Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

891.51A/8–1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 10, 1945—10 a.m.
[Received August 10—4:30 a.m.]

603. My telegram 473, July 9.³² After most careful consideration of Department’s telegram 379 July 25 and further study of whole situation here, I have come to conclusion withdrawal American financial advisory group is not advisable at this moment. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

1. Present Iranian Minister Finance, Mahmoud Bader, is probably most competent man to hold that office since Mission began work and has additional advantage that he speaks fluent English and so eliminates serious language barrier which has handicapped cooperation in past. Although he was at one time reported hostile to Americans nothing in his conversations with me nor in actions that have so far come to my direct attention indicates anything but a desire to make best possible use of advisers. Like any capable executive he wishes to decide for himself how this should be accomplished, but we can hardly take exception to this, especially since he is setting up machinery for consultation with the Americans on this point. He has shown every intention of cooperating. Therefore if Bader remains in office, I feel there is hope of working out satisfactory relationship between him and the advisers.

2. Advisers have this week advanced a step toward unity among themselves by unanimously approving, with minor modifications, draft program for future operations.³³ (Embassy’s despatch 311, May 22, and my telegram 451, July 3³⁴) By vote of 18 to 11 Brownrigg Drafting Committee was chosen to make presentation to Finance Minister, and this decision appears to have [been] accepted, though reluctantly, by Pixley and Black. Bader has already expressed to me his desire to give full consideration to program, which should be in his hands this week.

3. On positive side therefore I think there is still possibility that Mission can render useful, if unspectacular, service to Iran, and in its current desperate state Iran unquestionably needs all the help it can get. In light of developments of past several months I need hardly emphasize disastrous consequences, international as well as internal, which would almost certainly follow collapse of Iranian administration.

4. From more negative point of view I think sudden withdrawal of whole group on our initiative would constitute in a sense a betrayal of Bader, whom we have encouraged to work toward rehabilitation of American Mission, and of the Americans themselves, whom we have urged to work to same end. This is especially true right now when advisers have finally settled knotty problem of program presentation. Some of them place high hopes on program and we should at least allow them opportunity to see whether they can work out something mutually satisfactory with Iranian authorities.

5. Mass departure of Americans from Ministry Finance would probably be taken by public as indication of American displeasure with Iran Government and might well bring about fall of Sadr Cabinet. It would be unfortunate for any act on our part to contribute to already disturbed conditions here.

6. Real test of future prospects will come when Bader carries out intention of naming Pixley sole head of Mission and when discussions on program get under way. If Pixley is accepted by group as a whole and if favorable progress is made on program, I think we should continue our support. If large group of members reject Pixley and program discussions go badly, we may expect group to break up of its own accord, which I think would have less undesirable effect politically than affirmative action by us to have it withdrawn as a body.

I do not exclude possibility that it may prove necessary to terminate mission if developments are unfavorable, either in respect to attitude of Iranians or activities of Americans themselves. However for the moment I should prefer to await developments.

Murray

32. Not printed.
33. In despatch 295, May 17, 1945, Ambassador Morris reported that the Mission had designated a committee to prepare a draft program for future operations and that two reports had been prepared. The report by Dr. Black called for a program requiring powers greater than those formerly held by Dr. Millspaugh; that by William Brownrigg, Director General of Personnel, emphasized administrative reform and confined itself to activities falling strictly within the authority of the Ministry of Finance. (891.51 A/5–2645)
34. Neither printed.