FE Files, Lot 52–354
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)97
Reference is made to a memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary requesting the preparation of a brief commentary on the attached paper by Mr. William R. Johnson on the subject “Will Russia Supersede Japan as Aggressor in the Orient?”98
Mr. Johnson’s paper centers on the thorny subject of Kuomintang-Communist relations and his concept of what American policy should be in relation to China.
In brief, Mr. Johnson holds that for several years the American public has been subjected to an intensive propaganda campaign which has as its aims: (1) disparagement of the Chinese National Government, and (2) glorification of the Chinese Communists. The final objective of this campaign, according to Mr. Johnson, is the establishment in China of a Communist government dominated by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Johnson considers that such a development would be contrary to traditional United States policy and would jeopardize the interests and security of the United States. He consequently advocates continued United States support of the National Government of China as the policy best calculated to advance both the interests of China and the United States.
Mr. Johnson regards the propaganda which he asserts is being disseminated in this country in favor of the Chinese Communists as self-contradictory and misleading, and he undertakes on page 2 of his paper, in summary form, and on the following pages in extended form, to set forth six “reasons” as to why he is opposed to the conclusions which he regards as inherent in the propaganda campaign to which he makes allusion.
The six “reasons” (the last of which relates to the author’s concept of American policy toward China) are succinctly outlined on page 2 of the paper and clearly indicate its scope and content. It is accordingly [Page 435] recommended that these six “reasons”, together with part VII (pages 28–30), be read in their entirety.
It may be noted here that Mr. Johnson is an American missionary of many years’ experience in China, and that by virtue of his residence in Kiangsi Province during the period of Chinese Communist ascendancy in the lower part of the province (1928–1934) he was in a unique position to study the activities and policies of that group.
It seems evident that Mr. Johnson has drawn to a considerable degree on his own knowledge and observations in support of the conclusions advanced in his paper. It seems evident, also, that he has put much thought and care into its preparation. There can be little question but that Mr. Johnson is sincere in his convictions—particularly his distrust of the Chinese Communists.
While some of Mr. Johnson’s asserted statements of fact may be open to question and perhaps certain of his convictions may be regarded as extreme, he has nevertheless written a paper which is worthy of consideration and study.
In this general connection, Mr. Johnson appears to be laboring under the apprehension that United States policy has been influenced by the propaganda campaign to which he alludes: specifically, that some of our chief representatives in China have applied pressure on Chiang Kai-shek in behalf of the Chinese Communists (see last paragraph on page 27). While the United States seeks internal unity in China, it is obvious that the United States does not seek unity in China at the sole expense of the National Government or to promote the ambitions of the Chinese Communists, but in order to foster the prosecution of the war and to bring about stability in China. Also, while there is reason to believe that the Chinese Communists have a close ideological affinity with the Soviet Union, Mr. Johnson’s conclusion that they would willingly alienate Chinese territory to the Soviet Union seems scarcely tenable (see (3) page 2).