893.00/3–145
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent)19
The prospects for early political and military unity in China are discouraging. Chiang has announced plans for holding a Constitutional [Page 248] Convention in November to establish representative democratic government, but at the same time he has indicated clearly that during the interim period (which may prove to be of vital importance in military operations), there can be no question of “relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility”. He offers participation to the Communists in the Kuomintang Government but expresses opposition to the formation of a coalition government as a means of unifying and making more effective China’s war effort.
Quite apart from consideration of the relative justice of Chiang’s position and that of the Chinese Communists, the probability that unity of command will not be achieved in the near future, considered in the light of prospective military action in China this year, compels us to seek an alternative solution to the problem of effective utilization of all forces in China capable of fighting the Japanese.
There is every likelihood that American forces which might land on coastal areas north of Shanghai will find Chinese Communist troops in the near hinterland. Recent reports indicate that Communist troops are also pushing into the coastal areas of Chekiang Province south of Shanghai. There seems to be general agreement among the American military and civilian officials who have visited Communist territory that Communist forces could be of assistance not only in coastal landings but in related operations against the Japanese in north China, particularly in the matter of disrupting communications, provided they are given supplies.
Thus, while continuing to exert our influence to bring about Chinese political and military unity, we should be prepared, in the event of American military operations which could be aided by the cooperation of Chinese Communist forces, to supply those forces with arms and ammunition.
There should be no question of choosing between Chiang and the Communists; of withdrawal of support from Chiang. But likewise there should be no question of an exercise of our prerogative, dictated by military necessity, to utilize all forces in China capable of cooperating with us in the fight against Japan. Chiang, having failed to effect military unity, should be told that he has forfeited any claim to exclusive support.
Chiang’s initial reaction would probably be unfavorable—but without practical effect because it is extremely doubtful that he would be prepared actively to oppose aid to the Chinese Communists. There is also the probability that, faced with a positive statement of our stand and intentions, Chiang might actually be moved to effect, on a military level, the unity of forces for which we have been striving.
(Since preparing the foregoing, I have read Atcheson’s telegram [Page 249] no. [324] of February 28 and feel that it should receive the most serious consideration.)
- Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Grew) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine).↩