Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

740.00119 P. W./5–2945

Memorandum Concerning United States Post-War Military Policies With Respect to China¹²

April 3, 1945

(State Department Paper dated 3 April 1945)

The Problem

1. To establish a United States policy toward post-war China which will serve to determine the character of American post-war military policies with respect to China, such as the giving of United States assistance toward the establishment of an effective Chinese air force.

Discussion

2. Long-range Objectives and Policy of the United States with respect to China.

The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to China is based on the need to have China a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East as a fundamental condition for peace and security in that area. In particular, the political aspects of our policy are directed toward the establishment of a strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people which will effectively discharge its internal and international responsibilities. While favoring no political faction we continue to support the existing government of China. However, we look for the establishment within its framework of the unified and effective type of government that is needed. Should the authority of the existing government disintegrate, we would reexamine our position in the light of the manifested wishes of the Chinese people and regard sympathetically any broadly representative government or movement which gave promise of achieving unity and of contributing to peace and security in eastern Asia.

3. Important political and economic considerations, some of which are mentioned below, are involved in the development of a strong China capable of contributing effectively to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. The future military strength of China is also an important element. A well-trained and well-equipped Chinese national (non-political) army, supported by a modern air force, would unquestionably contribute materially to the maintenance of a strong China. In the opinion of the Department of State, however, the achievement of internal unity and the establishment of a stable government supported by the people are prerequisites thereto.

4. Political Considerations.

Existing political conditions in China are such as to require the greatest caution and flexibility in the application of measures designed to implement the objectives set forth in paragraph 2.

a. The American Government recognizes and supports the National Government of the Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. However, the unrepresentative character of the present government which is strictly controlled by a single party, namely, the Kuomintang, the inefficiency of its governmental, administrative and judicial machinery, the inefficiency and corruption prevalent in the present Chinese army and air force, the lack of protection accorded to persons and property and the absence of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, constitute factors which have created widespread dissatisfaction with the present National Government.

b. There are political groups of varying strength and importance which are opposed to the present Kuomintang-controlled National Government. These are:

(1) The Chinese Communist Party which, during the past ten years and in spite of the efforts of the National Government to liquidate its members, has developed into a dynamic force controlling considerable areas in the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, Anhwei and Kiangsu. It exercises political and military control over a population variously estimated to range from twenty to fifty million people.

(2) The Democratic League which may be described as a loose federation of minor political parties and groups opposed to continued control of the government by a single party, namely the Kuomintang.

(3) Certain Chinese militarists in Szechuan, Yunnan and Kwangsi. Mention might also be made of the semi-independent military rulers of Tsinghai, Sikang and Ninghsia whose allegiance to the National Government is largely nominal.

The existence of these dissident elements whose opposition to Kuomintang control of the National Government appears to be increasing rather than diminishing, constitutes a disturbing factor in the present political situation in China. This political disaffection has, of course, been greatly aggravated by the severe hardships suffered by the people as a result of eight years of continuous resistance to the Japanese.

It appears to the Department of State to be of the utmost importance that our support of the present Kuomintang-controlled National Government should be realistically alert to these political factors which may conceivably result in the overthrow of the present government or the outbreak of civil war. Through our diplomatic and military representatives in China, efforts are being made to induce the leaders of the present National Government to take rapid and concrete measures to effect the establishment of constitutional government and to bring about the internal unity and solidarity which is essential to the development of China as a strong nation capable of maintaining peace and security in the Far East. The measures recently announced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to the convening of a National Congress in November 1945 for the avowed purpose of formulating measures for the establishment of constitutional government are hopeful indications. Whether the proposed congress will include all political parties and whether a constitutional government based solidly upon the support of the people will in fact be established in the near future remains to be seen.

5. Economic and Financial Considerations.

The development of China’s military strength involves numerous economic and financial problems.

a. The creation and support by China of an effective army and air force involves such considerations as the extent and availability of natural resources in China, the development of industries, particularly heavy industries, technical knowledge and the financial resources of the country. While China’s natural resources, particularly her resources in coal, minerals and petroleum, have yet to be completely and adequately surveyed, it may be said that China is either deficient in or has limited resources of many minerals essential to the development of a munitions industry and that her petroleum resources are scanty and located in remote areas. China is also seriously deficient in trained personnel and technical knowledge. An attempt to build up a munitions industry to support a modern army and air force by the importation of raw materials and machinery from abroad would constitute a very heavy drain on China’s financial resources. In such circumstances the fostering of a munitions industry would seriously impede the development of a sound Chinese economy in which industry, agriculture, transportation and communications should be integrated and well-balanced; in other words, if China is to support a modern air force and ground force from her own limited natural and financial resources it would appear inevitable that sound and balanced economic progress cannot be expected. The utilization of the major portion of China’s financial resources to build up or purchase armaments is in our opinion unwise in view of China’s acute and urgent need to repair the ravages of war and to reconstruct and expand the country’s communications, agriculture and industries.

b. If the United States is to assume primary responsibility for the development and support of a post-war Chinese air force as appears to be contemplated, Congressional reaction to such assistance should be carefully considered in formulating a definitive policy. If it is contemplated that the United States should underwrite the supply of planes and equipment, which would involve substantial sums, it will certainly be necessary to obtain Congressional approval for such expenditures or loans. Whether in the post-war period the Congress would see fit to appropriate sufficient funds or approve loans for this purpose appears to the Department of State to be somewhat problematical. It is the belief of the Department of State that any credits which this government might agree to extend to China should be utilized largely to assist China to build a well-balanced economy which in its opinion will in the long run give to China the strength, stability and prosperity essential to the creation and maintenance of a modern army and air force.

c. The Army Air Forces believe that the United States should adopt a definitive program to assist in the creation of a strong Chinese air force to preclude the Chinese from turning to other nations for assistance. The Department of State is of the opinion that the British would be unlikely to embark on such a program, which they can ill afford, if the internal political situation in China should show no substantial improvement and should continue to deteriorate. It is also believed that Soviet Russia is even more unlikely to give assistance to a Kuomintang-controlled National Government; it is much more probable that Soviet Russia will assist the Chinese Communists. We do not know of any other country which has the financial and technical resources or is sufficiently interested in China to embark on an extensive and expensive program such as is envisaged.

Conclusions

6. We desire to see a strong united China capable of making its full contribution to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Implicit in this objective are the development of an effective and modern Chinese army and air force based upon a sound economy and the rendering by the United States of practicable assistance in the creation of such forces. However, in the opinion of the Department of State the implementation of this objective is dependent not only upon the political, economic and financial considerations mentioned above, but also upon the extent to which future peace in the Pacific area can be maintained by regional and international security organizations.

7. The Department of State believes that the equipping and training at the present time of the forces of the National Government and the training of personnel and the supplying of planes and equipment to the Chinese air force with the object of utilizing these forces against the Japanese is entirely justified and should be continued until Japanese forces in China and Manchuria are destroyed. In a communication from the State Department to the Secretaries of War and the Navy^* the following statement occurs:

“The mission of our military authorities in China, we believe, should be focused for the present upon the short-term objective described above (assistance in mobilizing all of China’s human and material resources for prosecution of the war against Japan). Undoubtedly measures devised to ‘contain’ Japanese forces, in cooperation with the Chinese, will result in a degree of rearmament of Chinese forces, but it is believed that measures undertaken at this time to rearm China in order that it might become a strong Asiatic power would be impracticable.”

8. With respect to the post-war period and with particular reference to the problem stated in the directive under consideration, the Department of State feels that it would be unwise to commit ourselves in any way with the present National Government of China to assist in the development and maintenance of a modern post-war Chinese air force unless and until:

a. Internal political unity and stability have been achieved in China.

b. The Chinese Government has obtained the support of the Chinese people.

c. The economy of China, with such assistance as it may be practicable for the United States and other countries to render, has been sufficiently developed to support a modern army and air force.

Recommendations

9. In view of the present unstable political situation in China, and the impaired and undeveloped state of China’s economy, it is recommended that we enter into no specific commitments at this time with the present National Government of China to assist in the development and maintenance of a modern Chinese air force in the post-war period. It is further recommended that this question be reconsidered when in the opinion of the interested departments of the American Government:

a. Internal political unity and stability have been achieved in China.

b. The Chinese Government has obtained the support of the Chinese people.

c. The economy of China, with such assistance as it may be practicable for the United States and other countries to render, has been sufficiently developed to support a modern army and air force.

12. Transmitted with a covering memorandum from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 83/1) to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy on May 28. This memorandum was the same as the one by Mr. H. Freeman Matthews printed on p. 116.
13. See Annex hereto. [Footnote in the original; for text of document under reference, see memorandum of January 29, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent), p. 37.]