Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/6–3045: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, June 30, 1945—10 p.m.
[Received June 30—6:24 p.m.]

1081. General Wang Jo-fei, ranking Chinese Communist in Chungking, accompanied by his interpreter, called on the Ambassador on June 28. (ReEmbtel 1067, June 28.) Counselor Smyth was present and made the following summary of their 3-hour conversation.

The Ambassador recalled to General Wang that he had been instrumental in obtaining the inclusion of a Communist delegate in the Chinese Govt delegation to the San Francisco Conference. He recalled also that he has made a trip to Yenan for conferences with Mao Tse-tung and had brought Chou En-lai and others to Chungking twice for the purpose of negotiating with the Govt, for a settlement. The Ambassador said that he had done more in an effort to bring about a just settlement between the Communists and the Govt than any other one man. He said he had been presented in the Communist press in China and elsewhere as being opposed to the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador said that he realized that much of the abuse was coming from people who are opposed to the National Govt of China and do not desire the unification of National and Communist armies in China. He said that notwithstanding all these unjust and untrue accusations, he is and has been the best friend the Chinese Communists have in Chungking.

The Ambassador admitted that he had assisted them in drafting the Communists’ 5-point proposal. He had presented that proposal to the Gmo. No other person had ever taken up the Communist case so vigorously with the Gmo. The Ambassador said that he believed that the press and other attacks on him constituted an attempt to keep the Communists and Kmt apart by persons who wished, for their own selfish reasons, to prevent the creation of a free, united, democratic and strong China. (Sent to the Dept., repeated to Moscow.)

General Wang stated frankly that real communism in China under present conditions is impossible. The General stated, however, with perfect candor that the party now supports democratic principles but only as a stepping stone to a future communistic state.

The Ambassador said that he had provided a plane to take the Committee of Seven and General Wang to Yenan on July 1st; that the Committee had requested his assistance in the discussion, but that he would not do so unless also requested by the Communists.

The Ambassador inquired whether the Communists would be willing to join in a Steering Committee to advise throughout during the transition period (remainder of the “period of tutelage” which would presumably end with the adoption of a constitution by the National Assembly opening on November 12th) and suggest ways and means to improve the Govt. General Wang replied that this would depend on whether the Committee had real power, if it were only to be a committee without real authority, then it would not be acceptable.

The Ambassador recalled that he had brought the Communist 5-point proposal to Chungking, where some Govt officials had told him that he had “been sold a bill of goods” by the Communists. However, he felt that he was making progress in convincing the Gmo that the proposals were generally reasonable, when the Communists sent in four additional conditions, namely:

1. Release all political prisoners in the country such as Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-chen, Yeh Ting, Liao Ch’eng-chih and numerous other patriots still in prison.

2. Withdraw the large Kmt forces surrounding the Shensi-Kansu–Ninghsia border region and those attacking the New Fourth Army in Central China and the anti-Japanese column in South China.

3. Abolish all the repressive regulations restricting freedom of the people.

4. Stop all special secret service activity.

General Chou En-lai asked that these conditions be met by the National Government as conditions precedent to any agreement by the Communists on the five points which they themselves had submitted through the Ambassador. The arrival of these new proposals blocked his efforts as the Gmo refused even to consider them. General Wang said that if the Government had agreed to the four points, there would have been no trouble over the five points. The Ambassador pointed out that if the four points had been accepted the Communists would have obtained all they wanted and would not have needed to go further with the five points. The Ambassador remarked that the Govt had already withdrawn some 60,000 troops from the north; there was considerable freedom of speech and press (the Communist newspaper is allowed to be published in Chungking); and Secret Police were necessary in wartime to deal with important security matters, as witness of CBI⁸⁴ and England’s Scotland Yard. The Ambassador said that if the 5-point proposal was agreed to, the Communists would then be a part of the Govt and would themselves take a hand in the settlement of the questions included in the four-point proposal.

General Wang believed that the 5-point proposal, with some alterations, would still be acceptable to the Communists as a basis for negotiations, indicating, however, that they would like to see the four points accepted before agreeing on the five points. The Ambassador said that the Gmo had informed him that he is prepared to make generous political concessions in order to bring about national unity—indicating that he was speaking of the Gmo, as distinct from the Govt. The Ambassador told General Wang that he believed the 5-point proposal of the Communists and the 3-point proposal of the Government contained in themselves sufficient basis for an agreement between the parties. The Ambassador felt certain that the Communist 5-point proposal with some alterations would be acceptable as a basis for negotiations.

General Wang requested that, while the Committee of Seven was engaged in conversations with the Communists at Yenan, the Ambassador endeavor to persuade the Gmo to accept the 4-point proposal as a condition precedent to further negotiations. The Ambassador replied that for the reasons already stated, he could not do so. Action on the four points should come after and not before an agreement with the armed Communist Party. The Ambassador stated frankly that nearly everyone familiar with the situation was of the opinion that if the Gmo conceded the four points prior to an agreement the Communists would not enter into any agreement at all. The Ambassador pointed out further that events were moving very rapidly and that perhaps the logic of events would bring a solution of the controversy between the Communists and the Government without strife and without formal agreement.

The Ambassador said that in his opinion one of the most serious factors prejudicing a settlement between the Communists and the Kmt was their mutual lack of confidence. He expressed his earnest hope that the Kmt, Communists, Democratic League and others would now get together as patriotic Chinese and endeavor to create a free, united and democratic China.

Hurley

84. Symbol of American intelligence unit.