Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The American Republics, Volume IX

835.00/11–1745

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Director, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs)

Buenos Aires, November 17, 1945.

Dear Ellis: I should like to put before you for what they are worth certain thoughts I have had on the present situation here in Argentina. I recognize that they may shock many people but I do think that they merit consideration in checking our policy.

Two questions appear to me to be fundamental in any determination of policy: 1, Are Perón and his clique inherently fascist? 2, Are they essentially Nazi stooges? A crack-down policy such as we are now pursuing must be predicated on an affirmative answer to one of these two questions. Many people would say yes to both. I gather Spruille’s⁵³ answer would be “yes” to the first and “probably” to the second.

The question whether Perón and his clique are inherently fascist is vital because of the bearing it must have on our obligations not to intervene in Argentine internal affairs. Unless the Argentine regime is inherently fascist the various non-intervention obligations which we have must prevail against any unilateral action, no matter how much we may detest many acts of the present Argentine regime. More: we must, I feel, be in a position to prove beyond reasonable doubt the inherently aggressive character of this fascism. Fascism is a very flexible term and I think that it may fairly be said that in Portugal and in Vargas’s⁵⁴ Brazil it has not proved inherently aggressive.

There are many evidences of the fascist character of this Government: its dictatorial nature; its military backing; its treatment of labor; its use of atorrantes, much as black and brown shirts were used in Europe; its outrageous disregard of civil rights and other repressive measures; Perón’s background; its demagoguery; its use of whipping-boys (such as the oligarchy, foreign capital, and the Jews) to stir popular feeling—in short, rather an impressive total of evidence. But there is a fairly impressive amount of evidence to indicate that Argentina is not and can never become truly fascist. With the newspapers fairly free, violent anti-Government speeches being openly made every day, the opposition political parties organizing and holding public manifestations, independent labor still holding many of its positions, the courts dropping banana skins under the Government from time to time, the town buzzing with anti-Government talk, and the supposed dictator quite evidently not 100 percent in control of the Government, it seems to me that it can scarcely be said that true fascism has as yet been reached. As for the danger that it will be reached, in other words, that we may be in the pre-1922 or -1933 stages of fascism here, one of course cannot afford to be too positive. It is a, natural assumption that if and when Perón becomes President he may seek to set up a fascist state. Against this, however, are two potent factors: 1, the hurly-burly of Argentine politics, which under a constitutional regime would make it the more difficult for Perón to be complete master of the situation (he would have to juggle the Constitution, the courts, Congress, the Army, the Cabinet, etc.), and 2, the inherently unruly nature of Argentines (I wish you could drive a few hundred yards down a Buenos Aires street and you would understand what I mean).

As for the aggressive intentions of this Government, we have also a certain amount of evidence: a lot of money is being spent on the Army; Perón has delivered some rather bellicose speeches; Farrell and Perón undoubtedly connived in the Bolivian Revolution in 1943;⁵⁵ Argentina has thrown its economic weight around against neighboring countries needing her food; etc., etc. I do not doubt, however, that the Argentine Army has honest misgivings about the shifting of the military balance in favor of Brazil; others than Perón, both in Argentina and the United States, have made speeches showing that they coveted other people’s vegetable patches; and Argentine economic sanctions against neighbors have, I believe, been used in most instances as counter-attacks against concerted action led by us.

In short, although there is much evidence of the growth of aggressive fascism in this country, I doubt that it is conclusive. While we assert with the greatest assurance that this Government is fascist, there are many people in other parts of the world who may by no means be convinced of this. More particularly, and this I wish to stress, I do not believe that we can justify avowedly coercive measures, even multilateral, on the basis of the comparatively nebulous proof we now have that Perón is plotting aggression. Unless we are to act on the basis of the available material regarding the Bolivian Revolution, and I see serious objections to such a course, I think we must await clearer proof of contemplated aggression.

In regard to Perón’s innumerable violations of fundamental freedoms, I find it necessary to point out that at least one republic (Brazil) is more fascist in form than Argentina; that several (Dominican Republic, Bolivia) more grossly violate civil rights (for example, so far as I know, no one has been executed here yet); that several have less freedom of the press; that various of them have done less against Nazi activities; and that some (Perú, Guatemala) have been more aggressive. Again, if we are to crack down on Argentina for its role in the Bolivian Revolution, are we to crack down on Mexico for its interference in Central America? …

The second great point which we have against the present Argentine regime is its obvious dalliance with Nazism. Some Embassy officers believe that the present regime is being actually directed from behind the scenes by Nazis. A more general belief is that this crowd is hand-in-glove with the Nazis. If Argentina is to become a base from which the Nazis may plot and contrive a third world war, then obviously no measure, even military sanctions, would be too strong for us to take.

There are still plenty of Nazis active in Argentina today. No Nazis have as yet been deported, although we hope to get some out in the near future. The leading Nazi firms, although for the most part intervened and controlled, have not been liquidated. Men like Freude and Delfino are still free to plot and contrive. The Government still deals with Proclaimed List firms and there is generally an important discrepancy between what has been done on paper and what has been done in fact.

I fear, however, that against these decided lapses on the part of the Argentine regime we must put certain acts which scarcely fit into the picture of a Nazi-run government. Argentina is at war; practically all German propaganda has been stopped by the Government; the Embassy has been closed and we have access to its remaining records; German spy rings have been rather completely broken up; most of the leading German firms are intervened or controlled and the liquidation of a number of them has at least been ordered; we have been given access to the German banks; some leading German agents are to be expelled and others are apparently to follow; an extremely good Safehaven decree has at least been issued; two submarines have been turned over to us; and despite all rumors there is evidently not a scintilla of evidence that there is anything behind their having come to Argentina; Axis schools have been closed; most of the notoriously Nazi members of the Government are out of office (there are of course important exceptions …). If you read the picture of Argentina as described in 1941 and –42 and compare it with the present I think that you must be convinced of the great progress which has been made in suppressing Nazi activities.

It is distinctly disturbing for me at a moment that we are trying to convince the other American Republics of the necessity for a joint crack-down on Argentina to have the Embassy’s economic warfare experts tell me that we have no case against Argentina for non-compliance with economic warfare measures agreed between the American Republics, notably Resolutions XVIII and XIX of the Mexico City Conference, and to have the Legal Attaché inform me that we have no case against Argentina regarding subversive activities, notably under Mexico City Resolution VII.

Needless to say, this situation may change. Particularly I had been hoping that the documents from Germany would confirm our suspicions and damn this Government beyond retrieval. Perhaps we shall yet uncover convincing evidence, but Spruille in his letter of October 24 said that Carl Spaeth⁵⁹ felt that we did not have a good court case.

It seems to me that our present attitude toward the Argentine regime is based to a very considerable extent on a series of factors which has not led us to wholly logical conclusions. Historically Argentina was the bad boy among the American Republics for many years before the present crisis. During the actual hostilities Argentina was unduly friendly to the Axis. There were many pro-Nazis in Argentina and an unduly high concentration of them in government circles. There was a wide margin between promise and fulfilment by Argentina. Because of Argentine recalcitrance inter-American solidarity was broken and it became more difficult to keep the other American Republics in line. Argentina was a base from which the Nazis could carry on their activities throughout this Hemisphere. Finally, we inherently dislike a regime like Castillo’s,⁶⁰ which was founded on fraud, and one like Farrell’s, which is founded on violence. Our bitterness at Argentina, it seems to me, is largely based on a consistently poor and laggardly performance rather than on overt acts, and perhaps a bit on the fact that Argentina’s failure to play ball has materially profited her.

There is a further factor in all this: Argentina is badly in need of social reforms. Social legislation is largely antiquated, if not nonexistent. There are immense discrepancies in wealth. Land is notoriously held by a few landlords; the industrialists have used war scarcities to gouge the public (I wish you could see what they have the nerve to charge for some ordinary articles produced in Argentina). Perón, using largely fascist methods, is beginning to make some social reforms. Naturally I don’t care for his methods and I doubt the wisdom of some of his measures, but at least he is doing something. As a result he is steadily gaining support among the lower classes. The people most vociferous in the opposition were by no means notable for their democratic leanings three years ago—quite the contrary, it was they who were largely responsible, by their reactionary policies, for the present mess here. It was they in many instances who were fractious regarding Pan-Americanism, if not downright anti-American. In short, while I have no desire to play into Perón’s hands, I can see danger that we shall not only be accused of blocking social reform but, worse, that we shall be charged with the worst sort of dollar diplomacy to protect our capital from the legitimate demands of Argentine labor.

I suppose that I get somewhat impatient about social reforms as a result of what I hear in society. The old families here make New York bankers sound like William Z. Foster.⁶¹

There is yet another factor in the situation which to my mind cannot be disregarded. We have assumed almost without giving it a second thought that the elections would be grossly fraudulent, because Perón would not have a Chinaman’s chance in fair elections. Various cool-headed observers are by no means as certain of either assumption now as they were until quite recently. I know that Perón is saying that he can win in fair elections. The Government is going to rather extraordinary lengths to insist upon its intention to give fair elections, and, although I still believe that the chance of fair elections is comparatively small, I do not think that we can afford altogether to eliminate from our calculations the possibility that Perón may win in reasonably fair elections.

You may think that all of the above adds up to a plea for appeasement à la Rockefeller. I have no intention of making any such recommendation. Spruille proved that the only way to deal with this Government was to be tough. There is still much to be accomplished in cleaning out Nazi activities, largely because of Argentina’s failures in the past, but partly because of our own delays. I have always felt and I continue to feel that we must move in on this situation as fast and as thoroughly as we can. Moreover, I think that we must make perfectly clear on every suitable occasion our support of democratic principles and our repudiation of the worst acts of this Government. By such methods we can encourage and aid the democratic forces in this country and I hope accomplish our own main objectives.

The point I wish to make is that we should not carry our crackdown policy to such extremes that it becomes contraproducente. We thought at one time that the Argentine people would accept economic sanctions to get rid of this Government. Today I earnestly doubt that this is the case. We are seeking through consultation to line up the other American Republics against this Government. I do not know to what extent we may be justified in doing this. Personally I should be very happy to see the Uruguayan proposal⁶² adopted by the free will of the twenty-one American Republics; I question whether even a bare majority will willingly subscribe to it if it means possible intervention in their internal affairs. Perhaps they would accept it if it implied moral pressure only. But if the little I hear about consultations down here is any criterion I gather that a number of the Republics are showing reluctance and even balkiness in following our initiative. If the Argentine regime were as bad as it is generally pictured I would agree that this was an obstacle which had to be overcome. But I am disturbed at the way the term Nazi-Fascist is sometimes used. When I was in Washington I heard innumerable government officials in CCA⁶³ countries so described, and the war record simply didn’t bear it out.

The fact that we are consulting is of course a restraining influence on this regime. But in view of the lack pictured above of an adequate basis for a crack-down, I do not see how we can justify the very serious risks that we are running of wrecking the inter-American system and the Good Neighbor Policy which are inherent in any effort to achieve an effective crackdown on Argentina. I must also emphasize as I have so many times in the past that we must not go forward on an all-out crack-down policy only to find that we are not prepared, when the time comes, to take the necessary measures to achieve our goal. To embark on such a policy without being prepared to carry it through would further bewilder everyone and eventually wreck the policy.

Furthermore I question the advisability of a policy of merely making ourselves disagreeable on all possible occasions in speech and action. Certain things we must say, for example that our sympathies are definitely with democratic processes; certain things we must do, for example maintain our embargo on shipments of war material. I do not believe, however, that it is wise gratuitously to shy a brick at the Argentine regime every time we say anything in public. I feel that there would have been little point to having rebuffed the Argentine Army by routing General Bissell⁶⁴ around Argentina as the State Department tried to do, quite apart from the inconvenience to General Bissell; and I fear that our failure to consult Argentina in a number of matters regarding which all the other American Republics were consulted is rather futile. Such actions neither help essentially to make more clear our repudiation of this regime, nor do they contribute notably to the overthrow of Perón. To many people sitting on the fence in Argentina they merely sound bad-tempered. I particularly call to your attention that our recently abandoned policy of economic restrictions may, due to the time lapse, well result in starvation, not to mention undesirable political repercussions, in Europe, all for the sake of dubious political advantages. Although we had no way of knowing how serious the results might be in Europe, it was always clear that Europe and the Argentine public would be hit earlier than Perón. I also question the wisdom of refusing to take Argentine students in our army training courses. … I continue to believe that missions should wait till after the elections.

It is very important for us to realize that if the Argentines choose to use it, we are building up rather a bad case against ourselves in our dealings with Argentina. Our failure to consult, in spite of our commitments to do so, is one instance in point, although mitigated by some previous actions of Argentina. Our failure to exchange information, e.g. the Von Thermann⁶⁵ report, is another. We are clearly violating the 1853 treaty by maintaining discriminatory export permits for Argentina. …

Perhaps I feel somewhat upset about the present situation precisely because I must be disagreeable on all possible occasions and I therefore have so little to give in return for my many demands. One effect, of course, is that our own information is faulty inasmuch as both our policy and that of the Argentine regime precludes any close contact between the higher officials of this Embassy and the higher officials of the Argentine Government.

You will doubtless feel that there is a lack of consistency between my views now and those I held two months ago. I am not sure that this view would be justified because of changes in the situation which have occurred in the interval. In September we assumed:

(1) That Perón had practically no popular support;

(2) That we were prepared to see a crack-down policy through to the end;

(3) That the democratic elements could successfully take over if given the opportunity; and

(4) (Until Cooke’s arrival) that we could never get rid of the Nazis under the present regime.

Moreover, elections had not been convoked.

Although none of these hypotheses has been completely destroyed, they all have been greatly weakened by subsequent events. We know (1) that Perón has a substantial measure of support among the poorer classes (I have, for example, seen a private estimate … that 50 percent of organized labor backs Perón); (2) that even the United States is not prepared for a full crack-down policy, let alone other countries; (3) that the democratic opposition got the opportunity which Spruille’s courageous stand won for them and proceeded to make the most ungodly, miserable mess of it; and (4) that we have, as Spruille foresaw, made great inroads on Nazi activities (although we should not be unduly optimistic about future progress, I think we can look forward to getting even further, at least as long as Cooke remains in office). Elections have now been convoked, and although few people expect them to be fair, it is generally felt that there are limits to possible fraud.

There is, of course, another factor which is that the Argentines themselves are realizing ever more strongly that this is an Argentine problem which they must solve themselves; despite the mess they made of it in October, they may have acquired some wisdom through their failure. They are making progress toward political unity and, as various Embassy reports have shown, they are giving indications of digging their toes in to fight it out if that proves necessary.

On the basis of the above analysis, I believe that our policy should basically be a continued full crack-down on the Nazis and a cold, not a hot-tempered policy towards the present Government.

This letter is horribly long and I suppose you will scarcely have time to read, let alone to analyze it. I do not need to tell you how greatly I would value your views with respect to the many misgivings I feel. It is easy to criticize a policy, as I know only too well from criticisms when I was on the receiving end in Washington. I hope that my views are not based on faulty information or on an unobjective analysis of the facts of the situation. If I am right, I am sure you will agree that it is most important to bear my thoughts in mind from this very moment on. I see no need for any great outward change in policy, but I do think that there is need for a change in our thinking about the Argentine situation.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

John M. Cabot

P.S. Curiously enough, the above was drafted before my conversation with the Foreign Minister, in which he used many of the same arguments and asked for the Von Thermann statement. Also, last night Enrique Gil⁶⁷ emphasized that we should quietly withdraw from the political picture; we could do little good and might do much harm. Pinedo⁶⁸ disagreed with him.

53. Spruille Braden.
54. Getulio Vargas, President of Brazil.
55. For documentation on non-recognition by the United States of the revolutionary regime in Bolivia, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. v, pp. 533 ff.
59. Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs.
60. Ramón S. Castillo, Argentine President from June 27, 1942 to June 4, 1943.
61. National Chairman, Communist Party of the United States.
62. See ante pp. 185 ff.
63. Symbol for the Division of Caribbean and Central American Affairs.
64. Brig. Gen. Clayton Bissell, on the occasion of an inspection trip to various Latin American countries.
65. Baron Edmund von Thermann, German Ambassador to Argentina.
67. Editor of La Semana Financiera.
68. Federico Pinedo, leader of the Nationalist Democratic Party.