C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation11
| Participants: | Secretary Byrnes |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Mr. Molotov said he had asked to see the Secretary since the latter knew that he had wished to leave on November 29, but it was now apparent that he could not get away at that time. He said he wished to discuss the status of the work of the Council.
The Secretary said he must admit he was greatly discouraged at the lack of progress that they had made. He said last Friday or Saturday he had almost come to the conclusion that it would be better to admit frankly that they could not agree and announce their disagreement to the world. He said he thought that as unfortunate as this would be, it would still be less harmful than the everyday report of no progress. He repeated that if they could not agree they should admit it and go on to the German question. He said the world would not come to an end because of their disagreement on these treaties and that Yugoslavia and Italy were now talking to each other, and that it was possible that within six months or so they might reach an agreement which would be better than any the Ministers could reach.
[Page 1265]Mr. Molotov said he was not so pessimistic as Mr. Byrnes, but he felt that they should have a clearer idea of where they were going. As to the direct negotiations he was doubtful that any results would be achieved, adding that Mr. Byrnes’ reply to the Italian Government had not been encouraging to the idea of direct negotiation.12
The Secretary said he had read the reply to the Council and he really did not see how he could have replied in any other way. They all agreed it was the business of Yugoslavia and Italy if they wished to negotiate, but he could not assume any responsibility for such negotiation.
Mr. Molotov agreed. He then said that their chief difficulty was to do something, even a little something, to meet the Yugoslav objection and avoid a pretext of their not signing the treaty. He inquired whether something could not be done to meet Yugoslav wishes.
The Secretary said that he understood that the Russians wished to help Yugoslavia but that our position was quite different since the Peace Conference. Up to the time and at the Peace Conference itself, we had made concessions and we felt that the recommendations of the Conference already represented great compromises, and that therefore, it was very difficult for us to do something for Yugoslavia in the nature of more compromises from the Paris recommendations. He pointed out that before the Peace Conference, Mr. Molotov had insisted that fundamental questions be agreed to by the Council, but had stated that secondary questions need not be decided beforehand. Thus, the questions which Mr. Molotov regarded as fundamental had been settled by the Council before the Conference. He said, for example, he thought that the recommendation on Trieste should have been accepted by the Soviet Delegation since it in effect represented a very real compromise on everybody’s part. He said he was pessimistic when he looked over the list of unagreed questions in the Italian Treaty which included more than thirty. He just didn’t see much possibility of agreeing on some of the open questions. He said they could try in a very private meeting to agree and if they found they couldn’t, it would be better to admit it publicly and let the Yugoslavs and Italians talk.
Mr. Molotov repeated that after many talks with the Yugoslavs, the Soviet desire was to give them something so that there would be no excuse for their not signing. He said they thought they should seriously examine what they could do for Yugoslavia and if something could be achieved along that line, he did not think it would be too difficult to settle the outstanding points.
[Page 1266]The Secretary said he was sure some of the difficulties were based on misunderstanding. For example, he felt that the Soviet Government was fearful lest we keep our troops indefinitely in the Free Territory and attempt to transform it into a base. He said nothing could be farther from our thoughts and, he knew, farther from the British thoughts. The only point he thought was essential was that the Security Council and its representative on the spot should be in a position to carry out the responsibilities to which we had all agreed. He said he thought there should be a reduction of the number of troops the three countries—Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the United States—would maintain during this period, but he did feel that the representative of the Security Council, namely, the Governor, having personal responsibility, should decide when conditions would permit withdrawal.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would not be possible to agree that the troops should be removed within 90 days after the treaty goes into force if the Governor does not object. If he objects, then Mr. Byrnes’ proposal that they should leave within 45 days after the Governor decides would be accepted.
The Secretary replied that he thought that that was a helpful suggestion and he would like to think it over. He went on to say that he would be prepared to propose a limitation of 5,000 troops for each one of the three powers concerned, namely, a total of 15,000 in the Free Territory.
Mr. Molotov said he thought that would be acceptable and helpful and he thought would please the Yugoslavs.
The Secretary inquired whether it would not be possible to accept the French proposal concerning the remaining oustanding points on Trieste. He pointed out that the French proposal was not ours, and that the British had had a different one, but he felt that the Soviet amendments to the French proposal made it very difficult.
Mr. Molotov remarked that in so far as the permanent statute went they were virtually in complete agreement.
The Secretary agreed but said not on the provisional regime.
Mr. Molotov said he thought that they should apply the relevant provisions of the permanent statute as the basis of the provisional regime.
The Secretary said he agreed and handed to Mr.
Molotov the five-point summary which had been prepared by the United States
Delegation. It reads as follows:
Mr. Molotov pointed out that in point 1 there had been another proposal which although not yet adopted provided for consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy and approval by the Security Council. He felt such a procedure would give more authority to the provisional regime.
The Secretary said that after all we intended to select a capable and honest man as a governor. If he was not so regarded by any one of us, he would not be appointed and he felt we should in the circumstances display every confidence in this Governor. Further, if we should start by saying that we would not trust him to select the Council but would have to refer it back to the Security Council, it would undermine his authority from the very beginning. He said, for example, if we should select Mr. Pavlov to be the Governor and explain to him how important and honorable the job was in order to persuade him to take it and then tell him he could not appoint the Provisional Council without reference back to us where any one of us could veto it, Mr. Pavlov would surely not be willing to take the job. He said as to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion concerning the withdrawal of troops he thought it might afford a basis, but he was only worried concerning the 90-day period over the possibility that there would be long delay in the appointment of a Governor. He said all hoped that this provisional period would be a very short one, but he did think that the Governor should be given large powers during the provisional period. Unless he was a first-rate man, he would not be appointed and, therefore, we could safely trust him to select a council to serve for a limited period.
Mr. Molotov said that if we all agreed the provisional period was to be short why not fix the date of elections within four months, as he had suggested, after the entry into force of the treaty.
[Page 1268]The Secretary said he had only one fear in regard to setting the date of an election and that was basing it on the entry into force of the peace treaty. That might mean that one-half of the four months would be used up in selecting a Governor and the Governor then would only have two months, or possibly even less, in which to make all the arrangements for the elections. He said he would be prepared to accept a period of time within which elections should be held provided the period began from the date the Governor assumed his functions.
Mr. Molotov said he would like to think that over. He went on to say that could not something be done for Yugoslavia in the matter of reparations, say $175,000,000, or at the very least $150,000,000, and $25,000,000 for Albania. This would make the total $300,000,000. He said these countries had suffered very much and deserved something.
The Secretary said he had had his experts look into the value of the utilities and installations which Yugoslavia would receive from the ceded territory.
Mr. Molotov said he thought that the Yugoslavs had counted on Trieste which would have had real value. He also inquired whether something could not be done in regard to Gorizia and the strip of territory between the Morgan and French Lines.
The Secretary said that would be very hard to change.
Mr. Molotov replied that as he had already said, he would, of course, support the agreed decision, but if they could find a mutually accepted compromise, it would at least do something for Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Delegation would not object. He then turned to the subject of compensation and said that the Soviet Delegation would support any figure the United States selected.
The Secretary pointed out that the Soviet and American Delegations had been together on that and said that in view of the feelings of the British and French he would be prepared to consider 75%.
Mr. Molotov suggested 50% and the Secretary agreed.
He then said that as to Article 71, he felt that the general economic assurances of equal treatment would be acceptable to them if they could agree on civil aviation.13 He proposed that this part be amended to grant equal facilities without discrimination to any concerning civil aviation in so far as this would not affect the national defense of the country in question.
The Secretary inquired how a civil aviation agreement could affect national defense.
Mr. Molotov explained that large passenger aircraft were no more than copies of heavy bombers and that certain countries might be afraid that if these large foreign planes were allowed to fly anywhere, [Page 1269] one day it might be transport planes and the next day bombers. He said he felt that way they could agree that a small country would have the right to refuse to sign the agreement on the grounds of national defense. The rest of Article 71 could be agreed upon.
The Secretary inquired what about the Danube.
Mr. Molotov said he would like to think that question over.
They both agreed to think over the various suggestions that had been made during the meeting.
At the conclusion, the Secretary invited Mr. Molotov to lunch the following day, and Mr. Molotov accepted with pleasure and said he hoped it could be at two o’clock.
- This appears to be the same conversation described, in somewhat different terms, in James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 152–153, and in James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 382–383.↩
- The reference here is to the message the substance of which is included in telegram Delsec 1094, November 11, 1946, to Rome, p. 1110.↩
- The item under reference appears to be article 71, paragraph 1c, of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as included in the Recommendations of the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 905.↩