CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 25
The Chairman read a letter addressed to him by the Polish Delegation, which stated that the Polish Delegation, in accordance with Section I (3) (c) of the Rules of Procedure, wished to be heard in connection with the economic clauses of the Rumanian and Hungarian [Page 282] treaties.58 The Chairman said that he had invited the Polish Delegation to attend the meeting, as the question of reparation, on which the Polish Delegation had submitted an amendment [C.P.(Gen)Doc.1.O.7], was to be discussed.
Mr. Walker (Australia) then made an explanatory statement with reference to the Australian amendment to Article 22 (Reparation) of the Rumanian treaty [C.P. (Gen.) Doc.1.B.24]. He noted that similar amendments were being proposed for each of the five treaties, that the Australian Delegation was raising a question as to the general approach to the reparation problem, and that the amendment to Article 22 should be considered in this light. Australia did not object to the principle of reparation payments by ex-enemies, but it was vitally interested that the reparation settlement should not be such as to interfere with the establishment of conditions conducive to a lasting European peace. Australia regarded it as essential that the reparation settlement should not lead to the economic collapse of the paying countries or threaten their independence. As to the specific provisions of Article 22, Australia agreed that the USSR should receive reparation from Rumania and that, if Poland could substantiate its claim, Poland’s right to reparation should also be recognized. Australia agreed that Rumania should make reparation only in part. However, Australia disliked the proposal that the Peace Conference should fix the sum of 300 million dollars and that this should be paid in goods in accordance with bilateral agreements between the USSR and Rumania. Australia recognized that it might have been necessary to set such terms in the Armistice Agreement, which had to be drawn in haste, without a full knowledge of conditions, and was designed for a state of war rather than for the establishment of lasting peace. The Armistice Agreement should therefore be regarded as a temporary arrangement pending the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. The treaty should provide for a full investigation of the relevant facts before the reparation burden was established. For these reasons Australia proposed that the following principles should be adopted: (1) that claims should be stated in detail; (2) that a competent authority (Reparation Commission) should be established to examine the claims and to be informed of the deliveries which have already been made, so that account could be taken of such deliveries; (3) that this authority should determine how much additional reparation should be made, taking into consideration Rumania’s capacity to pay; (4) that payments should not be made in goods after the signing of the treaty, but that Rumania should be obligated to turn over as payment a certain portion of its annual foreign exchange receipts from exports. The Australian [Page 283] Delegation believed that this would be advantageous to the recipients and would avoid an invasion of Rumania’s sovereignty. The Reparation Commission would be a permanent body to hear claims, to determine capacity to pay and the total amount to be paid, to allocate shares among the various recipients, to collect and pay over the reparation, and to execute the reparation provisions of the treaty. The Reparation Commission should determine the total amount to be paid within six months of the signing of the treaty.
The Greek representative admitted the wisdom and sound principles underlying the Australian amendment, but wished to suggest another principle which should be considered, namely, that an aggressor should not be allowed, by reason of inadequate reparation payments, to recover more quickly than a victim of aggression.
M. Molotov (USSR) strongly attacked the Australian proposal59 on the following grounds: (1) it would completely upset the Armistice terms, which had been accepted by the CFM and embodied in the draft Peace Treaty. In this connection he observed that the Rumanian Armistice had been published in full on the day it was concluded, whereas the world was still ignorant of the terms of the Italian Armistice.60 He himself wondered why the terms of the Italian Armistice had not been published, and wondered, though he did not assert it as a fact, whether the explanation was that it was desired to keep certain terms secret. (2) Rumania had not objected to the reparation terms. (3) The Australian proposal would indefinitely postpone the reparation settlement and seemed to indicate a desire to leave as many questions open as possible, a principle which could only serve the interests of aggressive and reactionary elements. (4) The proposal would not be conducive to friendly relations between the USSR and Rumania, or to peace in Europe and the world. (5) It would make Rumania dependent on the dollar and the pound, that is, on the US and the UK. (6) The effect of the proposal would be to nullify reparation for the USSR, which would strike a heavy blow at the rehabilitation of the USSR, whose people could never forget the terrible losses suffered at the hands of Germany and its satellites. (7) He did not believe that the proposal was in the interest of the Australian people, and thought that when the Australian Delegation considered the consequences of its proposal, it might withdraw the proposal. In conclusion he proposed that the Commission decline the Australian proposal—a proposal which, he noted, no one had requested the Australians to make—as incorrect and prejudicial to good relations between the Allies and to a durable peace and that the Commission approve Article 22 as drafted by the CFM.
- The Polish letter is not printed; for text of the Rules of Procedure, see vol. iv, p. 796.↩
- For text of Molotov’s statement, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, p. 130.↩
- Regarding the publication of the terms of the Italian Armistice, see footnote 74, p. 182.↩