability have to be handled on an operational basis with detailed directions on the spot from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. There is also the problem of avoiding any misunderstanding with the Russians both on areas around the Yellow Sea and on the Kuriles. It is believed that a way to handle this problem would be for the President to inform the Allied Powers concerned of our intentions.

For your information there is enclosed (Enclosure “B”) a message which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will present to the President at an appropriate time.

On the matter of the Kuriles, the United States and Russian Chiefs of Staff have agreed to a boundary line between areas of operations which passes through Onnekotan Strait. On the basis of the situation as it appears at present, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to instruct Admiral Nimitz to plan on receiving the surrender of the Kurile Islands south of this line. They propose at an appropriate time to inform the Russians of this procedure and that unless the Russians request assistance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expect the Soviets to receive the surrender and disarm the Japanese in the islands of Paramushiro and Shumushu.

The parallel 38° north has been selected in Korea since this gives to U.S. forces the port and communications area of Keijo and a sufficient portion of Korea so that parts of it might be apportioned to the Chinese and the British in case some sort of quadripartite administration eventuates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not know of uny detailed arrangements for the administration and government of Korea after the Japanese surrender and urge that the appropriate governmental authorities take steps at once in order that guidance may be made available to the U.S. commander charged with the occupation responsibilities in Korea.

There are many unknown factors concerning the Japanese capitulation which cannot be accurately estimated at this time. The situation is liable to be changing daily during the period when General MacArthur is completing the arrangements with the Emperor and the Imperial General Headquarters. It is therefore believed that General Order No. 1 should be sent to the Supreme Commander with a provision that it is subject to change as a result of further instructions through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also that the Supreme Commander is empowered to make changes in matters of detail which are indicated by the operational situation as known to him.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland

Brigadier General, U.S.A. Secretary

[Annex 1]

Enclosure “A”

General Order No. 1

Military and Naval

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, und pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16° north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38° north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16° north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks, and the Solomons, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38° north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)

(The remainder of the General Order No. 1 requires no change and should stand as written in SWNCC 21/5.)

[Annex 2]

Enclosure “B”

Draft Message From the President to Prime Minister, Generalissimo Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek

While giving first priority to securing the Japanese homeland, the United States proposes to use its naval and air power to expedite the surrender of Japanese forces in the coastal areas of the Asiatic mainland in order to discourage continuation of local hostilities and to prevent malicious destruction and sabotage of harbor facilities. I have directed U.S. naval forces immediately to take control of the Yellow Sea and waters adjacent to Japan in the event of Japanese capitulation and have also directed U.S. forces to secure key ports now held by the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland. I am sending this message for the purpose of making clear that these operations are in order to exploit U.S. military capabilities to expedite the surrender, are for military purposes only, and will not prejudice the final peace settlement.

88. Circulated as SWNCC 21/7, August 14; General Order No. 1, as amended, was thereupon approved by President Truman and circulated as SWNCC 21/8, August 17.
89. August 11, p. 635.
90. Printed as annex 1 to this memorandum.
91. Seoul.