Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

868.00/11–445: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

Caserta, November 4, 1945—1 p.m.
[Received 3 p.m.]

4042. Reference our number 4015 of November 2, 10 a.m. We now have seen SAC’s message to British Chiefs of Staff on this subject. He stated that the military, financial and political situations in Greece are bound together inextricably. He said that he understands British policy to be one of continuing to provide advice, military support and encouragement until such time as a Government is formed in Greece sufficiently strong to bring about drastic reforms necessary for return of stability in economic and financial fields. He added that the prospects are remote for formation of such a Government. From military point of view meanwhile British are drifting into a perilous situation which can be put right only by British Govt deciding on a clear long-term policy.

General Morgan’s message then went on to say that the following considerations were applicable:

(a) Greek gendarmerie, Air Force and Army are making excellent progress under guidance of British. With support of British Armed Forces at present in Greece, they are maintaining very fair standard of order and law throughout Greece including frontier points.

(b) Pending completion of reorganization and training of gendarmerie and army, it would be necessary for Allied troops to maintain law and order particularly in frontier districts.

(c) Next spring Four[th] Indian Division will probably be repatriated. By withdrawal this division from Macedonia without replacement by Allied troops, Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian efforts to foment disorder in frontier districts¹ would be encouraged with inevitable repercussions throughout Greece. Situation might result therefore which would give excuse for one or more of these countries to intervene in Greece.

(d) Brit Govt has recently informed Greek Government that from Jan 1, 1946 it must pay for maintenance of its own armed forces. Cost involved annually is approximately 12 million pounds. However conversations with British Ambassador and his financial adviser indicate that it is not practical for Greek Govt to assume this financial burden in full during 1946, whatever Greek inclinations on proposal may be. Any substantial reduction of Greek Army below strength already proposed will render it incapable of performing essential duties.

(e) By being on individual instead of Allied effort, British effort to assist Greeks to reestablish their State on a sound basis is grievously handicapped. US participation on equal basis would not only lighten burden but would for the future give added confidence and prestige. The same reasons for US Government recently agreeing to share British responsibilities in Venezia Giulia would seem to apply in Greece; also there are extensive American business interests throughout Greece while in Venezia Giulia such do not exist.

(f) Activities of UNRRA in Greece cause of another American interest there. UNRRA assistance is only stable factor in Greek economy at present. American taxpayer provides considerable portion of this assistance. Two hundred Americans at present included in UNRRA Mission in Greece and are increasing in numbers. Women compose half of these and their activities through the country are widely spread. Should internal disorder develop, British armed forces would be responsible for their protection and withdrawal.

(g) Withdrawal or serious weakening of British Armed Forces before at least end of 1946, whatever political future of Greece may be, might in Greece itself and Balkans generally have incalculable results on situation. Insistence that an early date Greece shall accept full responsibility for maintenance and equipment of her armed forces or failure to provide the necessary equipment for Greek army may well mean even if withdrawal of British forces is delayed that Greek Armed Forces will be incapable of carrying out essential tasks.

SAC concluded with recommendations: (1) American Govt should be approached with view to [sharing burden?] now being borne by UK alone. (2) Greece in bearing financial burden of her armed forces should be given very sympathetic consideration. (3) A long-term Allied policy be laid down towards Greece.

(h) If British assistance, both military and financial, is withdrawn too early, it is probable that the men they have expended, money and material to bring Greece from anarchy of the days of ELAS² rebellion to present comparatively ordered state will be in vain.

Kirk

1. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 300 ff.
2. The National People’s Liberation Army was the military arm of the National Liberation Front (EAM), the resistance group controlled by the Communist Party of Greece which led the revolution that began at Athens on December 3, 1944.