C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2094: Italian-Yugoslav Frontier No. 7
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Political Adviser, United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber)
| Participants: | The Italian Ambassador Tarchiani |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Matthews | |
| Mr. Reber |
The Italian Ambassador called this morning to inform us of the conversation which had taken place yesterday between the Italian and Yugoslav Delegations. Following the meeting several days ago the Italian Delegation had received a telegram from Rome stating [Page 1302] that Simic’s description of the Tito proposal was at variance with Togliatti’s understanding and requesting that clarification be obtained from the Yugoslav Delegation here.28 When Quaroni saw Simic yesterday, he asked the latter whether in fact the Yugoslav proposal had included an Italian corridor from Trieste to Italy proper. Simic did not answer directly but asked whether the Italian Government would be prepared to negotiate on such basis. Quaroni replied that he could not, on such vague information, express the Italian desires in this respect. He said that Italy would, of course, wish to obtain the ethnic line which in its opinion was closer to the Wilson Line, and would be willing for plebiscites to be held in certain small areas of which the ethnic character was not clear. Although Simic considered that no negotiations were possible on this basis, Bebler on the other hand was less categoric and offered to submit this to his government.
Quaroni then, under instructions from Nenni, raised the question of commercial negotiations and the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Belgrade. The Yugoslavs agreed to ask for instructions in this connection.
Quaroni then asked whether the Yugoslav Delegation considered that the Big Four negotiations would be successful. Bebler expressed [Page 1303] considerable doubt that any conclusions would be reached and reiterated that in any event Yugoslavia could not sign a treaty on the basis of the French Line.
It was then agreed that a communiqué be issued as a result of the conversations to the effect that certain of the information published from Rome about the conversations was inexact. This has been interpreted in the American newspapers this morning to indicate that the statement that Yugoslavia had asked for Monfalcone was incorrect, although this was definitely not the impression that the communiqué was designed to give. Tarchiani then went on to state that a telegram had just been received from Nenni showing that the Yugoslavs were confiscating property on a large scale in Zone B and arresting Italian inhabitants. A copy of this telegram is attached.29 The Italian Delegation is under instruction to take this matter up with the Yugoslavs and point out that if this continues, it will be difficult for the two governments to have direct understanding.
In Tarchiani’s opinion the Yugoslavs do not wish to close all possibility of discussions and may be deliberately emphasizing their decision not to sign the treaty in order to confuse the issue and possibly force the Italians later to reach a settlement which will not have the French Line as its basis. If Yugoslavia does not sign the treaty, a very difficult situation for Italy would be created as it would then be asked to sign a treaty, the most important part of which, as far as it is concerned, would not have been agreed.
Tarchiani asked whether there was any possibility of a settlement which did not envisage the possibility of a Free Territory. He said that in strictly confidential conversations with the French Delegation he had gained the impression that if Italy was willing to make some concession to Yugoslavia, as for example the cession of certain of Grorizia’s suburbs and the renunciation of that part of Zone B which lies between the Morgan Line and the French Line, the French Delegation felt that there might be some possibility of securing Yugoslav agreement to allowing Italy to retain possession of Trieste and the remainder of the Free Territory. Tarchiani said that if such a proposal were made and accompanied by guarantees of freedom of transit for the Port of Trieste, he would be prepared to urge his government to accept this solution.
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The first meeting between the Italian Representative, Egidio Quaroni, and the Yugoslav Delegation headed by Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić was held in New York on November 20, 1946, from 3:00 to 4:30 p.m. According to the Italian memorandum of conversation covering this meeting, a copy of which was given to the Department of State by Ambassador Tarchiani, Simic described the Yugoslav proposals in part as follows:
↩“Simić pointed out that according to their information Tito’s proposals were sufficiently precise. Quaroni observed that the only thing which Togliatti had spoken of in a concrete fashion was that Tito admitted territorial contiguity between Trieste and Italy. Simić said that this was not quite exact. According to him the Tito proposal consisted in the recognition of Trieste as an autonomous regime under Italian sovereignty within the limits of the territorial arrangement proposed by the Yugoslavs to the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, that is to say without a corridor and including the cession to Yugoslavia of Gorizia and Monfalcone. Quaroni observed that what Togliatti had referred to Nenni seemed to be on a different basis. Simić replied that these were Tito’s proposals. Quaroni pointed out that in that case they could not constitute even a basis for discussion. We depart from the position that the French Line is now an established fact and we cannot accept any change for the worse in a line of such importance. Bebler observed that we were wrong to consider that the French Line was an established fact because Yugoslavia would never accept it. Furthermore, Tito’s proposal contained a new suggestion, that is, the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Trieste and this would be a great advantage for us and we should understand that Yugoslavia is not prepared to grant this without obtaining some compensating advantage. According to the French Line, Trieste is lost to us. In this way it would revert to the status of an Italian city. Quaroni objected, pointing out that since the Free Territory of Trieste is very largely composed of Italians, the creation of a Free Territory is not the same thing as giving Trieste to Yugoslavia.” (CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 2094, Italian-Yugoslav Frontier No. 7)
- Not printed.↩