Office of the Historian

893.00/6–2345

Memorandum by Mr. Everett F. Drumright of the Division of Chinese Affairs

[Washington,] June 28, 1945.

Subject: Kuomintang Relations

Reference is made to the attached Chungking telegram No. 1038, June 23, 3 p.m. on the above-cited subject.

[Here follows summary of telegram printed on page 416.]

Comment:

While the reported agreement of the Kuomintang and the Communists to resume negotiations through the agency of a committee composed of delegates of neither Kuomintang nor Communists affiliations is a hopeful sign, this development should not in itself be taken as indicating that a satisfactory solution is likely to eventuate.

In this connection, it should be remembered that the People’s Political Council which met in September 1944 passed a resolution providing for the formation of a similar committee. Such a committee was actually formed, but for reasons that are not altogether clear never initiated negotiations for a solution of the Kuomintang–Communist impasse.

In connection with this problem several points are believed to be worthy of comment:

(1)
It would appear from the Ambassador’s telegram that some of the appointed members of the committee may not be willing to serve thereon. This was true in the case of the committee set up by the [Page 423] People’s Political Council. The difficulties confronting the mission assigned the present committee are quite likely to cause some if not all the members to seek to evade the responsibility of serving thereon.
(2)
It will be noted that the Communists have invited the committee to proceed to Yenan to canvass the situation. While the Ambassador does not go into the matter in his telegram, the possibility exists that the Chinese Government will suggest that Communist representatives proceed to Chungking to carry on negotiations.
(3)
It will be noted, according to Ambassador Hurley, that while the Chinese Government is agreeable to recognition of the Communists as a political party, it refuses to recognize them as an armed belligerent or insurrectionary group. This last proviso would appear to be tantamount to reiteration of an oft-stated Government demand that the Communists subordinate their army to Government control. This the Communists have hitherto been unwilling to do, and it seems highly improbable that they will do so now or in the near future.
(4)
The recent violent criticism of the Kuomintang and its leaders emanating from Yenan, far from suggesting that the Communists desire reconciliation and unity with the Kuomintang, seems to indicate that the recent and present purpose of the Communists is rather to discredit the Kuomintang in the eyes of the Chinese people and the foreign powers.
(5)
The proceedings at the recently held Seventh Chinese Communist Party Congress, to the extent that they are available, indicate that the Communists are preparing the way for the formal establishment of a separate state in Chinese Communist-controlled areas of China. They do not indicate that the Communists entertain any thoroughgoing hopes of solidarity with the Kuomintang.
(6)
The recently reported decisions of the Chinese Communist Party not to participate in the meeting of the People’s Political Council to be held in Chungking in July is further evidence of a widening cleavage between Chungking and Yenan.
(7)
Comment available from the Chinese Communist press and radio suggests that the Communists have already made a firm decision to boycott the National Assembly which the Kuomintang proposes to hold in November.
(8)
Reports from various quarters are to the effect that during recent months and at present the Communists have made appreciable efforts to expand their areas of control in central, eastern and southern China. Communist territorial expansion in these areas is reported to have led to sporadic armed clashes with Kuomintang troops and is likely, if continued, to lead to further military friction and possibly to the resumption of general internecine strife.

Consideration of the above-mentioned trends and developments in the Chinese internal situation leads to the conclusion that Kuomintang–Communist relations have been steadily deteriorating and that the possibilities of their being solved or even improved by the efforts of committee under discussion are extremely remote.