740.00119 FEAC/10–2445
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)
Sir George Sansom called by appointment at 11 o’clock. He was accompanied by Mr. Foulds, a British Foreign Office official who has been sent to Washington to assist the British representative on the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.
Sir George first brought up the mechanics of the Commission. I told him that the State Department would furnish a secretariat and that Mr. Nelson Johnson68 was being suggested as Secretary-General [Page 777] of the Commission. He seemed pleased with this suggestion and said that he had assumed that the American representative would be the permanent Chairman of the Commission and that the Secretary-General would also be an American. He asked about the attendance of assistance or advisers at the meetings of the Commission. He seemed to think they should be limited to two or three persons. I agreed but said that the Commission itself would probably wish to determine this matter.
He asked about publicity. I told him that it was not intended that the press would be admitted to meetings of the Commission but that the suggestion had been made that at the opening meeting, which would take place some time during the morning of the 30th, the press might be present initially for a short period.
Sir George then reviewed the situation with regard to the “misunderstanding” over our support for the revised British Terms of Reference. I told him that I knew the background of this matter but that I did not know what the latest step had been to resolve this difficulty.
Sir George said that the Secretary had several days ago spoken to Lord Halifax with regard to a plan for setting up in Tokyo a military council to advise General MacArthur and that this plan might meet the desires of the Russians for a Control Council. Sir George said that he thought the plan was a good one but that he was sure the British Government would not look upon it as a satisfactory alternative to revision of the Terms of Reference proposed by it. He said that the military council suggested by Mr. Byrnes, to which political advisers might be attached, would fill a much felt need on the part of the British Government for information as to what was the situation in Japan and what was taking place from day to day, but that it would not meet the British desire for actual and real control in shaping the policies under which General MacArthur was operating.
At this point I asked Sir George whether he could say just what was the objective of the British in proposing a revision of the Terms of Reference; that is, whether the British Government desired to broaden the control of Japan by having 11 members of a Commission, voting by majority, prepare and adopt directives to General MacArthur, or whether the British Government simply desired itself, and on behalf of the Commonwealth Governments, to have a real participation in the formulation of policy for the control of Japan. Sir George said emphatically that the latter was what the British desired. He recalled that the original suggestion of the British Government was that a Control Council of 5 members be established; that the revised Terms of Reference was simply a device to achieve some control and yet meet our desire for a Far East Commission; and that [Page 778] the British Government saw the disadvantages of having a Commission of 11 members formulating and adopting policies.
Sir George then went on to read from a telegram received by Lord Halifax from the British Government which outlined the reasons why the British Government desired to have a real voice in policymaking for Japan. He said that the British Government was vitally interested in measures that would be taken affecting future strategy in the Pacific; affecting economic relations in the Pacific; and affecting the political and social structure of Japan. With regard to this latter point he said that the British Government was anxious that the administrative machinery and structure of the Japanese Government should not be so disturbed as to lead to chaotic political and social conditions in Japan.
In making the foregoing statements Sir George emphasized that he was not—the British Government was not—being critical of anything that had happened so far under directives issued to General MacArthur. He said that, as a matter of fact, the British were quite pleased with the way General MacArthur was handling the situation. He went on to say, however, that the British Government would feel that future developments made it advisable—made it necessary—that the British Government participate in the formulation of directives. He referred to certain papers on economic matters concerning Japan which had already been prepared by a planning board in London and which have received Ministerial approval.
Sir George next expressed the British Government’s concern lest Russia not become a member of the Commission. He indicated that every effort should be made to induce the Russians to participate in the Commission, but he added that the British would participate whether or not the Russians agreed to. He said that the British Government feared that a most unsatisfactory situation might develop, however, if the Russians do not participate. He mentioned Korea and Manchuria as places where the Russians might proceed to consolidate and extend their position as a compensation for not having a voice in the control of Japan. I told Sir George that every reasonable effort was being made to induce the Russians to have a representative on the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.
In conclusion, the question of the location of the Commission came up. I told Sir George that the Secretary had agreed that the Commission might sit in Tokyo but that it was our definite understanding that the headquarters or permanent location of the Commission would be in Washington. Sir George said that, if the objective of the British revised Terms of Reference was achieved, there would be no insistence that the Commission remove itself to Tokyo. He said that there might be advantages in having the representatives on the Commission visit [Page 779] Tokyo for two or three weeks to familiarize themselves with conditions in Japan but that he could himself see disadvantages in having the Commission remove itself permanently to Japan.
- Minister in Australia and former Ambassador in China.↩