Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890B.00/8–2945

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] August 29, 1945.

The basis for the American policy toward the newly-founded League of Arab States is to be found in the traditional American attitude of benevolence toward Arab nationalism and toward the recent movement for unity among the Arabs of which the League represents the culmination to date. The Arab national movement, which was at first directed at achieving independence from Turkey, had its origins during the Nineteenth Century and received considerable encouragement from the liberal ideas imparted by American educators in the Near East. American sympathy toward Arab aspirations was set forth in the twelfth of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,² which read in part:

“The other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”

This Wilsonian concept was incorporated and even expanded in Article XXII of the League Covenant,³ creating the mandatory regime. The Arabs, however, regarded the mandates as a negation of their hopes for the independent Arab Empire which they believed had been promised to them, and, accordingly, the primary objective of the Arab nationalists in the postwar period was the termination of French and British control. Some progress was achieved in this direction, for Iraq became independent in 1932, and in 1936 France signed an agreement to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon.⁴ (This agreement, however, was not ratified by the French and did not go into effect.) Until such time as the Arabs both in the mandated areas and in the independent states could achieve complete independence, any movement toward some kind of union between the different Arab countries was naturally relegated to the background.

March 4, 1933–September 1, 1939

During the first part of the period under review, as throughout the period between the two wars, there was no occasion for the United States to adopt a positive policy toward the Arabs, although our general attitude of encouragement to Arab aspirations for independence was maintained. Thus, this Government accorded recognition in 1931 to the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and Nejd⁵ (now Saudi Arabia) and in 1932 to Iraq. Our relations with these states, as with the mandated areas, were concerned largely with securing non-discriminatory treatment for American rights, in accordance with fundamental American policy.

September 1, 1939–December 7, 1941

The outbreak of the war in Europe brought the nationalistic aspirations of the Arabs into greater prominence, since Arab friendship was cultivated by both the Allied and the Axis powers, as a part of the struggle for the Middle East. This was particularly true of the Axis, which embarked on an elaborate propaganda campaign through the use of Arabic-language broadcasts and in other ways.⁶ The British, for their part, were also conscious of the need for Arab support, and at a moment when the British strategic position in the Middle East was particularly acute, Foreign Secretary Eden gave recognition to the newly-developing movement for Arab Union in the following statement made at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941:

“The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.”⁷

American relations with the Arabs remained in general unaffected by these developments, except in so far as there was a crystallization of Arab opinion on the Palestine question, making it necessary for this Government to take such opinion increasingly into account in the formulation of our policy toward Palestine.

December 1941 to date

The Arab union movement was naturally given impetus by Mr. Eden’s Mansion House declaration, one of the more important results being the publication early in 1943 by Nuri Pasha, then Prime Minister of Iraq of his “Blue Book” entitled Arab Independence and Unity. This work proposed an Arab League to be composed initially of (1) a unified Syrian state comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan; and (2) Iraq, with provision for other Arab states to adhere to this League.

Early in 1943 Mr. Eden made another statement, declaring on February 24 in the House of Commons:

“As they have already made plain His Majesty’s Government would view with sympathy any move among the Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative would have to come from the Arabs themselves and so far as I am aware no such scheme which would command general approval has yet been worked out.”⁸

This declaration had the direct result of leading Nuri Pasha to write Nahas Pasha, at that time Prime Minister of Egypt, urging the latter to take the initiative in calling an Arab Congress. Shortly thereafter Nahas announced that he was starting a series of individual conferences with representatives of the Arab states for an exchange of views regarding Arab union and with a view to the eventual convening of a full-dress Arab Congress. These talks took place through the remainder of 1943 and the early part of 1944 and were attended in turn by representatives of Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and the Yemen. The inclusion of representatives of the Arabs of Palestine was several times considered, but no agreement could be reached on the composition of a Palestine delegation.

During the discussions between the Saudi Arabian representative and Nahas, the former queried our Minister at Cairo as to the American attitude toward Arab union, and under date of October 26, 1943⁹ the following reply was made:

“The policy of the United States Government toward the Near Eastern nations has not been formally stated, but its general attitude is well known. This Government desires to see the independent countries of the Near East retain their freedom and strengthen their economic and social condition, and fully sympathizes with the aspirations of other Near Eastern countries for complete liberty.

“If the peoples of the Near East should find it advantageous to unite of their own free will, it naturally follows from this Government’s basic attitude that such a development would be viewed with sympathy, always on the understanding that it should take place in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter¹⁰ and in harmony with the declarations of Secretary Hull, notably those of July 23, 1942 and September 12, 1943.¹¹

“It is realized that the countries concerned will shape their own decision, but it seems to this Government that the events and problems of the war years have shown that the Near Eastern countries need greater strength in the economic, social and cultural domains, and that first steps toward unity might well have these ends in view.”

In July 1944, the Saudi Arab Government again sought an expression of this Government’s views, and a reply was made in substantially the same terms as above.

In September and October 1944, a preliminary Arab Conference met at Alexandria and soon developed into a full-dress meeting of the Arab States. A representative of the Arabs of Palestine was present, as were delegates from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the last two as observers only.

The Conference adopted a protocol¹² providing for the formation of a League of Arab States, in accordance with plans to be drawn up by an interim sub-committee. There were also to be subcommittees on economic, cultural, social and other matters, while in addition the Conference passed resolutions according recognition to the independence of Lebanon and affirming Arab rights in Palestine.

Subsequently, a draft constitution for the Arab League was drawn up and was embodied in a pact signed by delegates of the seven member states on March 22, 1945.¹³ The pact was accompanied by annexes providing respectively for the participation in the work of the League of a representative of the Palestine Arabs and for cooperation with certain Arab territories not members of the League (Presumably such non-independent areas as French North Africa and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms).

In brief, the Pact of the League prohibits any resort to force among member states, provides for consultation and mutual assistance in the event of aggression against a member state, sets up a Council and a Secretary General with headquarters in Cairo, and provides for cooperation between member states in many non-political fields.

At San Francisco¹⁴ the members of the Arab League gave indications of a desire to work together as a definite bloc and to have their group accepted as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter.¹⁵

The establishment of the League was welcomed by a spokesman of the British Government in Parliament on May 9, 1945¹⁶ and was also referred to in the following terms by Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, at a banquet in New York City in honor of the Regent of Iraq on June 2, 1945:

“The determination of the Arab people to reestablish their independence and to play a role in world affairs to which they feel themselves entitled by reason of their brilliant past and their talents and industry, undoubtedly was one of the factors which motivated them during the first world war to fight for their freedom. Unquestionably the same determination contributed to their decision recently to form the League of Arab States. We welcome the development of Arab cooperation and are confident that the strengthening of the ties between the various Arab countries will not only be to their common benefit but will also enable them to make important and constructive contributions to the great tasks awaiting the United Nations.”¹⁷

Present Policy—Summary

The American Government has traditionally viewed with sympathy the attempts of the Arab people to reestablish their independence and play a more prominent role in world affairs. We have thus welcomed such manifestations of Arab cooperation as the establishment of the League of Arab States and the steps which have already been taken toward unity between the Arabs in the economic, social and cultural fields.

Loy W. Henderson

2. The Fourteen Points were included in an address by President Wilson delivered before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918; for text, see ibid., 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 12.
3. For annotated text of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 69; article XXII is printed on p. 93.
4. For documentation on the interest of the United States in these subjects, see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. ii, pp. 672 ff., and ibid., 1936, vol. iii, pp. 496 ff.
5. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. ii, pp. 547 ff.
6. For documentation on the concern of the United States in 1942 at the impact of Axis victories and propaganda on the political stability of the Near East, see ibid., 1942, vol. iv, pp. 24 ff.
7. The full text of statement is printed in British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941): Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden … delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941; for documentation on the position of the United States in July 1941 on Arab unity, see exchange of telegrams with Cairo, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 612–616.
8. For complete text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 387, col. 139.
9. See telegram 1605, October 26, 1943, 8 p.m., to Cairo, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 853.
10. Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
11. For texts, see Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1942, p. 639, and ibid., September 18, 1943, p. 173, respectively.
12. On October 7, 1944; for text of the Alexandria Protocol, see Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1947, p. 966.
13. Ibid., p. 967. The text transmitted to the Department from Cairo as an enclosure to despatch 641, March 26, 1945, differs in minor language details from the version printed in the Bulletin.
14. Reference is to the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met from April 25 to June 26, 1945.
15. The United Nations Charter, signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031. For documentation on discussions concerning regional matters at the San Francisco Conference, see index under “Arab League”, vol. i, p. 1571, and in United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, vol. xxi, pp. 338, 346.
16. For remarks by the British Minister of State (Law), see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 410, col. 1885. For remarks by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) on January 17, 1945, on the “sympathy and interest” of His Majesty’s Government in the efforts of the Arab States to reduce the barriers between them, see ibid., vol. 407, col. 138.
17. The complete text of Mr. Phillips’ speech is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1945, p. 1036; for information on the visit of the Iraqi Regent to the United States, see bracketed note, p. 586.