893.00/7–1045: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 87
[Received July 10—8:21 a.m.]
1139. Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information, advised the Embassy yesterday that the new Communist proposals brought back from Yenan covered principally two main points: (ReEmbtel 1127, July 7) (1) that the National Government call off (at once?) [or postpone] the National Assembly scheduled for November 12; (2) that the National Government summon a political conference composed on the basis of equality of representation of the Kuomintang, Communists and Democratic League, three members from each party with an additional three members to be chosen from independent political parties or organizations.
The function of the political conference is to decide the time for the termination of Kuomintang party rule, the organization of coalition government and to set up a program for the new government. (Sent to Dept as No. 1139, repeated to Moscow.)
Dr. Wang said that the new Communist proposal made no mention of the main purpose of the meeting, namely, the unification of the military forces of China.
Dr. Wang pointed out that if a political conference was called on the basis suggested by the Communists, the Communists, a minority party, the Democratic League, a very small party with Communist leanings, and two still smaller independent parties with Communist leanings, all of which together represent only a minority of the Chinese people, would control the political conference. This is said to be a deep laid plot by which the Communists expect to get control of the National Government. If it is a plot at all, it seems naive.
My own opinion is that even the Communists do not take this play seriously. It is their way of playing for time awaiting the results of the Soong conference at Moscow.
We advised President Roosevelt more than a year ago that the Communist problem in China could not be settled until the Soviet attitude [Page 431] toward the Chinese Communists was known to us and understood by Chiang Kai-shek. In compliance with this suggestion we went to Moscow late in August, 1944, for the purpose of ascertaining definitely the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese Communists. We did ascertain that attitude and we did recommend more harmonious relations between the Soviet and China. (See my telegram to the President and Marshall, NK 22221, dated September 8 [7], 194488 and many others to the President. Our telegram to Secretary of State NK 167, February 4, 1945,89 and the Secretary of State’s telegram to me dated February 6, 1945, NK 200,90 and many others.)
Personally we convinced Chiang Kai-shek of the advisability of sending an emissary to Moscow. Soong was chosen. The Soviet agreed to receive him the latter part of February. We thought a solution would be reached at that time. Soong’s visit to Moscow was postponed from time to time for various reasons all of which were reported.
We are convinced that the influence of the Soviet will control the action of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communists do not believe that Stalin has agreed or will agree to support the National Government of China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists still fully expect the Soviet to support the Chinese Communists against the National Government. Nothing short of the Soviet’s public commitment will change the Chinese Communist opinion on this subject.
The Chinese Communists are threatening to publish the five-point basis for settlement which we obtained from them November 10, 1944, and presented to the National Government. The Communists say they will charge that we were the author of the five points. We will not deny the charge if it is made but we are too modest to claim that we are the sole author of the five points. They contain much Communist material and suggestions.
The publication of the five points at this time will not be embarrassing. It will in fact be helpful. I have told the Generalissimo that Mao Tze-tung seems to want to publish the five points. We asked permission of the Generalissimo to say to Mao Tze-tung that we would consent to the publication. The Generalissimo gave his approval. However, on further consideration, we thought possibly the publication of the five points and a Communist-National Government debate at this moment might not be helpful to Soong’s negotiations in Moscow. For that reason we shall not tell Mao Tze-tung for the present that there is no objection to publication but we do believe [Page 432] that all offers of settlement from both sides should be published at an early date.
The reasons we favor the publication of the five points is that they offer (1) a reasonable basis for settlement; (2) a unification of two objectives of the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the National Government and (3) the only document that Mao Tze-tung has ever signed in which he agrees to conditions under which the Chinese Communist Party will submit control of the Communist Army to the National Government. The five points are not altogether satisfactory to the National Government but they do furnish a basis on which a fair settlement can be obtained. (For the five points see our message to the Secretary of State, NR 141, January 31, 6 p.m.).
We are advising the National Government that if an agreement is reached with Russia the National Government can afford to be very generous in the political concessions it will have to make to secure the unification of the armed forces of China.
Before the Yalta Conference, I suggested to President Roosevelt a plan91 to force the National Government to make more liberal political concessions in order to make possible a settlement with the Communists. The President did not approve the suggestion.
I believe the Soviet’s attitude toward the Chinese Communist is as I related it to the President in September last year and have reported many times since. (See my Navy telegram NK 232355, December 23, 1944, to the Secretary of State.92) This is also borne out by Stalin’s statement to Hopkins and Harriman. Notwithstanding all this, the Chinese Communists still believe that they have the support of the Soviet. Nothing will change their opinion on this subject until a treaty has been signed between the Soviet and China in which the Soviet agrees to support the National Government. When the Chinese Communists are convinced that the Soviet is not supporting them, they will settle with the National Government if the National Government is realistic enough to make generous political concessions.
The negotiations between the Government and the Communist Party at this time is merely marking time pending the result of the conference at Moscow.
The leadership of the Communist Party is intelligent. When the handwriting is on the wall, they will be able to read it. No amount of argument will change their position. Their attitude will be changed only by the inexorable logic of events.
The strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Communists has been exaggerated. The area of territory controlled by the Communists [Page 433] has been exaggerated. The number of the Chinese people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated. State Department officials, Army officers, newspaper and radio publicity have in large measure accepted the Communist leaders’ statements in regard to the military and political strength of the Communist Party in China. Nevertheless with the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communists could bring about civil war in China. Without the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communist Party will eventually participate as a political party in the National Government.
- In telegram No. 1141, July 10, 4 p.m., the Ambassador requested the Department to repeat No. 1139 to the Secretary of State (en route to Potsdam).↩
- Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 154.↩
- Post, p. 851.↩
- Post, p. 852.↩
- See telegram from the Ambassador in China to President Roosevelt, January 14, 3 p.m., p. 172.↩
- Apparently the Ambassador’s telegram received in the Department on December 24, 1944, 12:10 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 745.↩