The attached memorandum entitled “U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta
Agreement and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept
[Page 935]
in Regard to Outer Mongolia
and, Manchuria”, has been prepared in pursuance to the suggestion
contained in Ambassador Harriman’s 081800 and your request sent through
Admiral Leahy (MR–IN–19).89
There is in the Department no copy of the Yalta Agreement or of any
records of conversations relating thereto. The attached memorandum has
therefore been prepared on the basis of our recollection of its
contents.
You may wish to give special attention to the portions of the memorandum
which have been marked in red.90
[Annex]
U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement
and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to
Outer Mongolia and Manchuria
Outer Mongolia. With regard to the
interpretation of this Government of the term “status quo” as
applied to Outer Mongolia the following facts are pertinent.
The Chinese Government claims all of Mongolia, including the area
occupied by the Mongolian People’s Republic, as part of the Republic
of China. The present Chinese Provisional Constitution for the
Period of Political Tutelage (1931) states that the territory of the
Republic consists of the several provinces and Mongolia and Tibet.
Although China lost control over Outer Mongolia in 1911, the Chinese
Government has never ceased to claim it as an integral part of the
Republic, and in the treaties which it concluded with imperial
Russia respecting Outer Mongolia and with Outer Mongolia itself
China gained from both of them recognition of this claim. (See the
note attached to the Sino-Russian Declaration, November 5,
1913;91 Article II of the Tri-Partite
Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915,92 and Article V of
the Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles of May 31,
1924.93)
China, having gained recognition of its claim to sovereignty from the
U.S.S.R., contends that it is the sole government legally competent
to regulate the affairs of Outer Mongolia, and it has protested
against
[Page 936]
any agreements
made by the U.S.S.R., with or concerning Outer Mongolia. Thus when
the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact of March 12, 193694 was signed,
the Chinese Government protested to the Soviet Union that Outer
Mongolia was an integral part of the Republic, and that no foreign
state might conclude treaties or agreements with it. The Soviet
Foreign Office in reply reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s recognition of
Chinese sovereignty.95
China also protested against the Declaration attached to the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 194196 which
stated in part:
“… the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity
and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect
the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian
People’s Republic.”
The following day the Chinese Foreign Minister issued a statement in
which he declared:
“The four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are an
integral part of the Republic and will always remain Chinese
territory. The Chinese Government and people cannot
recognize any engagements entered into between third parties
which are derogatory to China’s territorial and
administrative integrity.”*
The substance of this statement was communicated to the Soviet
Foreign Office in the form of a protest to which the latter answered
that the Soviet-Japanese Pact was solely to insure the security of
the Soviet Union and had no bearing on Soviet relations with
China.
The U. S. S. R. has not claimed the territory of the Mongolian
People’s Republic, and it has repeatedly informed the Chinese that
it respects Chinese sovereignty therein. In statements by Soviet
officials the view is held that the Government of the Mongolian
People’s Republic is autonomous, and able to enter into independent
treaty relations. Izvestia, the semi-official
Soviet newspaper, in its issue of March 6, 1925 quoted Chicherin,
Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as declaring: “(the U. S. S.
R.) recognizes Mongolia as part of the whole Republic of China,
enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese
interference with its internal affairs and to permit the
establishment of independent relations by Mongolia”. (Quoted by
Louis Nemzer, “The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law”,
American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 33, 1939, p. 461.) Statements by other Soviet officials so far
as they are available all emphasize the autonomy of the region.
[Page 937]
The representative of the Mongolian People’s Republic in Moscow does
not bear one of the usual diplomatic titles but is called a
“Delegate Plenipotentiary and Commercial Representative”, indicating
that the Mongolian People’s Republic is not regarded as a fully
independent state. When Vice President Wallace visited Ulan Bator in
the summer of 1944 no Mongol visa or other Mongol, Chinese or Soviet
document was necessary, although the visit was made with the advance
knowledge of the U. S. S. R. and China. Notwithstanding the special
consideration doubtless shown to the Vice President of the United
States, this is nevertheless an indication of the anomalous status
of the Mongolian People’s Republic vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and
China.
In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual
Assistance Pact, the British Prime Minister was asked in Parliament
whether Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People’s Republic) was an
independent state or a part of China. He declared that:
“His Majesty’s Government continue to regard
Outer Mongolia as under Chinese sovereignty; and since the
conclusion of the Protocol of the 12th of March, the Soviet
Government have declared that in their view the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of May 1924 in which Outer Mongolia was recognized as
an integral part of the Chinese Republic, is not infringed
by the Protocol and retains its force.” (Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons Official
Report, Vol. 312, p. 5, [6,] May 11,
1936.)
No statement has been issued by the United States Government in
regard to Mongolia, or the Mongolian People’s Republic. By the terms
of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 to which it is a signatory, the
United States has agreed to respect the territorial and
administrative integrity of China (Article I) and it has been at
pains to refrain from any indication that it considered the outlying
dependencies of China such as Mongolia in a different status from
the remainder of China.
It would thus appear that while de jure China
has sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, de facto
sovereignty has not been exercised since 1911.
If the future status of Outer Mongolia is decided on the basis of the
principle of sub[self]-determination of
peoples, then there is little doubt that that territory would
separate itself from China, and as an independent nation or
otherwise, enter the Soviet orbit. Mongolians have been
traditionally antipathetic to the Chinese and, so far as can be
judged, have been willing adherents to Soviet ideologies and
influence. In the light of realities of the situation it is believed
that the Chinese Government would be well advised to give formal
recognition to a situation which has long existed in fact and at the
same time endeavor to capitalize upon the good-will of the Soviet
thereby gained
[Page 938]
to obtain
firm commitments from the Soviet Government which will confirm and
strengthen the Chinese position in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.
Such a disposition would not materially affect any substantial
American interest.
Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement contains a
general provision for the reversion to the Soviet Union of rights in
Manchuria formerly possessed by Czarist Russia prior to the
Russo-Japanese War. Under sub-headings to this main provision there
are certain specific provisions dealing inter
alia with the “internationalization” of Dairen and joint
Sino-Soviet operation of Manchurian railroads. It is not clear to
what extent the specific provisions are to be construed as
explanatory to the main provision and to what extent they represent
modifications of or limitations on the main provision.
The principal rights enjoyed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the
Russo-Japanese War may be summarized as follows:
Leases of Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dairen) (Russo-Chinese
Convention of March 27, 1898.98) Lease for 25 years
(expiring in 1923), subject to renewal by mutual consent, to the
Russian Government of Port Arthur and Dairen. The lease “in no way
to violate the sovereign rights of the Chinese Emperor to the leased
territory”. Russia to have complete and exclusive enjoyment of the
whole area, including the entire military command and supreme civil
administration with no Chinese land forces permitted in the leased
area. Port Arthur to be used solely by Chinese and Russian vessels.
Dairen, with the exception of one of the river bays set apart for
the use of Russian and Chinese fleets, to be open to foreign
commerce with free entry granted to the merchant vessels of all
countries. The Russian Government at its own expense to erect
fortification, buildings and lighthouses, to maintain garrisons and
take steps for defense.
Railways. The Chinese Eastern Railway, constructed in 1897–1901, by
the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, was nominally a Russo-Chinese
institution but actually almost exclusively, if not entirely
Russian, which Company was granted by the Chinese Government
exclusive rights of operation. It was provided that 80 years from
the date of completion the line would pass free of charge to the
Chinese Government, and further that after 36 years from the date of
completion the Chinese Government would have the right to buy it
back.
The Chinese Eastern Railway extended from Manchuli Station in the
west across Manchuria to Pogranichnaya on the Ussuri Railway, with a
southern branch extending from Harbin to Dairen (Dalny) and Port
Arthur. That portion of the southern branch from Changchun
[Page 939]
(Hsinking) southward was
transferred to Japan by the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace of 1905.
The remainder of the Chinese Eastern Railway was transferred to
“Manchukuo” in 1936.
The Russians assumed civil administration of the railway zone until
1920. Under the agreement of September 8, 1896, between the Chinese
Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank,99 lands necessary
to the construction, operation and protection of the railway were
ceded to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and according to the
Russian (French) text, the company was given le
droit absolu et exclusif de l’administration (the absolute
and exclusive right of administration or management). The Chinese
text of the treaty, however, does not contain this stipulation. On
the basis of the French text, interpreting administration to mean
administration in the full English sense rather than mere
management, the Russians organized within the railway zone, (an
irregular strip of land extending for some distance on either side
of the railway and embracing Harbin and other cities which developed
along the railway), their own civil administration, including courts
of justice, police, schools, etc. The Government of the United
States has considered that this procedure was an encroachment upon
Chinese sovereignty and impaired the extraterritorial rights of
American citizens.
The statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company provide for a
board of management (or board of directors), to consist of nine
members elected by the shareholders. The chairman of the board was
appointed by the Chinese Government. The vice chairman was chosen by
the members of the board from among themselves. Shareholding was
limited to Russian and Chinese subjects. It is understood that
nearly all of the shares were purchased by the Russian Government.
The Chinese were, at the most, allowed an amount of stock sufficient
only to afford a right to participate in the election of the
directorate. Prior to 1917 the board of directors sat in St.
Petersburg. The actual operation of the railway was confided [confined?] to a manager, who was assisted,
and to an extent controlled with respect to important matters, by a
council of administration consisting of the manager and his
principal assistants. The manager was also civil governor of the
railway zone and as such possessed the most extended powers.
The provisions of the proposed agreements in regard to the ports of
Dairen and Port Arthur and in regard to railways, as described in
Moscow’s 081750Z,1 are clearly more advantageous to China than
[Page 940]
would be terms calling
for the complete restoration of the rights possessed by Russia in
Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese war.
On the other hand, the provisions of the proposed agreements are less
advantageous to China than would be terms based upon a normal
construction, taken by themselves, of the somewhat ambiguous and
vaguely worded terms of the specific sub-headings of the main
provision calling for the recovery by the Soviet Union of its former
rights in Manchuria. For example, the term “internationalization” of
Dairen could not of itself warrant the interpretation placed upon it
by the Soviet Government in the draft agreement, calling for Soviet
predominance in administration, nor would the provisions in regard
to the joint Sino-Soviet operation of the railways call for an
implementation whereby Russia would have sole ownership and
superiority of authority over the Chinese in the management of the
railway.
There is an undoubted inconsistency between the Soviet commitment to
respect Chinese sovereignty and proposals under which for even a
limited period of years Russia would exercise virtual control over
the main railways of Manchuria and enjoy predominant administrative
rights in Dairen and exclusive administrative rights in Port Arthur.
For reasons set forth below, it is believed that there are less
disadvantages to be seen in the proposal in regard to Port Arthur
than in the rest of the draft agreements which, if carried out in
full, would represent a reversion to a situation which was one of
the most pernicious foci of imperialism and which we had hoped might
be eliminated once and for all, and is therefore disappointing from
the point of view of American interests, policy and ideals.
Accordingly, if it should be possible for this Government, either
singly or in conjunction with Great Britain, to influence the Soviet
Government toward a modification in favor of China (and of other
countries) of the terms relating to Dairen and the railways, it is
believed that we should make the effort. There would seem warrant
for such an approach to the Soviet Government on the ground that it
was not our understanding of the Yalta Agreement that
“internationalization” of Dairen meant transfer of predominant
administrative rights to the Soviet Union or that joint operation of
the railways called for transfer of exclusive ownership to the
Soviet Union and for vesting Russia with a predominant position in
management. If through such an approach the Soviet Union could be
influenced to make substantial modification in these proposals it
would be very welcome from our point of view. At the same time the
fact cannot be lost sight of that the National Government of China
stands to gain much by Russian participation in the war against
Japan and by Russian agreement not to support the Chinese
Communists. For these benefits China must be prepared to make
reasonable concessions and we should
[Page 941]
not support Chinese objections to such
otherwise reasonable concessions as are not inimical to American
interests or in contradiction of American policy.
The United States has, of course, an important practical interest in
trade and commerce in Manchuria which should be safeguarded. In
respect to any arrangements which may be made between the Soviet and
Chinese Governments regarding Manchuria we should obtain explicit
commitments from both governments that the principle of
non-discrimination in international intercourse will be respected in
all areas and operations which may be the subject of agreement. We
should expect that application of this principle would cover the
right of equality of access by the United States to the port
facilities of Dairen, the privilege of leasing and purchasing land
there for business and residential purposes (a right which was
generally denied in practice during the Japanese regime) and the
right of free and full use of traffic facilities of the
railways.
With regard to the proposed arrangement for Port Arthur, it is
believed that the Chinese could afford and would be well advised to
grant to the Russians privileges at least no less liberal than those
granted to us by Great Britain in connection with the lease of
certain naval and air bases in British territory in the Western
Hemisphere. For example, in the master agreement comprised in an
exchange of notes between the British Embassy and the Department of
September 2, 1940,2 it is provided that:
“His Majesty’s Government, in the leases to be agreed upon,
will grant to the United States for the period of the leases
all the rights, power, and authority within the bases
leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and
air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases,
necessary to provide access to and defense of such bases,
and appropriate provisions for their control.”
In the Anglo-American Agreement of March 27, 19413 for the lease of air
bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua,
Trinidad and British Guiana Article IV specifically grants
jurisdiction to United States courts over members of the United
States forces, United States nationals, persons not British
subjects, and British subjects charged with having committed, either
within or without the leased areas, offenses of a military nature
punishable under American law including but not restricted to
treason, offenses relating to sabotage or espionage, and any other
offenses relating to the security and protection of United States
bases, establishments, equipment or other
[Page 942]
property or to operations of the Government of
the United States in the territory. While the proposed arrangement
for Port Arthur envisages that the port will be under “Soviet
administration”, there would not, in the light of all the
circumstances, seem to be ground for putting forth objection on our
part if the Chinese grant the Soviet Government exclusive
jurisdiction within the port area of Port Arthur, whereas the
proposals relating to Dairen and the railways as they now stand are
open to legitimate objection on the part of the United States and
other of the United Nations.