Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/7–3145

Memorandum by Colonel S. V. Constant, Director, Security and Intelligence Division, Headquarters, Second Service Command

[New York,] July 31, 1945.

1. W. H. Donald, age 68, was born in Australia and educated there and in England. In 1903, he went to China as an advisor to the Viceroy of Shantung Province and remained in the country for approximately 42 years except for periodic visits abroad. During these years he personally knew China’s leaders including Sun Yat Sen and succeeding dignitaries, working closely with them while engaged in private work as a newspaperman. At various periods he was editor of the China Mail, correspondent for the N. Y. Herald Tribute, and Manchester Guardian, among others. In 1928 or 1929 he ceased newspaper work to devote his time and energy to China’s political problems and in 1934 became personal and political advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. As an advisor to him, Source knew intimately the leading Chinese dignitaries and worked closely in the shaping of China’s policies. In 1940, due to a personal difference of opinion with the Generalissimo on a matter of interpretation of policy, Source left China and went to the Philippines. He remained there until internment by the Japanese in Los Banos, Philippine Islands, and several other camps while the Japanese futilely sought to locate and identify him as a personal friend of the Generalissimo and one intimately connected with Chinese affairs. His identity was never discovered by the Japanese. Upon release from internment, he was aided in returning for rest to the United States by G–2 offices in Manila to whom he reported in length. At San Francisco, New York, and Washington, since his recent return, he has reported to various Intelligence Agencies on Chinese military and political aspects, both domestic and foreign. Source was extremely open and frank and spoke with authority on China’s problems, based on his personal acquaintance with leading Chinese personalities over a period of 42 years. He was interviewed 26 July 1945.

2. Source stated that many aspects of Chinese internal problems could be settled by the simple expediency of a change in the approach of the United States to China which would, at the same time, bring about fundamental alterations in their foreign policies. Changes in foreign and domestic status would be highly beneficial to the United States.

The change advocated by Source centers upon the policies of various American military and political advisors to the Chungking Government. It has been the general practice, Source stated, for such advisors to urge, upon the Generalissimo, complete and full cooperation with the Chinese Reds, whereas the situation should be reversed; our advisors should demand of the Chinese Reds, as a rebel, and recalcitrant force, that they should be the yielding force rather than the Chungking National Government.

Source asked simply, “if the Communists of this country became a rebel source and a continual sore spot and Great Britain’s advisors urged the Washington National Government to yield to those Reds, what would the people of this country think of Great Britain taking such a stand? That is the similar situation in China today. China resents the sustained ‘hammering’ of our advisors on the Generalissimo in an effort to secure greater national cooperation. Let them go to Yenan and make those demands of the Chinese Communists”.

China, he added, nationally, sees no reason why it should yield in its determined efforts to get the full cooperation of the Reds. The Chungking Government is the nationally constituted party and should be so recognized. It is up to the Chinese Reds to recognize this.

As is well known the Generalissimo has long fought the Communists and, Source stated, will continue to do so. The sooner our various representatives to China learn this, the sooner will the United States position in China be bettered. China needs the full aid of this country and by getting it, China’s internal problems will be more easily ironed out to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Source believes the sooner our advisors to the Chungking government cease trying to force the Generalissimo to give in to various Chinese Red demands the quicker will be the results for all. In the same vein, we should desist in sending as advisors, the “table pounding, shouting, dynamic” type, for once a “table is pounded”, the Chinese feel they have “lost face”. And the act of “losing face” is a serious problem, full implications of which are rarely grasped by the Occidental mind.

Source stated that many of the aspects of the Red problem in China could be countered if the United States could convince the Yenan [Reds?] of the necessity of the two following points:

1. To institute an organized, sustained campaign against the Japanese, rather than sporadic “columnar” attacks, thereby at the same time showing to one and all there is no hoarding of arms and supplies for a possible civil war later.

2. To give greater cooperation to the Kuomintang government, especially in the disposition of Armed Forces under Nationalist command.

Source does not believe the Yenan Reds are operating and functioning with the backing and favor of the U. S. S. R. In 1936, he said, Russia withdrew its support of the Chinese Communists. The present group of Chinese Communists are a “hangover” minority presently trading on former Russian influence, each striving for personal gain and influence through a “reign of terror and demoralization and excessive taxation in an effort to secure more territorial gain”.

Source feels that the United States policy of “kowtowing” to the Yenan group is a serious mistake. “And we would be arming a civil war, were we to supply arms to a rebel political party. They have no more reason to be armed in China than they have in America”.

But, Source stated, there are serious defects in the Kuomintang itself. Source has long attempted to convince the Generalissimo of the necessity of certain governmental changes. Source advocated:

1. Formation of a Chinese Civil Service to secure only the properly educated and qualified for governmental service.

2. Repudiation of incompetent ranking officials who secured their positions through favoritism, friendship or financial standing.

Most officials in the present government, he added, are there by virtue of personal “pull” or their financial standing. As a result, there is no progressive spirit and a definite lack of nationalism so that in his opinion “95% of the present Kuomintang should be booted out”. In addition, there is a pro-German element, a “bad lot”, who in 1940 were subtly attempting to push China into the Axis sphere, although now are avowedly pro-American, and rabidly nationalistic: This “lot” he said were led by Ho-ying Ching, former Minister of War and Chu Chao Hwa,⁴ both of whom still yield strong influence and “are bad for the Generalissimo”. Both men asked Chiang Kai Shek for the deportation of Source in 1940, and both are still very close to the Generalissimo. Their influence on China’s domestic and international policies, with the possibility of an inimical attitude to the United States can be broken only, Source stated, by winning back Chiang Kai Shek’s confidence in the United States intentions, backing him in his national political efforts and encouraging his government by all out political cooperation and materiel supply.

Source feels that T. V. Soong, long antagonistic personally to the Generalissimo, might tend to show partiality to the Chinese Reds. It is Soong’s ambition, he added, to run China and to have the Generalissimo take his orders. As long as the Yenan group opposes Chiang Kai Shek, Soong will find personal pleasure in the situation, for in it Soong can see a threat to Chiang Kai Shek’s power. He will continue to be considerate of the Reds and rebels of China no matter who they might be as long as they constitute any menace to Chiang Kai Shek. Source feels that upon the death of Chiang Kai Shek, Soong will try and step in his shoes. He feels that Soong has a good international reputation and is internationally minded and as a result might bring progress to China in the international picture, provided he and the Generalissimo continue to work together at least outwardly, although inwardly they are not in accord personally with one another. Source believes that Soong’s present conferences with Stalin might prove of benefit to China, provided he forgets his personal dislike of the Generalissimo, and does not grant too much to Russia to enable them “to do in China what the papers here in America might push the Russians into doing”. But, he added, he believes Soong’s position will depend largely upon how much a threat he presents to Chiang Kai Shek’s influence and could possibly be relieved of his duties if that threat becomes too powerful.

Referring again to the practices of the United States toward China, Source advises:

1. Present advisors should prove to China that the United States is trying to help them.

2. Do away with unequal treaties and selfish private enterprise practices which exploit China.

3. Drop as quickly as possible our feeling of superiority over the Chinese and eliminate the “table pounding” type of advisor, both military and economic.

4. Engage in as quickly as possible a campaign to win China’s confidence as to our intentions toward them, to eliminate the threat of which we think Russia might be led to do in China if they gain China’s confidence.

For the Commanding General:

S. V. Constant

4. Chu Chia-hua, holder of prominent positions in the Kuomintang and in the Nationalist Government throughout the 1930’s and early 1940’s; Minister of Education from November 1944.