740.00119 Control(Japan) /11–1545
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the tinder Secretary of State (Acheson)26
Subject: Allied Participation in the Occupation of Japan
As you are doubtless aware, in the 29 Oct 45 and 6 Nov 45 meetings of the Committee of Three, Secretary of State Byrnes made statements concerning the above subject generally as follows: Marshal Stalin does not wish to place a Russian force under the command of General MacArthur; it might therefore be better not to request forces from the other Allies.
Secretary Byrnes’ views expressed above are not in conformity with the policies set forth in the conclusions of SWNCC 70/527 which were approved by the President on 18 August 1945, and under which the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have since been operating. Extracts from these conclusions are as follows:
- a.
- Great Britain, China, and USSR have a responsibility to participate in the occupation and military government of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof.
- b.
- The major Allies should be called upon to make substantial contributions to the occupation forces.
- c.
- The interest of the U.S. would be served by participation of Orientals in the occupation forces and in the occupation authority.
War Department planning for the occupation, demobilization, and the strength of the army had accordingly proceeded on the basis that participation of Allied forces would reduce the requirement for U.S. forces to 50% of the total, thus permitting comparable reductions in the strength of the army as a whole.
Communications on the military level have been exchanged with the British concerning their participation in the occupation forces and, in the same connection, the Chinese have been contacted informally.
- a.
- The British, as early as 13 April 1945, in the 190th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requested as soon as possible the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff concerning British participation in the occupation of Japan. The British, in CCS 901/4 (14 August 1945) informed the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that their planning assumptions included participation by British forces in the occupation of [Page 854] Japan. In CCS 901/5 (17 August 1945), which was cleared by Mr. Dunn of the State Department the British were told that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle the participation of British forces in the occupation of Japan. The State Department recently passed to the War Department a copy of a proposal from the Australian Government, acting on behalf of the British Commonwealth, for the participation of a British Commonwealth force in the occupation of Japan. It is understood from informal inquiry that the State Department has not acted on this proposal. In a combined shipping review for the first half of 1946, completed in October, allocations of shipping were made to transport British forces to Japan.
- b.
- As to Chinese participation, on 17 August General Wedemeyer reported that he had discussed the subject with Generalissimo Chiang, who expressed a desire to make available one army of three divisions for the occupation of Japan. Although it had been contemplated that this force could be transported after 1 December, General Wedemeyer recently advised the War Department that due to internal conditions in China, Chinese forces for Japan can not be provided for several months. The Generalissimo regretted this situation and stated that he desired participation of Chinese forces should his internal situation permit.
- c.
- No discussions with USSR on the military level reference this subject have taken place.
In view of Secretary Byrnes’ remarks at the meetings of the Committee of Three, and of our information that State Department had not yet acted on the Australian Government’s proposal, the War Department is taking no action toward furthering Allied participation in the occupation of Japan. The possibility that the policies of SWNCC 70/5 have been invalidated, has hindered the War Department seriously in its planning for the occupation forces for Japan, for the strength of the Army, and for demobilization.
If the policy for the participation of Allied contingents in the occupation of Japan as stated in SWNCC 70/5 is no longer accepted governmental policy, it is requested that the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed as soon as possible of the proposed revisions in this policy. Early advice is necessary in order that urgently required planning may be completed.