761.93/7–945: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Truman and the Secretary of State
091730. Soong asked me to call on him again this morning to discuss the situation confronting him in his negotiations with Stalin, whom he expects to see again tonight, and to ask my personal reactions. I told him that I had nothing further to add to what I had previously said in accordance with your message No. 308 July 4 regarding the provision in the Yalta Agreement on Outer Mongolia.
On the differences between the Generalissimo’s proposals and Stalin’s demands on the arrangements for the Ports, I expressed the personal view that although I would be pleased if Stalin accepted the Generalissimo’s proposals I did not believe that he would do so. I considered the Generalissimo was being unrealistic in not conceding [Page 925] more liberal rights and privileges to the Soviets, as it seemed to me that under his proposal it would be completely impossible for the Russians to establish a naval base at Port Arthur. I referred to the type of lease that the British had granted us in their possessions adjacent to the United States and stated that I believed that if the Generalissimo was sincere in his willingness to offer the Soviets a naval base at Port Arthur the Soviets must have full privileges for administration and defense of the Port and sufficient adjacent area to establish airfields and other defenses. In connection with the Port of Dairen I also expressed the view that the Generalissimo could afford to be somewhat more liberal in the rather restricted special privileges which I now find he proposes to grant the Soviets. I pointed out that 20 years was a short period for the arrangements and that his argument that the Treaty of Friendship only ran for this period was not entirely valid since the Treaty provides for an automatic renewal unless terminated by either party. I urged Soong not to come to an impasse with Stalin over the Generalissimo’s proposals as to the ports and railroads and if the present differences could not be adjusted in the short time remaining of his visit that he should leave the discussions in as friendly a manner as possible and indicate that these matters would be given most serious consideration on his return to Chungking. It is my personal impression that he personally is ready to go considerably further than the Generalissimo’s proposal in attempting to meet Stalin’s demands. It should not be inferred however that he is ready to accept Stalin’s proposals which he definitely considers go beyond the Yalta Agreement and would mean Soviet infringement on Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria because of the proposed Soviet complete control of Dairen, the railroads, and the industries connected therewith.
Soong specifically states that he would resist any attempt of the Soviets to restrict freedom of all nations in the use of the Port of Dairen as a free port and of the transportation facilities on the railroad and in the development of commerce within Manchuria. In this he showed that he was in agreement with your attitude given for my personal information in Navy cable No. 310, July 6.80
I again pointed out to him the great advantages to the National Government in coming to an agreement with the Soviet Government prior to the entry of Soviet troops into Manchuria and the serious consequences which otherwise might result. He agreed and I gained the impression that he was prepared to make realistic concessions to attain such an agreement providing the form of the agreement was of a character that could be accepted with “face” by the National Government and providing he was satisfied that the Soviet Government would [Page 926] in fact, and not only in generalities, support the National Government in unifying China.
Soong is concerned over the limited time left before Stalin must leave for Berlin. Because of the slowness of communications with the Generalissimo he is fearful that even if Stalin accepts the Generalissimo’s proposal on Outer Mongolia there will not be time to come to a compromise agreement as to the ports and railroads. I urged him to attempt to get Stalin to agree that if an understanding could not be reached during his present visit, a communiqué be issued giving a favorable and friendly atmosphere to the progress made during his discussions in order to leave the way fully open for a resumption of the discussions at an early date in whatever manner seems best.