USUN Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
Discussion With Senator Austin on Disarmament
Following Mr. Molotov’s speech on Tuesday36 raising the disarmament issue and Senator Austin’s speech on Wednesday37 accepting the Molotov proposals with regard to disarmament, I had a long discussion with Senator Austin this afternoon with regard to the next steps we should take to implement our acceptance of the Russian proposals. As a result of this discussion, which dealt primarily with the question of atomic energy disarmament, it was decided that I should go down to Washington for the weekend and discuss with Mr. Acheson, Mr. Cohen, and others the Senator’s views and get from the people in the Department their reactions and their own views.
It was understood at the outset and throughout our conversation that the Senator’s views were not to be taken as committing himself to any particular positions. He wanted, in effect, to think out loud.
We first discussed security measures to protect those who comply against those who violate. There must be some way whereby the Security Council would administer and be responsible for the administration of inspection and enforcement without the veto. It was necessary to eliminate the veto for the purpose of expediting action against violators.
It would seem to be better to have the Security Council responsible for the inspection than a special organ. Thinking in terms of trying to reach a compromise position with the Russians, we would be with them in taking inspection into the Security Council instead of some separate unit but we would be going against them by eliminating the veto.
[Page 981]We then discussed the Soviet idea of inspection by national inspection forces. Our plan, the Senator said, goes against them on this. He asked whether there is a middle ground wherein national operating agencies can be brought nearer to, but not into, an international organization.
Our problem of seeking a compromise was to maintain the autonomy of the United Nations, its jurisdiction, and at the same time to accommodate the nationalism which is still strong with regard to inspection.
The Senator then indicated that our military intelligence experts’ must have a great many precedents to guide them. This is not based on treaties, he said, but on practice. There has always been a certain, amount of inspection by intelligence forces.
There are two extreme positions, the international represented by our proposal and the national represented by the Soviet proposal. We should get the two together, something in between. Our proposal is absolute, a very extreme position.
The Senator then went on to say some bookkeeping scheme so far as the rare products of the soil are concerned is possible. This means that the United Nations or the Atomic Development Authority can get control of uranium and thorium; we can’t do that, however, with bacteria and gasses.
I asked the Senator if he could give me a definite impression that I could convey to Mr. Acheson with regard to Baruch’s proposal to force a vote in the Atomic Energy Commission on the Baruch proposals in line with Mr. Baruch’s request for support when he called on the Senator some days previously. The Senator said that with the proviso that I make clear to Mr. Acheson his reaction was indefinite and immature [premature?], he would prefer to have the State Department say to Mr. Baruch, no, we are not going to force this issue now. The Senator then went on to comment that, “When you have the power you must stand back and get the perspective as to when you ought to use it. This relates to wisdom, not timidity.”