811.34553B/7–1646: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received July 17—2:25 a.m.]
615. For the eyes of the Secretary only from Russell.55 The Ambassador and I saw Salazar at 11 o’clock this morning and made the following statement to him:
“Mr. President: I appreciate this opportunity to meet you, to bring you the personal respects of Secretary Byrnes and to discuss with you in broad outline the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement between our two Governments for the use of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands in the interest of security in the Atlantic. I wish to emphasize to you the importance and deep concern with which my Government views this question and the personal interest which the Secretary of State has in it. It is our feeling that since Portugal and the US are both important Atlantic powers, you and your Government are likewise vitally interested in this matter and that there exists a mutually advantageous basis upon which our two Governments may agree concerning their own security and that of the world. I feel assured in my own mind, therefore, that we can in a friendly and forthright way discuss this whole question and quickly determine the character and extent of the basis upon which agreement can be reached.
The Government of the US desires to come to an agreement with Portugal for joint use and operation of extensive airbase rights and privileges in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. Frankly we feel that such a contribution by Portugal to Atlantic and world security is definitely in Portugal’s interest as well as our own. Since the conclusion of the May discussions Mr. Byrnes has given earnest study to your statements concerning Portugal’s own security position. It has been our understanding that in the absence of certain assurances from the Government of the US, the Government of Portugal would find it difficult to extend to the US the rights and privileges we desire.
The Secretary has asked me to come here in order to submit for your consideration an assurance such as has never been proposed by the Government of the US to any power outside of the Western Hemisphere. This assurance would contemplate an understanding that any threat to the territorial security of Portugal would constitute a threat to the security of the Atlantic and of the world as a whole and would therefore represent a problem of paramount interest to the Government of the US. Furthermore, were Portugal to be the victim of aggression the US, by reason of its commitments under the United Nations, is obliged to use force against any aggressor in the maintenance of peace. Should the United Nations through the Security Council fail for any reason to act in the event of such aggression, the Government of the US would be prepared to consult immediately with the Portuguese Government with regard to this situation. This assurance [Page 1005] would be predicated upon the Portuguese Government granting the desired airbase rights and privileges in the Azores and in the Cape Verde Islands.
On May 2 you informed the American negotiators that you ‘do not reject in limine the possibility of Portuguese cooperation in the security of the Atlantic.’56 I appreciate that an agreement such as I have proposed would require negotiations and study by both parties. I have brought Mr. Culbertson and General Kuter with me in order that they and Ambassador Baruch may go forward with you and your Govt with such negotiations provided you feel in the light of my remarks to you that a real basis for agreement exists. As much as I would like to stay in your delightful country I must return immediately to Washington. In view of Mr. Byrnes’ personal interest in this question and the importance which he attaches to it, however, I am anxious to give him as full a report as possible upon my return. I, therefore, hope that you can advise me before I leave whether you consider that a basis for agreement does exist and whether you would be prepared to undertake negotiations to that end.
Should your answer to my inquiry be in the affirmative, I would suggest that immediate consideration be given to the effect which such expected agreement would have on the May 30th agreement. In any event a reexamination of that agreement and mutual understanding of its interpretation is essential.”
After the President of the Council had read this memorandum I inquired specifically whether I could say to the Department of State on the basis of his quick review of this memorandum without any final commitment on his part that he felt this provided a basis for a final agreement on long term base rights. He replied that he was “not unfavorable” to the suggestion but that the whole idea would require further study. The President then reviewed previous negotiations referring (1) to commercial rights, (2) transit rights in support of our occupation forces and (3) long term airbase rights. He said that the first question had been solved and that the second was “liquidated” by the agreement of May 30th leaving for discussion only the third question on which we had submitted a proposal for study. He expressed the view that our proposal met the requirements of what he described as a “juridical” basis but that there were other considerations. These he said were that Portugal could not cede its territory to a foreign power or deal with a proposal for the presence of foreign troops on her soil in time of peace. I pointedly asked if this represented a final statement on these points. He replied that he was merely stating what were “Portuguese susceptibilities”. I then emphasized that we did not ask for a cession of territory; that we recognized the [Page 1006] territorial sovereignty of Portugal but wished a joint use and operation airbases under arrangements which should be worked out in a spirit of friendliness looking to the broad objectives of the agreement itself. I stated however that any agreement would be useless if we were not permitted to use military personnel because we would expect to install facilities which would be available only for military purposes and could be operated only by our military personnel. He then wished to know what specific uses we wished to make of the airbases. After stating that this was a technical question which I would prefer for the negotiators to discuss in detail I said that we wished (1) the right to base military planes, (2) transit rights and (3) the right to install communications, meteorological and other facilities essential to the most modern airbases. He then discussed the agreement of May 30th which he considers as final. After I had stated that we wished to observe the agreement but felt that there must be some discussion of its interpretation, he said that he thought these questions could be easily resolved but that the presence of his Minister of War was necessary for the discussion and that his Minister of War was on an inspection tour abroad until August 8. I told him we felt that these discussions should proceed at once and inquired if he could not recall the Minister for this purpose. He then wished to know which of the two discussions we wanted to take up first and I replied that we wished to discuss both immediately and simultaneously and that we regarded time as of the essence in both cases. While he expressed some reluctance for simultaneous discussions, he said that he would accede to our request. I then told him that the Ambassador, Mr. Culbertson and General Kuter were at present available for discussion of both matters at such time and with such personnel as he should designate on behalf of his Govt.
In conclusion I again asked whether it was agreeable with him for me to state to you on my return that on the basis of our discussion and his hurried examination of the memorandum he felt there existed a reasonable basis for negotiating an agreement for long term airbase rights. He authorized me to say that he did.
Sent to Dept as No. 615; repeated to Paris as No. 96 for Matthews only. [Russell.]