Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

Memorandum by the Hungarian Minister (Szegedy-Maszak)

1). The forthcoming peace treaties will establish the framework within which the people of Eastern Europe shall live after the ordeal of World War II and the uncertainties of the armistice period. It is obvious that the peace will involve hardships for a conquered nation like Hungary, but in the interest of the peace itself these hardships must not be greater than those of the war or of the armistice period. A peace worthy of the name must differ from war and from the armistice period, the latter having been a simple continuation of the war by political, economic and sometimes even by military means. Otherwise peace will be just another word for conquest, and for the sake of peace it would perhaps be better to admit this.

The worst hardship—if the peace treaties would simply legalize the iron curtain and thus further consolidate the partition of Europe—would not be for Hungary alone but for all of Eastern Europe. If isolated economically, spiritually and politically from the rest of the world, Eastern Europe, exhausted by the war, crushed by the tremendous burden of two occupations and the actual fighting on its soil in the period in between, would soon become completely integrated into the Eastern system. This could happen in spite of its traditions and interests, and in the case of Hungary, in spite of its freely expressed will.

The equality of small nations, solemnly assured by many documents and public statements, cannot be boiled down to a consolidation of the status of satellite, with only a change in the imposed overlord. The punishment for having been a satellite—and an involuntary one—must not be a continuation of the condition of being a satellite. This would destroy the faith in principles and would justify all that has been said of the supremacy of force.

Eastern Europe is a vital part of the Old World. Two wars were begun in this area, and at least partially provoked by conditions prevailing there. The control of Eastern Europe has always been a very important factor in the attempt to control the whole of Europe and, in the light of the experiences of two wars, even a prerequisite thereto. Unfortunately, this importance of the region itself has never enabled its inhabitants to decide their own fate, for they have been divided among themselves and have had to face overwhelming force, to which they could not but succumb.

Europe is one entity, and therefore cannot be cut into two parts. The fate of Western Europe is closely connected with that of Eastern Europe, and what is happening on and to the Danube or the Vistula is at least likely to happen also to the Rhine. The iron curtain can therefore not be regarded as a definite boundary. A similar boundary was once drawn to include the “lebensraum”, but the line of Munich, while somewhat better than the line of Godesberg, was not definite either. Although the interests of its inhabitants and the character of Eastern Europe predestine it to be a connecting link, rather than a bulwark of the West or the East, the countries of Eastern Europe have occupied an advanced position between the two.

2). The compromise reached after the long negotiations in Paris, and embodied in the draft treaties, does not indicate that there will be a substantial change in the present situation of Eastern Europe. The positions gained or lost during the past eighteen months remain as they are. It must be said in all frankness that this is not an especially happy development, because it appears to vest with finality a situation which has been regarded as a transition period, after which the pledges of the Atlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit of the Yalta Agreement would be implemented, and the nations concerned could restore their public and economic life along the lines which they desired. It looks, however, as if what was once the “lebensraum” would be continued as a sphere of influence, with all that this implies.

Unfortunately, it cannot be expected that the people of this region should live and act as if there was one world, when they actually are living and acting in another, separate world. The dominant factors in this world are the presence and continuous intervention of large occupying forces, and the presence and continuous pressure of the communists or the communist-dominated groups. The two-fold pressure is coordinated and directed toward the same goal: to expand and intensify the over-all influence of the occupying power; to expand and intensify the power of the minority groups; to restrict and ultimately exclude all kinds of influence by the rest of the world.

The veto power in the international councils gives an idea of the methods which the occupying power and the communist party are using in the Eastern European countries that are governed by Allied Control Commissions and coalition Governments. But the positional advantage of the Russians dealing with an occupied country and of the communist party dealing with the majority parties is quite different from that held in the Security Council or at the Conference of Foreign Ministers. One must have had experience in bargaining under duress, against overwhelming force, to realize how difficult, humiliating and hopeless this situation may be. And one cannot blame the statesmen of these occupied countries if they are not more successful in advancing their aims than were the Western Powers in the respective Allied Control Commissions or in their protests against the Russian definition of German assets, under the Potsdam Agreement.

What has happened recently in Hungary is typical. The Prime Minister was able to resist the demands of the communist-dominated left wing parties, but when the Russians presented the same demands, he had to yield. In view of the experiences of the past eighteen months, Mr. Nagy had to arrive at the conclusion that the USSR is the dominant power in Eastern Europe, and on the eve of the peace treaties he could not take the risk of an open conflict with the USSR. He might have acted somewhat differently, but the main fact remains: he had to take into account the possibility of the two worlds, as they are now taking shape in the peace treaties.

The developments in the Polish situation are also very instructive. It was openly admitted that Mr. Mikolayczik must not win the election, because Russia would not tolerate it. In Hungary, Mr. Nagy won the first free elections in the Russian zone. If it is more or less openly admitted by the Great Powers that nothing decisive can be done against Russian domination in Eastern Europe, how can the elected majorities and the Governments within the Russian zone itself accomplish anything about it?

3). The United States has thus far done the most to prevent the definite partition of Europe, The words and deeds of the Government of the United States have been a substantial contribution toward maintaining at least the hope of an eventual settlement on the basis of one world. In the case of Hungary, the granting of UNRRA relief and of a $15 million surplus property loan, the release of Hungarian displaced property—these three most important factors in the economic rehabilitation of the country—are evidence of the sympathetic and understanding attitude of the United States.

Unfortunately, the draft of the peace treaty in its present form is not likely to provide effective safeguards against a complete integration into the Russian world. There still exist some possibilities of preventing the iron curtain from becoming total and exclusive,—of preventing the peace treaties from becoming a “Charter For The Iron Curtain”, as it was put in a weekly magazine. A few points were left open by the compromise in Paris and are to be settled by or after the 21-nations conference. If there is a proper settlement, i.e., if the views of the United States Government prevail in these matters, and the principles laid down eventually are implemented, Eastern Europe and Hungary will be able to find the road back to the community of free peoples.

The issues are as follows:

I. Freedom of Navigation on the Danube.

In this respect it should be pointed out that a simple statement of the principle itself or a mere recommendation to this effect will not assure the actual freedom of this vital waterway, the gap between principles and their implementation being rather wide in Eastern Europe. In disposing of the question, it should be definitely stated how the principles are to be given effect, and a definite obligation should be imposed on the riparian states. It would seem to be desirable to take into consideration the 50–50 per cent navigation agreements between Russia on the one hand and Roumania and Hungary on the other, since these establish exclusive monopolies for port and other facilities. Incidentally, it must be observed that the Hungarian-Russian treaty of navigation is decisively affected by the definition of German assets under the Potsdam Agreement, inasmuch as the main Russian contribution to the joint enterprise is the coal mines and other properties of the Austrian Donau Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft which existed long before 1938.

II. Freedom of Trade in the Danubian Countries.

Under normal conditions, trade in this region was far more westbound than eastbound. A shift to the east is possible, of course, and may even be desirable, but only on a commercial basis. The standard of living of these war and inflation-ridden populations can hardly be raised unless they are permitted to profit by their trade, that is to exchange their goods for commodities which they need or for a free currency with which to buy these commodities elsewhere. To its own disadvantage, Hungary has not been permitted thus far to grant landing rights to commercial air lines, other than those Russian-controlled. Equal opportunities for all nations should be provided for in the peace treaties.

III. Reparations.

The Hungarian economy is gravely suffering under the reparations as fixed in the armistice agreement and subsequent bilateral instruments. Reparations are indeed regarded as the paramount reason for Hungary’s economic plight, as expressed in the unprecedented inflation. It is therefore questionable whether improvement can be achieved without a preliminary revision of the reparations obligations. The Government of the United States has long since recognized the necessity of a tripartite inquiry into the Hungarian economic situation, and Secretary Byrnes has reserved the right to discuss the total amount of the reparations. It is highly desirable, therefore, that reparations should be fixed in accordance with Hungary’s productive capacity, and should not be used to exert both political and economic pressure.

IV. Occupation.

The occupying army in Hungary has been reduced during the last six months, but its presence still constitutes a heavy economic and political burden. Pending the evacuation of Austria, it would be possible to secure the lines of communication with an even more reduced army.

V. Minorities in Czechoslovakia.

It is understood that Mr. Molotov intends to raise the question of the forced transfer of Hungarians, as planned by Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is a victorious state, one of the United Nations, but even this fortunate circumstance should not permit that country to expel hundreds of thousands of Hungarians, who have already been deprived of all of their human political rights. The United States is opposed to harsh and vindictive treaties. But can there be anything more vindictive and more harsh than artificially to create hundreds of thousands of individual underdogs, and throw them into an already overcrowded and poor country? Neither should the unwritten most unfavored nations clause, prevailing in Eastern Europe, be forgotten. If the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia are to be expelled, the expulsion of Hungarians in Yugoslavia or Roumania may follow very soon. Safeguards of the elementary human rights, including the right to domicile and property, must be included in the peace treaties if unavoidable hardships are to be reduced to a minimum. Territory and the people who live on it belong together. If Czechoslovakia desires to keep the territory in question, it must also keep the inhabitants. But if Czechoslovakia wishes to get rid of the Hungarians at any cost, the territory necessary to their living should also be given up.

VI. Rectification of the Hungarian Roumanian Border. In spite of the extremely mixed character of the population of this area, a fair possibility exists of returning to Hungary a substantial number of Hungarians without including an equal number of aliens. The psychological effect of such a measure would be tremendous on the Hungarians, who again see themselves as the only underdog in Eastern Europe.

4). According to official statements, the Hungarian Delegation will be granted the right to state its case freely at the 21-nations conference. Unfortunately, however, this is not only a question of rules of procedure. In consequence of the conditions referred to above, the Hungarian Government is not a free agent. Its activities and decisions are limited beyond the terms of the armistice agreement, either by the direct intervention of the occupying power or by the steady and aggressive pressure of its Hungarian agents.

It is therefore doubtful whether the Hungarian Delegation in Paris will be permitted to state its own views and its own aims on fundamental issues which directly affect the basic policies of the occupying power. It may be recalled in this respect that the Hungarian Government delegation on its recent visit to Washington did not raise questions which were known to be controversial between the Great Powers. The interests of Hungary and those of Eastern Europe are identical with the principles and aims of the American Government. An open stand in favor of these principles, however, would be considered by Russia as an unfriendly, if not a hostile act, and Russia not only is on the spot but will probably stay there. Hungary is thwarted in her efforts to pierce the iron curtain, and Russia is in a position to make Hungary pay for such attempts, just as Russia has already collected a rather high price for the results of the free and unfettered elections.

The only remaining hope for Eastern Europe and Hungary is centered in the United States. The last opportunity to realize this hope will be at the conference in Paris. But the representatives of the peoples directly involved will not be able to speak freely, since they must live in that other world, and their people must try to survive, even though the iron curtain should be finally closed down.

The issues could be settled according to the principles of American policy and in the genuine interest of Eastern Europe by the 21-nations conference, under the strong leadership of the United States. The firm voice and the firm attitude of America, backed by a majority of the twenty-one nations, can achieve a great act of liberation. Eastern Europe cannot achieve this by its own power, but will surely respond to such an act even if, as a consequence of the dire realities of power politics, it should be reduced to a farewell message to the small nations submerging into that other world.

Washington , July 23, 1946.