811.34553B/9–346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:12 p.m.]
777. For Hickerson from Culbertson. Mathias lunched with the Ambassador and me yesterday. He was told of our intention to recess discussions for the time being, that it is our feeling that considerable progress had been made in the development of American-Portuguese relations and understanding although our proposals and theirs were still considerably far apart and that it was my intention to return in a few days to Washington in order to be in a position to explain in person rather than by telegram the course and progress of our discussions here. Mathias seemed somewhat taken aback by this and took the attitude that we were breaking off negotiations entirely. I think we were able to straighten him out on that score and that he has now accepted the recess idea. He talked at great length of his hopes [Page 1018] and aspirations to develop and build closer ties between our two countries, ties that would stand the test of time in the years to come, etc., etc.
It was obvious throughout the whole discussions that Mathias is resentful of and maybe antagonistic toward the understanding Kissner has been so successful in reaching with the Minister of War. He directly implied that we were calling a halt to our present long term discussions because we were getting indirectly all we wanted under the arrangement with the Minister of War. I am afraid he may try to throw a monkey-wrench into the works. With much gesticulation he outlined what he had had in mind when he proposed the language of the May 30 Agreement emphasizing that the transit rights did not envisage the maintenance of troops at Lagens, just a few technicians, no hospital or anything like that.… War Minister is expected to sign memorandum of understanding tomorrow.
I received this morning at 10 o’clock from Admiral De Souza the memorandum quoted below. It is dated August 31 but I wonder whether the timing of its delivery does not have some connection with the conversation with Mathias yesterday.
“As a result of the conversations which have taken place between the two delegations and after a closer examination of the conditions under which Portugal will cooperate with the United States and the United Kingdom to the security of the Atlantic the Portuguese position may be summarized as follows:
- “1. In case of war, in the hypothesis which has been considered and during the period of effectiveness of the agreement which may be entered into for the purpose and once guarantees which are deemed sufficient have been obtained Portugal will cooperate with the US and the United Kingdom placing at the disposal of the American and British air forces for the time of duration of the war and for use without restrictions the air bases of the Azores. These bases will be served through certain ports where the necessary facilities will be granted.
- “2. The Portuguese Government cannot acquiesce to the establishment of American or British forces in its bases in the Azores in times of peace.
- “3. Portugal with the object of giving its cooperation in the most effective form compatible with its possibilities intends already in times of peace to take certain steps and would therefore desire to know: (a) the improvements which the American delegation understands as convenient to be made to the installations either from the technical point of view or from the military point of view for a more efficient use in warfare so as to examine up to what point it will be possible to give satisfaction; (b) the plan of training of the Portuguese Air Force in American and British schools so that its personnel may conveniently familiarize itself with the new equipment to be utilized.”
At Mathias’ invitation I lunched alone with him today. He had talked with Salazar last night who according to Mathias was greatly [Page 1019] disturbed about recessing the discussions and also about the terms of the Kissner-Minister of War agreement. Apparently the Minister of War has not kept Lisbon informed of the character of the agreement and had, again according to Mathias, far exceeded his authority. Mathias did not know what Salazar would do. He did say that if the understanding were approved he would submit his resignation to Salazar and to prove his point reached in his pocket and produced his letter of resignation. On the other hand if Salazar disavows the Minister of War that could possibly produce a Cabinet crisis. From Mathias’ point of view things are really snarled up.
It again came out that Mathias feels that we think we have put a fast one over by means of getting the Minister of War to agree to what we want and we are not therefore interested in continuing long term discussions. I told him the two had nothing to do with each other and that I fully expected to see us resume long term discussions in the not too distant future. Mathias’ attitude does not surprise me since I never have been able to figure out how the Minister of War could commit the Portuguese Government to our keeping several hundred troops at Lagens in time of peace when at the same time here in Lisbon Salazar and the Foreign Office were telling us such a thing was not possible under a long term understanding.
Mathias reiterated several times this afternoon that the Kissner-Minister of War negotiations had caused him and Dr. Salazar to lose faith in negotiating with Americans; that when the American Army once got in a place they would never leave; that he could assure me that notice would be given that there would be no extension of the present 18 months May 30 Agreement; that the presence of American troops in Portuguese territory in time of peace was impossible of acceptance.
He spent considerable time in extolling the possibilities of a long term understanding by which we could have use of any Portuguese territory in time of conflict or if we thought conflict imminent we could move in bombers for a short period of time etc., etc., always however we guaranteeing Portugal and her territories.
I don’t like the way the atmosphere has changed and although I am anxious to get home I feel I should stand by a few days longer than I had planned and will do so unless you instruct to the contrary.72
Sent Department 777, repeated Paris for Delsec as 140. [Culbertson.]
- Department agreed with Mr. Culbertson’s decision to stay.↩