Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Moscow Embassy Files: 713—Atomic Bomb

Memorandum by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay ⁸⁹ to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

secret

[New York,] October 21, 1946.

On Saturday evening, October 19, Mr. Eberstadt, Dr. Herring,⁹⁰ and I dined with Mr. Sobolev, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. The meeting was arranged through Herring with the purpose of establishing a point of contact with the Russian Government in addition to the official contact established through Gromyko.

Sobolev began the discussion by asking why we refused to stop bomb production. He stated that we would still have our plants, personnel, and technical skill, and could start again at any time as we had an absolute monopoly at the present time. He acknowledged that the use of the bomb was “possibly” decisive in the Japanese war. But he asked what purpose we could possibly have for more bombs at this time. He felt that in the present international situation that our continued production was an unstabilizing force in the world and made more difficult the conclusion of any international agreements or understandings. Sobolev stated that he based his statement that we were continuing bomb production on press reports.

Mr. Eberstadt stated that approximately six weeks ago he had come to the conclusion that the Soviet Government did not wish to reach an agreement for the international control of atomic energy. He had gone over all of Gromyko’s statements on the subject, as well as various articles which had been written expressing the Soviet viewpoint. He found in these objections to the American Plan no insurmountable obstacles, with the exception of our provision for international inspection and control. That seemed to be completely unacceptable to the Soviet Government.

Sobolev replied that the United States plan was in essence a plan for world government. The world, he stated, was not ready for world government. The Soviets, themselves, had attempted a similar proposal in 1927, but this proposal had been rejected by the world as attempting to go too far too fast.⁹¹ He asked whether or not we thought that the American Senate would approve a proposal for world government.

Mr. Eberstadt replied that he thought the Senate would probably not approve a proposal labeled “World Government”, but he did think a proposal such as ours, designed to accomplish specific objectives, could be passed by the Senate.

Sobolev stated that the question of world government had also been examined at Dumbarton Oaks⁹² and in San Francisco,⁹³ and had been rejected on the grounds that the world was not ready for it.

Mr. Eberstadt brought up the Kuh article which had appeared in “PM”. He felt that perhaps this article expressed legitimate cause for concern on the part of the Soviets. Sobolev did not indicate that he was the source for this article, but showed great interest in whether or not we considered it to be a legitimate article.

We attempted to demonstrate to him that our proposals in no way-would be directed unfairly against the economic development of Russia. Mr. Eberstadt stated that an initial division of plants might be agreed to in the treaty, and that additional plants might be constructed only upon approval of the Security Council with the veto intact. This would make it possible for the Russians to veto our further use of atomic power as well as our vetoing of their expansion. Thus, the American Proposals would apply equally to both nations.

Sobolev replied that the Soviet Union was not seeking equality, but, rather, freedom to pursue its own policies in complete freedom and without any interference or control from the outside. He made at this point rather an oblique reference to two previous attempts which had been made by foreign nations to deprive the Russian people of their freedom, both of which had failed.

Sobolev said that he had been trained as an engineer, and that he knew engineering projects of this type could not be allocated on purely political considerations, as a great many factors were required to provide adequate conditions for the construction of plants. If those conditions did not exist, it would not be possible to construct plants allocated by political means.

Sobolev further stated that the United States at this time had a tremendous advantage. We had all of the plants already and the skill to operate them, and all the subsidiary industrial potential to support such a complex project. It was inconceivable that any of this would be torn down.

Sobolev then returned to his argument for stopping bomb production. Mr. Eberstadt stated that we were perfectly willing to stop bomb production as a stage in the transition to ultimate international control. However, the final stage of international control must be provided for and agreed to before we would stop bomb production. He stated that although he did not know the official United States position on this, he would be prepared to argue the point with his Government for making cessation of bomb production the very first step in the transition stage. This would be done immediately upon signing of a satisfactory treaty. However, it would be futile to even consider such a program without adequate guaranties on the part of other nations. The American people would not support such a move and without such support the Government could not conceivably take such action.

He referred to the joint declaration of foreign ministers which envisaged an international control agency and controls sufficiently effective to protect complying states in the event of violations.⁹⁴ He did not know what the Soviet interpretation of this declaration was, but the American interpretation was that it certainly required effective and international control. [I cannot recall any reply that was made by Sobolev to this statement.]⁹⁵

Herring at this point suggested a possible compromise in which the initial disposal of plants would be provided for in the treaty in return for acceptance by the Russians of international inspection of the plant or plants located in their territory. Any nation would be perfectly free to construct additional plants at its own expense and where it desired, provided that it submitted to inspection. I stated that I doubted that such a proposal would provide for the minimum of security which we believe to be essential. I suggested, however, that the problem of inequality in requirements for power plants, which would cause a corresponding inequality in military potential, might be circumvented at least in part by permitting nations which did not desire to construct plants up to the agreed international quota to hold stocks of fissionable material equivalent to the working stocks that would be required in such plants. In this way they would be able to preserve their proportionate military potential.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested an alternate plan in which an initial quota of plants would be distributed throughout the world, and that construction of future plants would be up to Security Council approval. He emphasized, however, that he was speaking as an individual and that he had no idea whether such a proposal would be acceptable to his Government. Sobolev made no comment on either of these statements.

Sobolev again returned to the aspect of international control and repeated that the U.S. proposals were too ambitious, and that it was completely impossible for the Russians to accept them. He suggested the only possible way would be by slow stages as the world became more ready for international world government. He suggested that stopping of bomb production would be a first step, but that further steps could not be agreed upon now or could even be foreseen. He thought that it might be that after a period of years a situation could possibly be reached which would be quite similar to the situation envisaged by the U. S. proposals, but reiterated that our ultimate conditions could not possibly be accepted at the present time. He did, however, suggest that the compromise proposal suggested by Eberstadt and Herring might be the subject of discussion between Molotov and Byrnes while both are in New York. He stated that he thought Molotov would not take the initiative in such discussions, and that Byrnes would have to bring up the subject. Eberstadt asked who else he thought should be present at those discussions. Sobolev replied that at least at first no one besides those two should be present.

Mr. Eberstadt remarked that he thought it might have been a mistake to bring the United States and Soviet proposals into the Commission without having previously discussed them privately. Sobolev made no comment.

At one point in the conversations, Sobolev referred to the anti-Soviet attitude of the American press. He stated that the figure of ten million men in Russian concentration camps was ridiculous. He stated that the United States would not believe officially-published statistics of the Russian Government. He said that it was true the Russians were planning to build a Navy, but with the industrial potential of the country it should be perfectly obvious to us that the size of the Navy could not possibly approach the size of the American Navy in the foreseeable future.

He stated that the current 5-Year Plan had been interpreted in this country as a war plan. The reason for the emphasis on basic steel production was not for war purposes, but to rebuild the railways and bridges that had been destroyed during the war.

Eberstadt brought up the question of the Red Army. Sobolev replied the figures quoted in the American press for the size of the Russian Army were fantastic, that the size of the Russian Army could be obtained by anyone from official Russian statements. For example, they had announced that they had already demobilized 20 classes. He inferred that the size of the Red Army could be determined by such information. He summed up this part of the discussion by saying that the United States knew fully as much about Russia as Russia knew about the United States.

The discussion ended with a reiteration by Sobolev that he spoke only for himself and did not speak as a Soviet official.

Comment:

This is by far the frankest discussion with a Soviet official in which I have participated. Based on my previous work with the Russians, I believe it to be an accurate statement of official Soviet policy.

I believe the main conclusions which can be drawn from the talk are:

1. The Russians are most anxious to get us to stop bomb production, temporarily, at least. They probably think that if they can get us to stop production now they can use pressure of public opinion to prevent resumption of production later.

2. Stopping bomb production will in no way induce the Russians to accept any form of international inspection and control, the real obstacle to agreement.

3. The statement that the Soviet Union does not desire equality, but requires unlimited freedom to pursue its own policies, strongly indicates that no general understanding based on mutual trust and cooperation is possible between the two systems of government.

4. The proposal for discussions between Molotov and Byrnes was probably prompted by the hope that the Russians might get some concession from us, rather than by a desire to try to reach a general agreement.

The Soviet government is confronted with two alternatives:

a. To conclude an agreement which will mean world government in a limited and specific field, a system which might result in serious changes in their internal social and political structure.

b. Accept no international dominion of any sort; accept for the time being the superiority of the United States in atomic weapons; try to neutralize this superiority by all possible methods; and wait for the “inevitable” crack-up of capitalism.

We can only achieve success by making the second alternative more undesirable to them than the first.

Franklin A. Lindsay

89. Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
90. Edward Pendleton Herring, Secretary, Atomic Energy Commission.
91. Litvinov had made a proposal for complete and immediate disarmament, offered at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, at Geneva, on November 30, 1927. For proceedings of this session, see League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmanent Conference Entrusted with the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitations of Armaments, Series 1 (C667.M.225.1927.IX), p. 11.
92. For documentation concerning the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 713 ff.
93. For documentation concerning the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25–June 26, 1945, see ibid., 1945, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
94. See section 7 of the Report of the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, in telegram 4284, December 27, 1945, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 815.
95. Brackets appear in the original.