740.00119 EW/5–2446: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received May 24—2:04 p.m.]
1641. Personal for the Secretary and Matthews from Smith. The following is a summary of a confidential conversation with Quaroni, the Italian Ambassador, who visited me yesterday. His remarks may have considerable significance in view of his apparent present standing with the Italian Foreign Office.
With regard to the Italian peace treaty, he commented on the three points of difference between the USSR and the Western Powers. Those relating to reparations and Italian colonies he feels can be adjusted satisfactorily. However, in the case of Trieste, his opinion is that the Soviets have taken a position publicly from which it will be very difficult for them to withdraw, even should they desire to do so, in the relatively short period remaining until the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers and the subsequent peace conference.
He stated that some alternative must be sought between the proposals of the Soviet Government and those of the Western Powers, and in his opinion the only possible alternative whereby a compromise might be effected would be some form of internationalization of Trieste on Danzig pattern. He remarked that this would be a time and face saving factor for the Soviets, and that after all, Danzig had lasted more than 20 years.
He stated that, in his opinion, 90% of the people of Trieste would themselves vote for internationalization, and in response to a question by me replied categorically that the Italian Government would accept this solution, but it would, of course, be obliged to take the position before its public that the acceptance was forced.
On the other hand, he felt that the Italian people would never accept it. When asked what he meant by this statement he said that so long [Page 447] as Trieste remained outside of Italy there would be irredentist movement in Italy, but that the effect on Italy of the internationalization of Trieste would not be grave enough to cause the downfall of the government if this solution were not proposed formally until after the elections. He felt that the Russian position with regard to Trieste had cost the Communist Party in Italy a minimum of three million votes which they might otherwise have expected to get from the non-party registered voters.
He said that while those who are now dictating Soviet foreign policy are apprehensive that the US will make a separate peace with Italy, he had very good reason to believe that a strong group in Russia, and particularly the military, would prefer this. The thinking of the first group is conditioned on the fact that if the Western Powers were able to arrange a quadripartite peace with Italy while at the same time the US still declined to make peace with the existing Bulgarian Government and as a consequence the Soviet Government was not able to arrange simultaneously a four-power peace with Bulgaria, the Soviet position in the Balkans would be greatly weakened. The second group, however, is motivated by the belief that it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union to make a direct and separate peace with Bulgaria which would not in any way tie their hands with regard to such matters as disarmament. He commented that Soviet policy might be such that the Russian Government would trade Trieste for the advantage of a simultaneous four-power peace treaty with Italy and Bulgaria, the US receding from its present position of unwillingness to negotiate with the existing Bulgarian Government.
In commenting on the Italian-Yugoslav boundary as proposed by the Soviet experts as opposed to the more rational ethnic line selected by the Western Powers, he remarked that the importance of Montefalcone to any power with Mediterranean aspirations must not be overlooked. The present Soviet boundary would give Montefalcone to Yugoslavia, thus bringing into the Russian sphere of influence a shipyard which is capable of building 35,000 ton battleships and which has done so for Italy. Although other Yugoslav ports on the Adriatic might be converted into shipbuilding centers, there exists nowhere in Yugoslavia or in Russia such a population of shipbuilders, skilled and experienced, with the background of generations of shipbuilding traditions as at Montefalcone.
With regard to most of the above, I accept Quaroni’s opinions with reservations, but in connection with his statement on Italy’s willingness to accept under color of duress the internationalization of Trieste, I believe he knows what he is talking about.