Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The American Republics, Volume IX

835.00/10–245: Telegram

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, October 2, 1945—6 p.m.
[Received 8:15 p.m.]

2390. It is clear from the Department’s 1366, September 30, 1 p.m.,³³ that it is prepared to take such strong action against this Government that any future reconciliation would be virtually impossible. I concur that we must follow such policy and risks inherent therein.

I suggest for the Department’s consideration the following general course of action:

1. In connection with the postponement of the Rio Conference,³⁴ a public statement should be issued that we found ourselves unable to negotiate [at] the same table with an Argentine delegation from present Government because: (a) It clearly does not represent Argentine people and therefore has no right to assume undertakings on their behalf; and (b) we are going to accept no further promises until those made have been fulfilled. I believe that the effect of this announcement would be a blow to the Argentine Government and an encouragement to the opposition; it would give pause to those elements in the other Republics that still seek to avoid Argentine aggression by appeasing Perón and his clique; and it could scarcely be called interference in Argentine internal affairs.

2. No discussion of a new Ambassador until this Government has retreated from its arbitrary position in some important sector, for example, when elections are formally convoked on reasonably decent basis. Naming of an Ambassador at present moment would dishearten democratic forces; but on other hand, I continue to believe that one should be appointed at earliest date compatible with above to strengthen our foothold in enemy camp.

3. Action at the earliest possible moment in the United Nations’ Council to suspend Argentina from membership on grounds of persistent violation of its international obligations with danger to peace.

4. The issuance from time to time of factual case histories of Argentina’s failure to fulfill obligations. I strongly recommend against any policy of calling names or making faces at present Government except that Perón and his clique should be laughed at as tinsel demagogues when suitable opportunity offers.

5. Use of whatever propaganda channels may be open to us in other American Republics and elsewhere to increase agitation in favor of Argentine democracy.

6. Movement should be initiated by which organizations corresponding to organizations persecuted in Argentina express their solidarity with such Argentine institutions. I believe that if Argentine universities, scientific and professional societies, cultural societies, etc., should feel that their individual struggle was being watched by entire world, it would increase strength of their resistance.

7. Consideration should be given to denunciation of 1853 Treaty to clear the way for restriction on export of vital items, curtailment of shipping and other communications, etc.

8. Seizing every further opportunity which may offer itself to dishearten the Argentine Government and encourage democratic elements.

If we are able to keep the local pot really boiling for some months to come, I am fairly hopeful that there will be a break somewhere. Democratic forces are beginning to move forward, if very cautiously, on their own steam. I am assured that a large clandestine organization still does exist and has been little affected by recent events although its effectiveness is open to doubt. On other hand, the forces on which Government must depend, the Army and police are by unanimous agreement growing steadily less loyal to Government. This process may well be accelerated when new recruits are inducted from civilian life next January. Some blunder of Government or crisis induced by economic or international factors might therefore well precipitate a break.

If something does not happen by next spring, let us say, and it becomes clear to all the world that Government promises are false as we believe them to be, then we shall not only be in stronger position to act from diplomatic standpoint but also Europe would be less likely to suffer from any economic or military measures we might take against Argentina. We must, however, take sufficiently vigorous and continuous measures to assure democratic forces that we intend to see matter through, thus sustaining their morale. Obviously we do not want to place ourselves in position of using coercive measures if by patience they can possibly be avoided. I fear that strong multilateral measures either through inter-American system or through the United Nations may prove impossible and any failure of an effort on our part to secure such measures, any weakening once such measures are instituted, and, more particularly, any [ill]-conceived unilateral measures of coercion would be utterly disastrous.

Let us hold such measures as a final resort when it is demonstrable that present trend of Argentine people to work the problem out for themselves has failed to achieve its purpose.

Cabot

33. Not printed; this telegram indicated Department’s intent to issue a public statement relating to Argentina (835.00/9–3045). In statement released to the press on October 3, 1945, Acting Secretary Acheson stated that it was the purpose of the U.S. Government “to consult with the other American Republics in respect to the Argentine situation.”
34. Scheduled to convene on October 20, 1945, for the purpose of negotiating military assistance agreements.