CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 27
The Commission resumed its consideration of the Australian amendment to Article 22 (Reparation) of the Rumanian treaty [C.P.(Gen.) Doc. 1.B.24]. The Byelo-Russian representative said that the amendment was not in conformity with international law, as it would leave the amount of reparation blank and an ex-enemy could not be asked to sign a treaty containing a blank provision.
Mr. Thorp (USA) said that the U.S. Delegation was greatly disturbed at certain aspects of the discussion of the Australian amendment [Page 297] and must emphatically defend the right of any country to propose amendments without subjecting itself to attacks on its motives. The Conference was not limited to a discussion of articles left open by the CFM: only four powers were limited in any way as to the positions they might take. Amendments should not be discarded merely because they might adversely affect one or another of these powers. The U.S. Delegation would try to limit itself to a discussion of the merits of specific proposals and would rely on the wisdom of the countries represented to reach wise decisions. As to the Australian amendment, after careful consideration, the U.S. Delegation was unable to support it, for the following reasons: (1) It was desirable that both the paying and recipient countries know the amount of the obligation as soon as possible. (2) It was to be questioned whether even after study for six months a sure conclusion could be reached, for the fixing of reparation could not be an exact science and in the last analysis must depend on the judgment of men who were seeking a reasonable conclusion. (3) While any member of the Commission was free to seek such information as would enable him to form an opinion on the CFM decision, this decision should not be reopened unless a member could convince others that the decision was in error. (4) Although a logical case could be made for payments in foreign exchange, in view of actual world economic conditions the transfer problem might be so great as to lead to a breakdown of the reparation settlement. The use of foreign exchange would also create certain internal problems for the paying countries. (5) He had been impressed by the Canadian argument for a continuing body to supervise the execution of the reparation provisions where there was more than one recipient, but, as Poland had withdrawn its claim, it was not necessary to consider this suggestion in this case. For these reasons the U.S. Delegation was unable to support the Australian amendment on its merits.71
M. Alphand (France) said that, although it appreciated the spirit in which the Australian amendment was made, the French Delegation could not support the amendment, as it did not give sufficient weight to the actual situation. He agreed with the arguments made by the U.S. representative and thought that Rumania was able to meet its obligation and that payments in foreign exchange were not desirable. He thought that there was merit in the Canadian suggestion, which could be discussed at another point, as, for example, in connection with the Italian treaty.
Mr. Glenvil-Hall (UK) regretted the nature of the Soviet representative’s remarks on the Australian amendment. The purpose of this amendment had much to commend it, but nevertheless it was necessary for him to say, without going over the ground again, that the [Page 298] U.K. Delegation fully shared the views expressed by the U.S. and French representatives, as well as certain of the objections to the Australian proposal made by the Soviet representative.
Mr. Walker (Australia) referred to but indicated he would not reply to the attacks made on the motives of the Australian Delegation in proposing the amendment. He hoped that in the original some of the remarks made were not as offensive as in translation. He made a general defense of the proposal. He appreciated the work which had been done by the CFM, but wished to say that little information on this and other subjects had been placed before the Conference by the Four Powers. He denied that the Australian approach was stereotyped and suggested signs of a stereotyped approach in the provisions drafted by the CFM in which $300 million appeared to be the standard reparation figure. He observed that the Australian Delegation was not satisfied with the information available on Article 26 (Rumanian property in Allied territory) and intended to seek an explanation of terms which might be onerous and difficult to justify. He noted that reparation in kind did not eliminate the problem of pricing. He welcomed the support by the U.S., French and Canadian Delegations for continuing machinery for the execution of the reparations provisions. In view of the fact that the majority of the Commission were opposed to the amendment, the Australian Delegation had decided to withdraw it in the case of the Rumanian Treaty, while fully reserving its position on other treaties, especially as to the amount of reparation and the need for continuing machinery for the execution of the reparation provisions.
M. Molotov (USSR) then made a lengthy statement.72 He was determined to defend the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, even if it should offend others. He again attacked the Greek statement as favoring leniency for aggressors and as being confused. The support of a Reparation Commission by the Canadian Delegation indicated clearly the instability of the Canadian approach to reparation, as it had not previously questioned the Armistice terms. The Soviet Delegation had not challenged the right of Australia to put forward amendments and he wondered who wished to question the equally basic right to criticize proposals. He hoped that the various points of view would be presented fully in the press so that the public could form its own opinion. It was incorrect to assert that the Soviet Delegation had not dealt with the substance of the Australian amendment. As to the criticism that it would not be correct to say that the Australian Delegation did not represent the views of the Australian people, this sometimes happened in democratic countries and there [Page 299] was a procedure for settling such a problem, as had been seen at the Potsdam Conference, during the course of which there had been a change in the British Government. He quite understood that the U.K. and U.S. representatives were more interested in Article 26 than in Article 22. The Australian Delegation did not object to Article 26 and he asked that the Soviet Delegation be allowed to defend its legitimate claims. He referred to the heavy industrial losses of the Soviet Union at the same time that the U.S. was expanding its industrial plant, not only for peaceful purposes but also with war plants, perhaps designed to guard against future emergencies. He could not agree to any proposal which would hamper the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union. He noted that it had not been difficult for the USSR, U.K., and U.S. to find common language when the Armistice Agreement was negotiated and said that the Australian Delegation proposed to destroy this common language and to adopt a new language which could be spoken only by those who were prone to forget the war and its consequences and the contributions and sacrifices of certain powers. The purpose of the Soviet statement was to defend the common language that had been found. The Soviet people were determined, under the leadership of the great Stalin, to rehabilitate their country and to secure a durable peace and they hoped that this would be in the interest of all who were anxious to defend the cause of a durable peace and the interests of freedom-loving peoples.