893.00/6–945: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 64
NCR 3334. There follows a report prepared last week by Secretary Ringwalt and Counselor Smyth65 which I am sending along in accordance with my policy of giving full freedom to my reporting officers even though I may not concur in their reports. We wish to make it clear that the report which follows is not concerned in any way with questions of policy. We wish merely to report as of interest information received from such varied Chinese sources (including Kuomintang, Liberal and Communist) that we feel it should not be ignored.
- 1.
- [The] Japanese retirement from Foochow on May 17 and from Nanning on May 26 are indicative of the accelerated pace of the Japanese withdrawal from South China which has been apparent for some time. The Japanese appear no longer to be interested in maintaining their line of communications to South China and Indochina and Japanese pockets left behind in these areas are expected to fight only delaying actions without hope of retirement to the North. There are even indications that Kweilin is to be treated in future as a secondary base only as air communications and other facilities are being reduced for transfer northward.
- 2.
- Coincidental with the Japanese withdrawal from South China has been reported intensification of the sharp but so far localized armed strife between the troops of the Kuomintang and the Communists who are competing to (1) fill the vacuum left by the retiring Japanese and (2) occupy or control coastal and other strategic areas [Page 407] in the hope of making contact with anticipated Allied landing forces. Skirmishes between the two parties are reported to have occurred in nearly every province in Central and Eastern China. Especially serious has been the fighting in southwestern Kwangtung, in western Honan, in northern Hunan, where six divisions of Kuomintang troops (three Szechwanese and three under Hsueh Yueh) are reported to be engaged in a sizable battle with the Communists near Pungkiang northeast of Changsha, and in western Chiniang where three divisions of Kuomintang troops plus several regiments of the so-called Loyal and Patriotic Army controlled by General Tai Li are reported to have suffered a serious reverse at the hands of the Communists who are said by several sources to have captured over 400 American rifles and machine guns.
- 3.
- From a number of independent sources it has been reported that although the Sixth Kuomintang Congress went on record as sponsoring a settlement of outstanding Communist problems through peaceful means (Embassy’s 801, May 19) the attitude of the ruling clique in private sessions was just the reverse. It is reported by several sources (including Kuomintang, Liberal and Communist) that on several occasions the Generalissimo addressed the Congress in secret session on the Communist question coupling the Communists with the Japanese as enemies of the state who should be shown no mercy. At a dinner given by the Generalissimo for some of his general officers about the time of the closing of the Congress he is said to have addressed them in similar tenor stating the coming 4 to 6 months prior to a possible allied landing on the China coast is the golden opportunity of the National Government to deal with the Communist traitors.
- 4.
- The Kuomintang, Liberal and Communist sources from which the information in the preceding paragraph originates are extremely pessimistic in regard to the immediate future of China anticipating that open civil war will break out and will increase in scope and violence. They express the opinion that whereas heretofore Chiang Kai-shek has made only veiled threats of an open break with the Communists he appears to be now convinced that the time has come to deal with them once and for all.
- 5.
- According to our informants, both Kuomintang and Communists are convinced that as long as what they consider to be the present U. S. policy of unlimited support of the Kuomintang continues there is no possibility of a peaceful settlement and both parties are becoming increasingly intransigent in their attitudes toward each other. In this connection our informants point out that whereas 6 months ago time seemed to be working on the side of the Communists it is now working for the Kuomintang. The inference is that for [Page 408] this reason the Communists may feel it to their advantage to precipitate the issue, while the Kuomintang, fearing a possible junction of U. S–Communist forces, if and when the latter effect a landing on the China coast, are also not averse to open conflict for key coastal positions.
Comment by Ambassador Hurley
The first two numbered paragraphs of the foregoing report cover strictly military rather than diplomatic or political matters. Since those together with the succeeding paragraphs convey an alarming impression of impending civil war deliberately provoked by the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang, I deemed it imperative to seek to ascertain the facts. Last Sunday evening I accordingly called a meeting attended by our Tao Minister, Counselors66 and Ringwalt and by General Wedemeyer, Colonel Dickey (Wedemeyer’s G–2), Commodore Miles, Head of the U. S. Navy Group, and the Military Attaché and the Assistant Naval Attaché. I thus brought together not only the Commanding General China Theater but also all other American Army and Navy Officers who should be best qualified to express opinions based on the widest possible sources of military information. Each was requested to comment on the military section of the Smyth–Ringwalt report and the opinions they expressed were in substance as follows:
There is no question but that the relations between the National Government and the Communists are unsatisfactory or that those relations are capable if existing tendencies are unchecked of eventually producing civil war. That however is nothing new. It was precisely because of those dangers that I was despatched to China last year at a time when the picture contained many less favorable factors than we find today. Then not only were Communist-National Government relations more strained than at present but our own relations both diplomatic and military with the National Government were also far from satisfactory. Sporadic clashes between Communist and guerrilla troops have been occurring over a period of recent years the most serious having taken place in March. These have not assumed the proportions of civil war. All of the facts have been reported by the Military Attaché and the Naval Attaché and G–2 when and as they occurred. Our military authorities have no information to confirm for example that six divisions of Kuomintang troops have been involved or that several regiments of Tai Li’s forces “have suffered serious reverses at the hands of the Communists” resulting in the capture of “over 400 American rifles and machine guns”. The situation with respect to these sporadic clashes is estimated by our military authorities as being less serious than it was 3 months ago and not more serious as implied by Smyth and Ringwalt. The [Page 409] Generalissimo has assured both Wedemeyer and me that he is using his best efforts to avoid civil war and the American military personnel present confirmed the fact that orders have been given by the National Government to make every effort to avoid engagements with Communist forces.
Questioned concerning the sources of Smyth’s and his information, Ringwalt declined absolutely to identify them although [after?] a comment by the Assistant Naval Attaché that an item of information in the military section of the report was very similar to one which the Attaché has received from Wong Ping-nan, a Chinese Communist whose statement had been discounted by the Attaché as exaggerated, Ringwalt admitted that this Chinese was one of his informants. In reply to a further question Ringwalt also stated that one of his Kuomintang informants admittedly held a grudge against the Generalissimo over an alleged slight and that therefore this information might be subject to discount as based on a desire to discredit the National Government of China. I made an oral summary along the above lines after hearing the opinions of those present and my Army and Navy callers agreed that it correctly reflected their views.
I then said that I wanted General Wedemeyer to understand that the American forces and the American Embassy in China are a single team dedicated to the promotion of U. S. policy as defined by the President and the Secretary of State. With respect to military information which might be received by the Embassy in the future this would in every case be made available to General Wedemeyer for evaluation and interpretation and if such information should be reported by the Embassy the interpretation and evaluation of headquarters would be included therewith. I said I expected to see the frankest and fullest collaboration between us to the end that the entire U. S. Government effort in China shall be directed undeviatingly toward the objectives of over-all U. S. policy. General Wedemeyer expressed his concurrence with all of the foregoing and the meeting adjourned.
The following day Smyth (who had been unable to attend the night before) called on me and after a discussion of the matter asked that transmission of the report be deferred at least until he had an opportunity to investigate further. However, in view of the previous insistence of the authors of the report that it be sent at the earliest possible moment and their further insistence at that time on “taking the responsibility for the report” I am not prepared to have it modified in the light of these developments. But I do feel that Smyth should not be held so accountable as Ringwalt for any faulty evaluation of fact contained therein. Both Ringwalt and Smyth know that the rumors they report to the effect that the U. S. policy is to give [Page 410] “unlimited support to the Kuomintang” is untrue. They know that I conferred with the Communists at their headquarters in Yenan and since that time have done so almost continuously. They know that I have made two visits to Russia for the sole purpose of finding a solution of the Communist problem in China and bringing harmony in the relations between China and Russia. They know all these facts and yet they apparently persist in the old diehard attempt to bring about the collapse of the National Government in China. For my part I believe that the Communist controversy can be settled satisfactorily and without civil war if some of our American ideological crusaders will permit the American Government policy to become effective.