Secretariat Files
Memorandum Prepared for the Secretary’s Staff
Committee37
top secret
SC–169b
[Washington,] November 16, 1945.
Action on Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement of United
States Military Policy
the problem
The Secretary has received through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
a statement of United States military policy prepared and approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Annex I).38 It is necessary to decide
what action the Department shall take with respect to this statement.
recommendations
- 1.
- It is recommended that the Department comment on the statement by
observing generally that in the carrying out of the policy as finally
adopted it will be essential, because of the necessarily general terms
of such a statement, that there be close coordination between the State,
War, and Navy Departments;
- 2.
- That the Department’s more specific comments be along the lines of
Annex II;
- 3.
- That these comments be transmitted informally to the Secretaries of
War and the Navy; and
- 4.
- That the Department propose that the statement with the comments be
referred to SWNCC for revision by a
special subcommittee to be set up for this purpose.
background
- 1.
- … “United States Military Policy”, (Annex I) is a statement prepared
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by them. It has been forwarded
to the Secretaries of War and Navy with the request
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that they approve it and transmit it to
the Secretary of State and to the President for the latter’s approval
“as a present expression of United States military policy”.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper, which is in summary form, is divided
into two sections of unequal length. The first and longer part (pp. 1 to
5 of Annex I) is entitled “Basis for the Formulation of a Military
Policy”, and the second (pp. 5 to 7) is called “Statement of United
States Military Policy”.
discussion
The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper requires the most careful scrutiny by the
Department, in respect both to its general content and tone and to much of
the detail. It is necessarily couched in general terms, as must be the case
with a policy statement intended to guide the Executive branch of this
Government in the future. However, precisely because the terms are so
general it is of fundamental importance that they be clearly and accurately
phrased. This is particularly true of the broad generalizations contained in
the first section of the statement. They will be given concrete content only
as they are carried out under specific conditions and in specific cases. For
these reasons the application of military policy finally adopted is of equal
if not greater importance than the formulation of the policy itself. The
Department should, therefore, not only contribute to the formulation of the
policy but should participate continuously with the War and Navy Departments
in the carrying out of significant aspects of it.
Throughout the paper, but most specifically in paragraph (4) of the first
section, there is an emphasis upon the possibility of a breakdown in
friendly relations between the great powers and upon “potential enemy
powers”. In stressing these points the paper slights the necessity for
insuring the United States adequate allies as well as the possible effect of
U.S. military policy on our friendly relations with other countries. It also
ignores the need for making clear that our military policy must conform with
our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to employ force only
under conditions there stipulated.
Both in the first section and in the second, “Statement of United States
Military Policy”, certain general military policies and supporting policies
are proposed which should be carefully analyzed in the light of their
probable effect upon our relations with other countries.
In Annex II attached, there are set forth certain comments with respect to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper. These comments are not meant to be
exhaustive but should be regarded as illustrative and as intended to
demonstrate the relationship of this statement to foreign
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policy and to the Department’s
responsibility, and, consequently, to show the need for participation by the
Department in the revision of this paper before it is finally approved.
Annex II
Comments of Department of State on “United States
Military Policy” …
- 1.
- The Department of State recognizes its interest and concern in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff statement on “United States Military Policy”.
Therein it is stated (paragraph 1) that “the basic purpose for
maintaining United States armed forces is to provide for our
security …”. As the principal concern of statecraft is to obtain the
maximum degree of security, it follows that the Department should
scrutinize closely any formulation of military policy.
- 2.
- It is the view of the Department of State that the maximum degree
of security can be obtained only if our foreign policy and our
military policy are mutually helpful. Our foreign policy should not
hamper our military policy. Neither should our military policy
handicap the carrying out of our foreign policy. In fact, the
demands placed upon our armed forces are based upon our foreign
policy, as stated by President Truman in his address at New York on
October 27, 1945.39 This relationship was stated in terms of the
“four principal tasks” which, the President said, determined the
kind of armed might we propose to maintain:
“First, our Army, Navy and Air Force, in collaboration with
our Allies, must enforce the terms of peace imposed upon our
defeated enemies.
“Second, we must fulfill the military obligations which we
are undertaking as a member of the United Nations
Organization—to support a lasting peace, by force, if
necessary.
“Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to
preserve the territorial integrity and the political
independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
“Fourth, in this troubled and uncertain world, our military
forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental mission
laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States—to
‘provide for the common defense’ of the United States.
“These four military tasks are directed not toward war—not
toward conquest—but toward peace.
“We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the
peace of the world. For we now know that that is the only
sure way to make our own freedom secure.
“That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the
United States.”
- 3.
- In the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement the place assigned the task
of enforcing the terms of peace upon Germany and Japan seems to the
Department of State to be less prominent than it should be.
Hostilities with Germany came to an end a bare six months ago.
Operations against Japan ceased less than three months ago. In
neither case has the formal end of hostilities been proclaimed. Nor
have treaties of peace been formulated, fixing among other things
the period within which military forces of this country and of
others of the United Nations will occupy German and Japanese
territory. In the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement the significance
of joint occupation and of joint enforcement of peace terms as parts
of the job of securing the victory achieved through joint efforts
has been largely overlooked. Politically, no aspect of our foreign
policy carries greater potentialities for our future security than
those relations with our allies involved in the enforcement of
surrender and peace terms. It seems to the Department of State that
a correspondingly important place should be given to this task in a
statement of military policy.
- 4.
- Moreover, the responsibilities of the United States as a principal
member of the United Nations should figure more prominently in
making the estimate of our future military requirements. The
political leadership we took in this venture was made possible
primarily because of the military strength we mobilized during the
war. It will continue in proportion to the relative military
strength we maintain in the future. The United Nations is built upon
the power relations existing among the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, China, France, and the other members of the war-time
coalition. Its future will depend upon power relations which will
exist hereafter among the principal members. If the balance of this
relationship in military potential were to be impaired or upset, the
fabric of the United Nations would be weakened or at least would
require reexamination. We do not wish this balance to be upset.
Therefore, we should retain our military power in greater strength
than that which would be needed merely to fulfill our strictly
military obligations under the Charter. The question is: how much
greater? This estimate can be made only on the basis of developing
political factors. As our relations with other countries are
conditioned by our duties and responsibilities under the United
Nations Charter, greater recognition should be given these factors
as determinants of our military needs.
- 5.
- It is believed that the analysis of our military needs postulated
on a breakdown in peaceful relations among Britain, Russia and the
United States receives undue emphasis (paragraphs 4, 5, and 6). It
is given more space than that based on the continuance of peaceful
relations. This disproportion should be corrected. In this
connection
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the last of
the major national policies said by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
determine our military needs is overemphasized. This statement of
policy is: “maintenance of the United States in the best possible
relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when
necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security
and integrity of the United States” (paragraph 2g).
- 6.
- The hypothesis that our security may require extensive military
operations overseas needs close examination for its possible effect
on the relations with our principal allies in the recent war. This
hypothesis runs through the entire statement (paragraphs 2g, 8b, 9, 13a). The need for examination is emphasized by
the further hypothesis that such operations would be preventive in
purpose (paragraphs 8b and c, 9). Despite our strength, our chances of survival in a
future conflict would be increased were we to be assured of the help
of allies. This political need must be a constant pre-occupation of
our foreign policy. If a given hypothesis, such as the two just
referred to, might handicap the Department of State in its conduct
of foreign policy, a re-examination of this hypothesis should be
made.
- 7.
- The Department of State believes that certain of the subsidiary
policies listed in paragraph 13 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
statement also stand in need of examination before becoming part of
our stated military policy. The examination should be undertaken
from the point of view of our relations with other countries and
particularly with our principal allies. As a matter of national
policy “the maintenance of a large merchant marine, both active and
reserve” (paragraph 13i (2)) might in time
weaken the economic strength (hence the military potential) of
certain of our potential future allies, and thus might defeat its
purpose of contributing to our national security. The “maintenance
of industries essential to the war effort” (paragraph 13i (5)) needs examination on economic as well
as foreign policy grounds. The “stockpiling of critical strategic
materials” (paragraph 13i (6)) likewise
should be scrutinized from both economic and foreign policy angles.
It is also questionable whether our policy should be to support the
“development” of the armed forces of the other American republics,
as stated in paragraph 13k.
- 8.
- In addition to studying most carefully the foreign policy
implications of the statement as it stands, the addition of certain
new items seems to the Department of State to merit consideration.
Respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of
certain states, China, for example, might be considered for
inclusion as a national policy determining our military needs
(paragraph 2) since we are bound by treaty to accord this respect.
Moreover, the United States as a member of the United Nations has
agreed to refrain from the
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threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state (Article 2, 4). Consideration
should be given to adding this principle as a national policy
determining our military needs. Multilateral regulation of armaments
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is also
proposed as a policy determining our military needs which might be
added to those already listed in the statement. Finally,
consideration might well be given to including, as an additional
policy determining our military needs, the political policy of
maintaining friendly relations with other countries so as to prevent
the actual outbreak of hostilities, or, in the event of such
hostilities, to give us the maximum number of allies.
