893.00/2–1945: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 19—2:10 p.m.]
245. Referring to Department’s recent telegram.4 Following is reputed text of statement of February 14 by Chou En-lai.
The representative of the Government, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh’s statement at the press conference for the foreign correspondents on Wednesday is not frank. [It] (is) unfair. For he only mentioned the so-called concessions from the Kuomintang side in the Kuomintang–Communist negotiations without explaining under what conditions or prerequisites will these concessions be made. First, in the negotiations the National Government demands that the Chinese Communist [Party] should give over all the troops under their leadership to the control of the military council of the National Government; that is to say, to turn over to be under the control of the Kuomintang, for the National Government is a government of one-party rule by the Kuomintang. Second, in the negotiations the Kuomintang obstinately insisted that the one-party dictatorship will not be concluded at present.
Because of these two conditions or prerequisites, all these concessions only become either impractical or meaningless. Even more, they are not concessions but conditions hampering and detrimental to the forces of the war of resistance. To speak concretely, these mean: first, there will be no legal status for the Chinese Communist Party if its troops are not given over to the Kuomintang Government; second, the members of the Military Council have never met, have no power whatsoever; third, the so-called War Cabinet under the party-ruled Executive Yuan has no power for final decisions of policy; fourth, one-party rule will not be abolished. The military policy of excluding others will not be changed, under which [Page 232] condition formation of the Joint Committee of Three to discuss the reorganization of Communist troops is still the same as giving over the Chinese Communist troops to the Kuomintang Government. However, on the basis of achievements in fighting against the Japanese, it is not the Chinese Communist troops that should be reorganized but the Kuomintang troops. When these are made clear it will be understandable why I, representing the Chinese Communist Party, refused the whole proposal of the National Government. This is one side. On the other side, the more important reason is, the National Government has refused our proposal of establishing a democratic coalition government, a united high command in order to unite all the armed forces, to change political, military, economic, cultural, and other policies. We have also proposed to the National Government, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Democratic Federation to call an inter-party conference to discuss and decide how to put an end to one-party rule, how to reorganize the Government into a democratic coalition government, to draft a common political program—so that, after it is agreed upon, the plan of establishing a democratic coalition government can be realized.
The reply of the National Government is a conference advisory in nature; and its main content, which they figured out beforehand, is to be the maintenance of one-party dictatorship and the opposition to democratic government. Thus I must return to Yenan to report to the Central Committee of my party.
As to our hope that the National Government will first release patriotic political prisoners, annul all decrees suppressing the people, stop all activities of the Special Service agencies, withdraw all troops surrounding the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia border region and attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, the Government authorities have not accepted. Such is the main content of the negotiations between the two parties in the past few months.
As to the American Ambassador General Hurley’s enthusiastic help and continuous efforts in the negotiations during the past few months, we take this chance to express here our thanks.