811.345533/8–1540: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:05 p.m.]
727. For Hickerson from Culbertson. Am at a bit of a loss to know how to answer rtel August 1268 since Emtel 698 gives basic Portuguese proposal or offer. We have not been able to obtain improvement in or more details on that proposal. We have no statement of what [Page 1015] they want (I presume you mean the political formula). They have however made quite clear that they do not consider our draft as being satisfactory. From what little we have been able to get out of them I anticipate they will ask for a formula which would commit us to come to their immediate military aid in the event Portugal or any of her territories were attacked and that action would not be dependent on Security Council. I reminded Foreign Office yesterday of my suggestion we discuss the political formula. So far no response.
We had another fruitless meeting with Portuguese group Tuesday afternoon.69 We have endeavored to educate this group to a point where they will understand the requirements essential to a satisfactory air base and why Portugal could not maintain and operate such a base. Colonel Lopes … has no hesitation in arguing with Kuter on aerial requirements and strategy. However, even when we apparently get them to a point of understanding they drag out … inability to have foreign troops on Portuguese territory in peace time and then we find ourselves back where we started. We did get some small acceptance from them yesterday that if we were to train Portuguese personnel we would have to have American military personnel on the base.… They want to talk in terms of limited periods of time. Unless this Portuguese group receives radically different instructions the greatest improvement we can expect in their conditions would include American fighter group at Lagens with an Operational Training Unit title and function. This OTU would be expected to scale its strength rapidly as Portuguese substitutes were trained. Extensive training in the States would be required only the operational phase taking place in the Azores. The permanent basing of American VHB will not be accepted. On the other hand the building of all necessary VHB facilities is within the Portuguese concept. We might be able to obtain agreement on occasional brief visits by American VHB units in the Azores. They are thinking only in terms of a purely defensive base which they think they can operate with restricted amount of help from American technical personnel and a maximum American contribution of equipment and money. I feel quite sure we are not now going to get any basic change in that thinking nor will it come as a result of long weeks of negotiation and talk. It might come some time in the future if the Portuguese try to run an air base themselves and find if they will ever admit it that they are incapable either technically or financially to do so. Even so it would not necessarily follow that experience would modify their position on sovereignty and susceptibilities which gets repeated every time we see any of the Portuguese. They assume an attitude of our asking for a favor which if granted would jeopardize their [Page 1016] independence of action and position and would subject them to attack from any potential enemy of the US. We told them last week that if they considered our proposal as being one-sided, purely selfish and not in equal mutual interest we might or will [as well?] stop talking.
We got a new sidelight Tuesday from a non-official Portuguese citizen, one who is very close to Salazar. Salazar apparently feels that if he permits American “occupation” of Portuguese territory in time of peace he will be placing in the hand of the opposition a weapon and talking points which might well be used to whip up national pride and sentiment to point of causing Salazar’s downfall. If Salazar really feels this way our chances of getting any favorable modification of the Portuguese proposals are practically nil. I would guess that Salazar probably does feel that way and that to give us what we want would be a contradiction of his publicly announced policy.… We tried to plant the thought that the opposition may effectively criticize Salazar’s refusal of an opportunity to strengthen his ties with the US.
I think your decision will be whether we are prepared to give a political guarantee to Portugal and to undertake a commitment to assist financially and technically in the maintenance of a purely Portuguese air base which would be immediately available to us in the event of a war in which Britain and US would be co-belligerents. If the answer is no you will have to decide whether we are to hang on here for a long period of time trying to improve the proposals. If I were given a vote in these two decisions mine would be negative. We can now see the maximum improvement we might obtain as a result of continued negotiations (para 2 above) and we do not consider such improvement worthwhile since the proposal would still be such a far cry from what we want as to make it unacceptable.
It would be our recommendation that we tell the Portuguese that we regret our inability to arrive at an understanding at this time, say that our proposals will remain open if at some future date they feel an agreement along the lines we have proposed is feasible and then see whether time and experience will give them such practical education as to result in their adopting a different view of sovereignty and susceptibilities and in their developing a realistic appreciation of a time and other factors in modern warfare (perhaps this is too much to expect).
Our recommendations do not take into consideration the possibility of strong British support and participation or support from any other source if there is any. There is no particular reason to feel, however, that British or other support would in fact materially alter present Portuguese position.
Sent Dept 727, repeated Paris 129 for Secdel. [Culbertson.]