893.00/2–1645
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)81
Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2
Subject: Communist Plans for Expansion
Summary
Communist leaders in forward Base Areas are bitterly critical of the Central Government’s passive attitude toward the war and frankly outspoken with regard to Communist plans for territorial and military expansion.
These plans envisage the eventual development of a connected series of Communist Base Areas extending from the Great Wall to the East River. Communist plans for expansion stem from their conviction that the only strength of China is in her peasant masses, that these masses are willing to resist the enemy, but they must be organized, trained and led.
As Central Government forces withdraw in the face of the Japanese advance chaotic conditions create a political vacuum which the Communists are in position to fill and they propose to do so whenever and wherever possible. The people, say the Communists, must not be abandoned to the enemy.
Expansion into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria is not feasible at the present time, but possible eventually. Long-standing distrust of Chinese by the Mongols is [as?] a serious barrier and effective Japanese consolidation in Manchuria are stated as reasons.
The further one proceeds east in Communist controlled areas of north China the more outspoken and bitter becomes criticism of the Kuomintang Government. This is especially true among field commanders of the Eighth Route Army and their political commissars. In general all criticism centers around the passive attitude of the present Central Government of China toward the war against Japan and the failure of the Government to mobilize the mass strength of the Chinese people for economic and military resistance.
[Page 213]Constantly one hears expression of the conviction that the only real strength of China is in her agrarian millions and that only through the organization and leadership of this amorphous mass can the real strength of China be brought to bear against Japan. For this reason the Communist leaders maintain that it is necessary for them not only to consolidate their present north and central China bases, but to expand as rapidly as possible into other areas of China from which Kuomintang troops have been driven by the enemy. The people, the Communist[s] say, must not be abandoned by their Government as they were in north China after 1937; the people are willing to resist, but they must be organized, trained, and led.
At the headquarters of the Shansi–Suiyuan and Shansi–Chahar–Hopei Communist Base Areas I heard much more frank discussion of Communist plans for expansion than I had heard at Yenan. This was especially true after the fall of Kweilin and the rapid Japanese advance into Kweichow Province. Communist leaders pointed out on numerous occasions that Communist planning envisages the organization of Communist guerilla units in all areas of eastern China evacuated by Kuomintang forces and that it was hoped eventually to have a connected series of Base Areas extending from present bases in the north to the small Communist Base Area on the East River in Kwang-tung Province. If, say the Communists, the Japanese establish a line from north to south through China, that line must be harassed throughout its length by active guerilla operations and the people must be organized to support and to participate in such operations.
As an indication of positive action, it was pointed out that the recently established Communist guerilla base in the Sung Hsien area of northern Honan was effectively established by four regular regiments of the Eighth Route Army despatched to the area in plain clothes for the purpose of assisting in the organization and training of guerilla detachments activated earlier by local anti-Japanese elements and Communist underground workers. In this connection it is interesting to note that Communist leaders felt that one of the important reasons for early Communist action in northern Honan was to take advantage of large quantities of arms and equipment abandoned by retreating Kuomintang forces during the spring and summer of 1944 and collected by Honan peasants. It will be recalled that an important source of present Eighth Route Army equipment was battlefield sweeping in Shansi and Hopei in 1937 and 1938.
The Communists justify their expansionist plans on many grounds, chief among which are: (1) behind any Japanese advance there is a vast reservoir of hatred of the enemy among the people which should be turned to practical use; (2) disorganized Kuomintang forces cut off behind a Japanese advance prey upon their own people rather than [Page 214] oppose the enemy, chaos is compounded, and the isolated troops eventually become Japanese puppets in order to survive; (3) it is sound strategy to divide the strength of the enemy as much as possible by requiring him to disperse troops over a wide area in small garrisons to cover lines of communication and supply; (4) the morale of troops in isolated blockhouses and small garrison points deteriorates rapidly and they are thus more susceptible to psychological warfare approaches.
In the long run, however, the Communist leaders eventually return to their original premise, that the true strength of China is in her peasant masses. It is therefore necessary to organize the peasantry in order effectively to resist the enemy. Throughout the Communist controlled areas one is conscious of a deep pride of accomplishment in this work of peasant organization and its most impressive outward manifestation is the People’s Militia (a separate memorandum dated February 2, 1945 has been submitted on the People’s Militia). Among the Communists there is no doubt as to their ability to repeat in other parts of China their north China feats of popular organization.
Justifiably so or not, the Communist leaders are confident that within a comparatively short time they can materially expand their operations south of the Yangtze River, especially in the former Red Army areas of Kiangsi and Fukien. They admit that equipment is a serious problem but state that with abandoned Central Government equipment collected from the peasantry of areas from which the Central Government has withdrawn, with grenades and land mines of their own manufacture, and with a continuous limited increment of captured Japanese and puppet equipment they can establish important pockets of resistance behind the enemy.
The Communists maintain that troops are no problem. Regular units of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies can be despatched to new areas and replacements drawn from the People’s Militia. With the establishment of a People’s Militia in new areas there will be available a reserve for continued expansion.
With regard to expansion into Manchuria the Communists are less optimistic. They state that the Japanese have been in effective occupation for such an extended period and have developed the “protected village” and “pao chia” systems so extensively that Communist operations are too difficult at the present time. The limited areas of southwestern Liaoning and southern Jehol in which Communist units now operate are for all practical purposes considered as parts of eastern Hopei.
The Communists also state that there are serious difficulties facing their further expansion into areas of Suiyuan and Chahar where the population is predominantly Mongol. Previous experience of the [Page 215] Mongols over a long period of years under Chinese administrations has been unhappy and they are thus suspicious of all Chinese approaches. These suspicions have been confirmed by the attitude expressed toward national minorities in China in the Generalissimo’s book “China’s Destiny”. The Communists do maintain, however, that the lot of the majority under Japanese occupation in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is hard, that news of conditions under their own administrations is spreading gradually into these areas, that there is discontent and that Communist infiltration will be possible as external pressure on Japan increases and Communist strength grows and equipment improves.
In general it may be said that Communist plans for expansion are long-term in nature. It has been their experience in north and central China that too rapid expansion of their armed forces and territory is in the long run unsatisfactory; large forces may become too great a burden on the countryside and the inability successfully to continue operations in any given area brings serious enemy reprisals upon the people in addition to undermining confidence in Communist forces. They have therefore adopted a policy of consolidation of northern Base Areas and gradual expansion as opportunity offers. For example, the Communists point out that their operations on the north China plain in central Hopei have been expanded within the past eighteen months as the Japanese have withdrawn troops and thus reduced the number of strong points and blockhouses in order to make dispositions against the American advance in the Pacific. They state that their position has been especially improved since the American landings in the Philippine Islands. They report that although total Japanese and puppet numerical strength has not been changed greatly, they are now faced by a greater proportion of puppet troops and the reduced number of Japanese troops are of inferior training, equipment, and morale.
With regard to territory newly occupied by the Japanese, however, the Communist policy of expansion is somewhat different. In areas from which Central Government forces have been driven or have withdrawn rapid expansion of Communist operations is favored. Chaotic conditions, the hatred of the peasantry for the Japanese, the latent patriotism of liberal intellectuals, all offer ideal conditions for Communist expansion. The Communists maintain that the withdrawal of Kuomintang forces in the face of Japanese advances leaves behind a political vacuum which they are in position to fill and this they plan to do wherever and whenever possible.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 151, February 16; received March 3.↩