CFM Files

United States Delegation Journal

USDel (PC) (Journal) 50

The Commission continued discussion of the Czechoslovak amendment to expel 200,000 Hungarians [C.P.(Gen.) Doc.1.Q.5]. The Delegate of Yugoslavia said that a solution for the minority problem in Central Europe was necessary. He then proceeded to trace the history of revisionism in Hungary from 1919 on, reminding the Commission of the Backsa massacres, the twenty years of plotting on the part of the Horthy Government and the fact that Hungary had used the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia for the purpose of stabbing that country in the back in its moment of trial. He took note that there still was the same spirit of revisionism in certain circles of the new democratic government in Hungary. He was grieved that the Hungarians had used the argument that there was a surplus of manpower in Hungary and a lack of it in Czechoslovakia. This was not so. The U.S. Delegate at a previous meeting had pointed to the recently concluded agreement between Yugoslavia and Hungary on the minority issue, but it was incorrect to use this as an example since it was an arrangement for voluntary exchange and not a transfer. Moreover, Yugoslavia had solved its minority problem by giving rights to its minority peoples. Here was the chance for the sons of the mother country to return on an organized basis and the net result would be to remove a lack of confidence in Hungary which now existed.

The Delegate of Byelo-russia in a long speech also supported the Czech amendment and contended that it was necessary to have an article in the peace treaty in order to accomplish an effective bilateral agreement between the two countries since no positive results had [Page 526] occurred after the agreement signed between the two countries last February. He was sure that Czechoslovakia would fulfill its promises to accomplish any transfer in a humane way and that certain economic concessions would be made to Hungary in the form of credits or reduction of reparations. He refuted the Hungarian argument that there was no room in Hungary to receive these Magyars, stressing the fact that Hungarians were in the process of expelling half a million Germans. Should the Hungarians refuse to accept the return of the Hungarians now living in Slovakia, it would demonstrate that they did not wish to cooperate with their neighbors. He had listened to some delegations, who apparently had favored the absorption of minorities, but he could not support this conception. Referring the problem to the subcommittee was no solutiion. Statistics had already been studied. The Byelo-russian Delegate told the Commission of the successful exchange of populations which had already taken place between Byelo-russia and Poland. He was puzzled by the U.S. statement connecting the bridgehead question with that of the minority, since so few Hungarians were living in that territory. He therefore could not agree that the two questions should be handled together.

Viscount Hood (U.K.) said he was sympathetic with the aims of the Czechoslovak Delegation, but pointed out that it might be more unpleasant for the Czechoslovaks should they insist on the forced transfer of so many people and moreover had it written into a treaty. The Czechoslovak Delegation might well desire to carry out humanely the transfer but the resettlement of so many people in Hungary was quite impossible unless the Hungarian Government could agree to it. Unilateral solutions cannot and should not be imposed. The Czechoslovak contention that an effective exchange of populations had occurred after the last war between Greece and Turkey was not applicable here because in the former case both governments desired it. Viscount Hood hoped that in this case the problem could be solved by bilateral agreement; it was the only way. Merely because the Czechs had once tried and failed was no reason to feel that there could not now be some success. He recalled that the Hungarian representative had stated his country’s desire to live in peace with its Czechoslovak neighbors and was willing to seek a solution. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Delegation had indicated that the Conference itself should settle this matter. Consequently the Commission should refer it to its subcommittee for further study. It was not necessary to go into the facts and figures again, but in the light of many of the suggestions aired in the last few meetings, he thought that proposals might be worked out which would meet the approval of the Commission and the Conference. He therefore gave his strong support to the U.S. motion to refer the question to the Subcommittee.

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The Ukrainian Delegation questioned the competence of the Commission to handle such a serious matter. He also pointed to the successful experiment in exchanging populations between Poland and Byelo-russia. He suggested that the Commission itself could, of course, make recommendations. He felt that it was not right to refer the question to the Subcommittee.

M. Masaryk (Czechoslovakia) then made an extremely moving speech. He was not a good hater, he said, even though Czechoslovakia had had such a terrible experience with the Nazis. He was resolved to erase hatred from his heart and he wanted nothing more than to have friendship among the nations of Central Europe. He expressed great gratitude to the sympathetic viewpoint of all the delegations who had spoken on the Czech amendment including the U.S. and U.K. He was particularly grateful to M. Vyshinsky as an expert in minority matters and as a friend. The Soviet Union had solved many such problems in Europe today. He said the Czechoslovak Delegation had believed that the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians would be the beginning of a new era and that they would be received in Hungary with open arms as Slovakia would receive its returning sons. He said Czechoslovakia needed these sons and loved them, but this was apparently not so with the Hungarians. If at Potsdam it had been decided to solve the minority problem in the case of the German minority in Czechoslovakia why could not the problem be solved at Paris? Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia craved advice and the leadership of the Big Four. He pledged himself to proceed in an attempt to solve the problem in the very best way possible but described the transfer as the removal of a cancer by surgery, quickly and cleanly. Nevertheless, he accepted the proposal to refer the matter to the Subcommittee and concluded by saying that Czechoslovakia stood upon its Record, which was based on friendship and cooperation.

The U.S. proposal to refer the transfer amendment to the subcommittee was then adopted.

The Commission adopted Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. The Czechoslovak amendment to Article 6 (CP(Gen)Doc. 1 Q 6) was withdrawn by its delegation as was the Australian amendment to Article 8.17 The Australian Delegate wanted to have incorporated in the Record a short statement to the effect that Australia was convinced of the need for [Page 528] economic and social cooperation in Europe and its proposal had been designed to have these enemy states join the existing international organizations for economic and social problems.

General Smith (U.S.) read into the Record a statement similar to that made by Mr. Harriman18 in the Rumanian Commission regarding the desire of Rumania to sign a protocol with Hungary or any bilateral arrangement which the U.S. Delegation felt would tend to improve relations and good understanding between the two countries.

The Commission began discussion of a Yugoslav new proposal, to be added after Article 9, to have returned historical documents, cultural property and archives. The Czech delegation supported this amendment and suggested Czechoslovakia be included also. Both the U.S. and Ukraine Delegations felt the Czechs and Yugoslavs should devise some new wording to make the proposed amendment more specific and the Commission agreed to defer this matter until the next session.19

The Commission adjourned at 8:15.

  1. The Australian amendment, C.P.(H/P) Doc. 8, was as follows: “The Government of Hungary shall apply for membership of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the International Wheat Council, the International Health Organisation, and such other economic and social organisations as shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations, and shall co-operate with all those bodies in carrying out their decisions and recommendations. The Governments signatory to this Treaty undertake to support any such application made by the Government of Hungary”.
  2. Ambassador Harriman’s statement is summarized in the United States Delegation Journal account of the 8th Meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Rumania, September 5, p. 375.
  3. The Yugoslav amendment was originally proposed in C.P.(Gen)Doc.1.U.32. The redraft, C.P.(Gen)Docl.U.32 b, is not printed. For text of the new article based on the Yugoslav amendment ultimately adopted by the Commission, see C.P. (Plen) Doc. 27, the Commission’s Report, vol. iv, pp. 526, 531.