Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

840.50 UNRRA/9–2945

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State ⁷⁵

[London,] 29 September, 1945.

Dear Mr. Byrnes: We have received from Athens the text of a letter addressed to Mr. Maben, the head of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission, by the Greek Prime Minister on the 14th September. In this letter Admiral Voulgaris explains the economic policy which the Greek Government propose to pursue consequent on the resignation of Monsieur Varvaressos⁷⁶ and expresses the hope that U.N.R.R.A. will furnish the Greek Government with advice on the plan itself and on the organisation which should be established in order to give it effect.

Mr. Maben has interpreted this request to mean that the Greek Government recognise their inability to cope with the economic problems facing the country without a very wide measure of foreign advice and assistance. He feels that a major question of policy is involved, since if U.N.R.R.A. accept the request they may lay themselves open to charges of interfering in Greek internal affairs and of infringing Greek sovereignty. They would also require additional and highly qualified experts. On the other hand, if they fail to reply or if they decline to render assistance they will be accused of standing idly by while Greek economy progressively deteriorates.

I can well understand that U.N.R.R.A. may hesitate before taking on this additional responsibility which would inevitably involve them closely in the internal economy of Greece. I think it would be most valuable if we were to give them the advice of our two Governments and were to press U.N.R.R.A. to accept the Greek Government’s request if we feel that this would in fact be in the best interests both of U.N.R.R.A. and of Greece.

The Greek Government’s request is a direct consequence of Monsieur Varvaressos’ resignation. Admiral Voulgaris has always recognised his own inability to deal with economic matters and it is clear that he despairs of finding any Greek with sufficient ability to replace Monsieur Varvaressos. He has therefore appealed to U.N.R.R.A. for one or more experts whose status might in theory be purely advisory but who would undoubtedly influence and to some extent direct the whole of Greek economy by reason of the fact that Greece is dependent on U.N.R.R.A. for all her essential imports.

I am convinced that something will have to be done without delay if Greek economy is not to collapse. One course would be to induce Monsieur Varvaressos to reenter the Greek Government, but I am very doubtful whether he would agree to do so and I am not sure that it would be possible at this stage for him to resume his economic programme where he left it off on his resignation. I doubt therefore whether we can count on him, at least in the immediate future. Another possibility is that the Greek Government will be reformed on the Regent’s return to Greece and that a strong team will be appointed, capable of dealing with the country’s economic problems. It is doubtful, however, whether any available Greek has the necessary ability, and there is the obvious danger of delay even if a solution on these lines could eventually be reached.

I am inclined to think therefore that the only practical course is for U.N.R.R.A. to accept the Greek Government’s request. The danger that they will be accused of excessive interference in Greek affairs certainly exists, but I think that this could be accepted. The change in their position would not be too drastic, for so long as they are supplying almost the whole of Greece’s import needs they must inevitably exercise immense influence over the Greek Government’s internal economic policy.

I should be very glad to learn whether you agree with this conclusion. If so, I think that we might both of us inform U.N.R.R.A. of our views and press them to undertake this task. They would certainly need one or more first-class men, who would probably have to come from outside the present U.N.R.R.A. organization. In particular I am convinced that a really strong man is required for the head of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission in Greece if this Mission is to take on new responsibilities. Though we have one or two men who might do, it would probably cause difficulties if an Englishman replaced Mr. Maben. For this reason I think we must look to you to find a man and see that Governor Lehman appoints him. We for our part will try to support your nominee with other good men to strengthen the Mission. As perhaps you know, U.N.R.R.A. did try to get Colonel Hoskins from the United States Army to be the head of the Greek Mission, but Colonel Hoskins’ employer in civil life felt unable to release him; I have wondered if a personal appeal from you would induce him to change his mind. I am sure Colonel Hoskins is exactly the man who is needed for the job, and, in view of the gravity of the issues involved, I am very reluctant to abandon my hope that his services may be obtained.⁷⁷

Yours Sincerely,

Ernest Bevin

75. The Secretary of State was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held at London from September 11 to October 2, 1945.
76. On September 1, 1945.
77. In a letter of June 30, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, the Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Hendrickson) reiterated an earlier request by Governor Lehman for the appointment of Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins as Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Greece (840.50 UNRRA Personnel/6–3045). Colonel Hoskins was informed in telegram 1339, July 6, 1945, 7 p.m., to Cairo, that the Department regarded him as the “outstanding and logical US candidate for this assignment.” (840.50 UNRRA Personnel/7–645) Col. Hoskins did not take the UNRRA position.