CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 69
The Conference convened to consider the draft treaty for Hungary and the reports of the various commissions.
M. Simic (Yugoslavia) stated that his country had no desire to diminish the responsibility of the Fascist regimes for the war against the Allies. He wondered why there were no provisions preventing fascist propaganda in the Italian Treaty as there were in the Balkan treaties. Hungary had pursued a policy of revisionism which had contributed to German and Italian imperialism. It was not, however, the Hungarian people who were responsible, but the Horthy regime and certain forces in the West. Yugoslavia had joined the League of Nations, believing in the necessity for collective security for the Danube Basin. The western countries had retreated and the Little Entente then collapsed. There had been no indivisibility of peace and security. The Danubian countries had been unable to prevent the rise of fifth columns and consequently these governments had signed pacts with the aggressors. However, Yugoslavia had challenged Hitler, and its people had resumed the struggle in which many lives were lost. Hungary’s relations with its neighbors had already taken a new course as indicated by agreements with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia regarding voluntary exchange of populations and water rights regarding the Danube. The efforts of the riparian states, however, were hampered by the retention of their ships in the American occupied zones of Austria and Germany. M. Simic stated his country expected that Hungary would now conclude an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the transfer of 200,000 Magyars. He then concluded his statement by noting that the South African Delegate had said he regretted [Page 817] the Serbs “were not on our side.” He was surprised at this remark. There was only one side as a result of this war, and that was the side of truth. But at Paris there had been brought to bear a ruthless voting system which Yugoslavia believed was not as good as general agreement. Yugoslavia had come to the Plenary Session still in the hope of arriving at such agreement. Therefore it denies the binding force of decisions made by voting. The CFM should make no decisions without the concurrence of Yugoslavia.
M. Clementis (Czechoslovakia) said his country’s relations with Hungary had been and still were unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia had not been motivated by revenge nor had it asked for territory on strategic grounds despite Hungarian aggression. Czechoslovakia had two fundamental aims—the liquidation of Munich and the Vienna decision. The former had been attained, but the effort to prevent a repetition of the fifth column in Czechoslovakia had led his delegation to request in vain the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians to Hungary. If Hungary opposed this proposal, it was to have a basis for future territorial revision. All the delegates had sympathized with the Czech’s motives and the Slav states had fully supported their amendment. However, the US and UK Delegations had contended that it was inacceptable to insert a provision for a forced transfer of peoples in the treaty, so his Delegation had withdrawn its original amendment and proposed instead bilateral negotiations. He hoped that Hungary would now recognize that it must negotiate with Czechoslovakia, and that all the nations assembled would watch the manner in which Hungary would behave. It would be tragic if this Conference should give Hungary any idea that it had been released from an obligation to negotiate on this matter. It was unfortunate that in some sections of the world press and also in Paris the Slav countries were described as satellites of the USSR. These Slav states had made great sacrifices and their cooperation should be accepted with gratitude rather than with suspicion. Czechoslovakia hoped that the proposed treaty would give Hungary a new basis for reconstruction and development, which would contribute to the economic stability and peace of the Danube Basin. That was what Czechoslovakia itself strived for.
General Smith (US) said the US gladly supported the new Czechoslovak proposal which provided for bilateral negotiations with Hungary on the minority problem. The US Delegation had stated in the Hungarian Commission meetings that although it sympathized with the motives behind the original Czechoslovak amendment to transfer the Magyars from Slovakia, it could not look with favor on incorporating into a treaty of peace the principle of a forced transfer of populations. The US consistently supported the view that the subject was [Page 818] one for bilateral negotiations between the two countries concerned and should be settled to their mutual satisfaction so as to avoid future friction. It was the opinion of the US Delegation that voluntary transfer should be stressed to the utmost and every effort including minor territorial adjustments made to the end that a minimum number of people be uprooted.
All Conference members would certainly follow with the keenest interests the course of these negotiations. The use of restraint in the treatment of those eligible for transfer would create an atmosphere of good will.
Successful conclusion of an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary would lead the US to hope that Hungary and Rumania might also seek through bilateral negotiations to solve some of their outstanding differences. (For full text, see USD(PC)(PR)–40)46
M. Manuilsky (Ukraine) said he would speak on reparations and the Danube, and only on the former because he thought the US would press its proposal to reduce the amount of reparations which Hungary would have to pay. He spoke of the Ukraine’s immense material losses. If all Hungarian reparations went to Ukraine, it would amount to only one-half of one percent of these losses. This suggestion for reparations reduction had come from a country which had not suffered materially during the war and had not been bombed. It had in fact enriched itself. It was an unfriendly act by the US against those who had suffered. It would seem that there was more sympathy towards yesterday’s aggressor than yesterday’s victims of aggression. There appeared to be other ways to help Hungary, i.e., restitution. In regards to the Danube, he said M. Molotov and M. Kardelj had shown how artificial was the idea of linking control of the Danube into the treaties. The US and UK wished to solve the Danube problem against the will of the USSR and those riparian states which that country had liberated. After liberation, the Danubian peoples had believed that victory over Germany would remove political and economic aggression against small states. Since-the original Danube regime was established 90 years ago, the world had gone through two wars. People had changed. What other motive was there in this present proposal but a desire to dominate small states? For the first time the Danubian countries wanted to be free economically. M. Manuilsky then pointed out that the USSR had never been asked to participate in the 1921 convention and was still left outside. The Ukrainian Delegation could not recognize the previous votes taken in the Rumanian and Bulgarian treaties regarding the Danube. He noted that the French proposal had not received a two-thirds majority in the Commission [Page 819] where the members were those who had actually participated in the war. The two-thirds majority had only been gained in Plenary Session by virtue of the votes of countries who were not at war with the satellite states and far removed from them. He concluded by asking the CFM to take into account the Ukrainian Delegation’s views.
- For text of Ambassador Smith’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 27, 1946, p. 744.↩