Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

741.92/9–2945

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State has considered carefully the Aide-Mémoire of September 29, 1945 presented by the British Embassy in relation to Siam.

Siamese Rice

2. The Department believes that the views of this Government and of the British Government are essentially in harmony with regard to procedures relating to the procurement and export of Siamese rice. It would not, however, wish the Commission, as such, to purchase rice as might be implied from sub-paragraph 3 (c) of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire. It believes that the direct purchases contemplated by that sub-paragraph should be made by the Siamese Government or by the British or American or possibly other purchasing authorities. The Commission, this Government believes, should be an administrative agency for stimulating rice production and controlling the export of rice, but should not itself be a purchasing agency.

3. The Department agrees that settlement of the questions of the allocation of any free rice and of the procedures for payment in foreign exchange for purchased rice are not of immediate urgency. It adheres, however, to the principles set forth in paragraph 8 of the Annex to the Department’s Aide-Mémoire of September 1 subject, of course, to such modifications as may be required in connection with any free rice, and it would point out that this Government will doubtless desire to make its payments to Siam as promptly as practicable and once the Commission is in operation and agreement on prices reached, it would not ordinarily wish to place its payments in a suspense account or arrange for shipments on provisional invoices.

4. Unfortunately the intent of paragraph 7 of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire is not clear to this Government. The British Government may be assured that this Government desires to cooperate in every way in expediting the work of the Commission so that it may most effectively carry out its responsibility of stimulating the production and maximizing the export of Siamese rice in accordance with recommended Combined Food Board allocations. To this end it is anxious to simplify procedures and so far as may be possible to obviate needless delays. It will, of course, have particular concern for the prompt procurement and shipment of rice which it purchases in accordance with recommended allocations of the Combined Food Board and for the equitable distribution of needed facilities. Without a clearer understanding of the proposal advanced by the British Government in that paragraph, especially as such proposal might affect various aspects of American procurement, this Government is not in a position to express its agreement or disagreement. It would request, therefore, amplification and clarification of the proposal that under certain circumstances the British authorities take unilateral action.

5. This Government believes that it is important that the proposed tripartite agreement be concluded at the earliest practicable moment and in order to expedite agreement between this Government and the British Government on the details of that agreement for presentation to the Siamese it will furnish to the Embassy within a few days a draft agreement for discussion and comment.

Military Annex

6. With regard to the Allied military agreement, which would include a number of the points set forth in the Military Annex, this Government appreciates the assurance that Clauses 4, 13 and 14 will not be included, except with the concurrence of the United States in that agreement.

7. As regards Clause 14 of the Military Annex, this Government recognizes that the problem of concealed Japanese assets or Safe-haven or similar financial and economic matters arising out of the war with Japan may extend beyond the period necessary for the conclusion of matters of Allied military concern. It understands the reluctance of the British Government to accept any restriction which would hamper necessary action in relation to such matters. The language of Clause 14 as now stated, however, would give to the Allies complete control over the specified aspects of Siamese economy until the last of such matters was settled and would permit unlimited exercise of that control whether or not related to such matters. In view of the comments in paragraph 16 of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire, this Government is willing to withdraw its suggestion that the first part of Clause 14 be inserted as a sub-clause of Clause 11 and it would be agreeable to its inclusion in the Allied military agreement if that part of Clause 14 which follows the word “Allies” were changed to read “insofar as may be necessary for the conclusion of matters of military, economic and financial concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan”.

8. There has apparently been some confusion as to the views of this Government with regard to Clause 11. Clause 11 does not conform to the views of this Government but, in an effort to meet the views of the British Government, this Government has expressed its willingness not to press for an amendment. It would prefer to have the opening section of Clause 11, when included in the Allied military agreement, read “Insofar as [instead of ‘For so long as’]⁹³ may be necessary for the conclusion of matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan”.

Heads of Agreement

9. This Government appreciates the willingness of the British Government to try to meet the views of this Government with regard to Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D. Unfortunately, the meaning of paragraph 17 of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire is not entirely clear to this Government. That paragraph refers to the restriction on Siam proposed in Clause 4 of Section D as a temporary unilateral control over the power of the Siamese Government to determine certain conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade. The text of Clauses 2 and 3 of Section D of the Heads of Agreement, however, would require that such unilateral control be one of the principles on which a new treaty of commerce and navigation which Siam must negotiate should be based.

10. This Government is concerned over the implications of such unilateral control as a matter of fundamental policy. It believes that no independent and sovereign country should be subjected to unilateral control by another government over its power to determine conditions relating to its economy and trade. The existence of such a unilateral control negates the independence and sovereignty of that country. It believes that future world economic welfare and the effective development of international cooperation must be founded on the fundamental principle of reciprocal treatment in all commercial and economic relations between countries. This Government again therefore earnestly requests that the British Government reconsider Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D so that the economic, commercial and professional relations between Siam and Great Britian may be founded upon the principle of mutuality and not upon unilateral control.

Washington , October 9, 1945.

93. Brackets appear in the original.