Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Moscow Embassy Files—710 Sino-Soviet Relations

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Davies)

[Moscow,] July 10, 1945.

Estimate of Soviet Policy in East Asia

I. The Soviet Union may be expected to pursue in East Asia a unilateral policy designed to revise the situation in the Far East in its favor, for the following reasons:

A. Security against:

1. China which can, if it develops along certain lines, emerge after one or two generations as the greatest single threat to the Soviet Union on the Eurasian continent;

2. Korea as a natural corridor for an attack on the Soviet Far East;

3. The Kuriles, Karafuto, Hokkaido and Honshu which are so situated as to constitute in varying degrees a potential menace to the Soviet Far East. The example of the British Isles serving as a springboard for a transoceanic invasion of the adjacent continental land mass is presumably not lost on the Kremlin.

B. Naval and merchant marine expansion.

1. The need for new ports and bases to accommodate an expanded Soviet merchant marine and navy is another reason for a revisionist Soviet policy in East Asia.

2. Control over certain straits in the Japanese chain of islands stretching from Shumushu to Formosa is essential to the USSR if it is to have free access to the open Pacific. Such control can be assured only through Soviet command over the islands dominating those straits.

C. The political attraction of:

1. The internal struggle for power in China which seems likely to develop during the final stages of the Pacific War into open conflict between Chungking and Yenan. Whether the unilateral policy toward China, resulting in part from this political attraction, will be aggressive or apparently passive depends on tactical considerations (discussed below).

2. The political vacuum in Korea which will exist following the destruction of Japanese authority there.

3. Chaos in Japan during the concluding phases of and after the war.

II. Minimum Soviet Objectives in East Asia:

A. Security cordon (areas which the Soviet Union will seek to dominate or win the voluntary allegiance of):

• North China, including Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. (Outer Mongolia is here considered to be a part of the Soviet System).
• Manchuria.
• Korea.
• Karafuto (southern Sakhalin).
• Kurile Islands.

B. With regard to Japanese main islands:

1. A voice in the peace dictate to be delivered Japan.

2. An opportunity to exploit politically the postwar situation in Japan.

III. Possible Choices of Soviet Strategy. In seeking to attain its objectives in East Asia, the Kremlin has open to it three choices of strategy:

A. Military conquest.

While this strategy would yield the Soviet Union control over that part of continental Asia which the USSR now desires, an open display of Soviet power and expansionist ambitions would presumably arouse the United States, which the Kremlin prefers not to do. One of the by-products of an aroused United States might well be an Anglo-American denial to the Soviet Union of any real voice in the decision regarding the Japanese islands or access to them.

B. Political action.

If the Soviet Union remains militarily aloof from the war against Japan and relies solely on political action, it is not likely to achieve fully its minimum objectives on the continent. More than Soviet intrigue and support of native guerrilla operations is needed to secure Soviet control over Korea, Manchuria and possibly North China.

C. Politico-Military action.

This is the most flexible of the three strategic choices and is the one most likely to achieve the Kremlin’s objectives.

IV. Tactics of Politico-Military Action. The Kremlin is in the favorable position of having an exceptionally wide choice of tactics at its disposal, of being able for the most part to select its own timing, to act with slight concern for domestic public opinion and to retain the element of surprise in its foreign relations.

It is impossible to predict at this stage precisely what tactical pattern the Kremlin will employ. It is unlikely that Stalin and his lieutenants have plotted in detail hard and fast tactical plans. Soviet tactics may be expected to be applied opportunistically and pragmatically. Those likely to be employed are:

A. Axis tactics of provocation, intimation, bluff and sudden military attack.

B. A “correct” attitude toward China (including Manchuria) and Korea so as to avoid:

1. Appearing imperialistic to Asiatic peoples;

2. Openly provoking charges of Soviet interference in China’s internal affairs;

3. Revealing its intentions toward Korea;

4. Incurring at this juncture intensified American suspicion and hostility.

C. Utilization of Outer Mongolia’s “independent” Status.

We should not be surprised if the Mongolian People’s Republic plays a disproportionately active role in military and political activities in East Asia, carrying the ball for the Kremlin whenever the latter does not wish to assume responsibility.

D. Utilization of Asiatic national groups in the USSR.

1. Korean. If, as has been reported, the Soviet Union has trained and equipped Korean troops, these forces can be usefully employed to serve political as well as military ends in Korea.

2. Central Asian. Soviet Kazakhs, Kirghiz and other Soviet Central Asiatic peoples can obviously be used in furthering Soviet designs on Sinkiang.

E. Heavy reliance on Communist China to:

1. Serve the Kremlin’s immediate aims in China. It is debatable whether Moscow could have counted on Yenan’s unquestioning obedience had the American Government last autumn and winter (while the Soviet Union was still unprepared to act in Asia) accepted the fact of a divided China and realistically and vigorously sought to develop the nationalistic tendencies of Communist China. However that may be, it is clear that Communist China can now operate only in the Soviet orbit.

This situation is entirely satisfactory to the Kremlin because it can conduct fundamentally meaningless flirtations with Chungking while being fully confident that:

a. Yenan will resist spontaneously—and probably effectively—Chiang’s attempts to establish Kuomintang authority over Northeast China.

b. Communist China will become a part of the USSR’s security cordon, because if for no other reason, it will scarcely be accepted by any other foreign alignment.

2. Provide native leadership in East Asia.

a. Manchuria. Leaders for Manchurian administration may possibly be drawn from the Yenan regime.

b. Korea. A Korean Communist organization was founded last year in Communist China. Personnel from this group will probably be introduced into Korea for political and administrative purposes, along with the Koreans from the USSR.

c. Japan. It was presumably not wanderlust which prompted Susumu Okano, the representative of the Japanese Communist Party on the Comintern Presidium, to proceed to Yenan following the dissolution of the Communist International. He has established in Communist China among Japanese prisoners of war a Japanese People’s Emancipation League, the members of which are potential leaders of political activity in postwar Japan. Soviet efforts to gain influence in Japanese affairs will thus be channeled through Yenan, as in the west the French Communists, rather than Moscow, now accept public responsibility for promulgation of international Communist policies.

F. Pan-Asianism is a tactic which Japan found effective and to which the Kremlin may resort, if Stalin and his advisers believe they can keep it in hand. If used, it will probably be voiced by Outer Mongolia or Communist China, and not the USSR.

G. Anaesthetization of the United States.

For obvious reasons the Kremlin will be careful in performing its political surgery in Asia to cause during the next two or three years as little shock and pain as possible to the United States. Therefore the present “correct” attitude and other tactics designed to diffuse the one basic issue of aggressive Soviet expansion. Therefore also, the Kremlin may be expected to operate more gradually in Korea, Manchuria and North China than it would otherwise need to. Finally, therefore, some of the more high-handed Soviet actions will be timed, if possible, to coincide with waves of American public gratitude to or appreciation of the Soviet Union.

This anaesthetization will be effective in pretty much direct proportion to the degree of ignorance in which the American people are kept with regard to the issues involved.